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GREGORY S. WEBER"

Twenty Years of Local Groundwater
Export Legislation in California:
Lessons from a Patchwork Quilt
ABSTRACT
Over the last 20 years, in response to actual or threatened water
development projects, eight California counties have enacted
ordinances that attempt to restrict the export of groundwater from
those counties. State legislation enacted in 1992 may encourage a
new wave of such local groundwater restrictions. In an effort to
evaluate the appropriatenessof using the eight extent ordinancesas
models for further local legislation, the articledescribesand critiques
the current ordinances against the backdrop both of fundamental
hydrogeologicalconcepts and the Californiadecisional and statutory
law on the acquisitionand transfer of groundwaterrights. In particular, the article exhaustively analyzes the texts of each of the
ordinances, both individually and in comparison to the texts of the
other ordinances. The analysis points out numerous instances of
vague, ambiguous, or hydrologically inappropriatedrafting. To the
extent that these eight ordinances may become models for a new
wave of state approved locally initiated groundwater management
legislation, the articlesummarizes drafting lessons learned from the
current ordinancesand suggests problems to avoid. Finally,drawing
from the lessons learned from the eight ordinances, the article
broadly criticizes the wisdom of allowing this kind of local management of a state resource. It concludes that the state's ad hoc
approach to groundwater issues has resulted in an incoherent policy
that can ultimately only be remedied by greater state direction and
control over local management efforts.,
I. INTRODUCTION
Groundwater has been an important water source for California's
farms and cities throughout this century.' Groundwater basins underlie
* Associate Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific
Sacramento, CA
1. California Dep't Of Water Resources, Bulletin 118, California's Ground Water 20-24
(1975) [hereinafter Bulletin 118-75]. Groundwater basins have several advantages over
surface storage: "(1) A groundwater aquifer can act as a distribution system; (2) evaporation
from groundwater basins is insignificant compared with that from surface reservoirs; (3)
groundwater basins provide natural treatment and purification for both naturally

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

about 40 percent of California lands.' On average, groundwater provides
40-45 percent of the state's annual applied water needs, and about 25
percent of the state's annual net water demands.3
The two droughts that have struck California in the last 16 years
have focused the attention of many California water providers on the
state's extensive groundwater supplies. In a drought, groundwater is
like money in a bank.' Over millennia, nature made the original deposits
into the account.6 During wet years, natural and artificial groundwater

percolating and artificially recharged water; (4) surface systems, including distribution, may
be destroyed during catastrophes such as earthquakes or acts of war; (5) groundwater often
provides emergency drought relief." D. Jaquette & N. Moore, Efficient Water Use In
California: Groundwater Use And Management 3-4 (1978). Other than shortages and the
costs of extraction, the principal problems associated with groundwater development have
involved quality degradation. Id. at 4.
2. Jaquette & Moore, supra note 1, at 5.
3. See California Dep't Of Water Resources, Bulletin 160-87, The California Water Plan:
Outlook In 1987 55 (1987) [hereinafter Bulletin 160-871 (distinguishing applied and net water
demand).
In the early 1970s, groundwater represented about 24 percent of the net water
demand. See California Dep't Of Water Resources, Bulletin 160-74, The California Water
Plan: Outlook In 1974 55 (1974). About half of the groundwater pumped in an average water
year represented "reuse of water percolated from applications of excess surface water." Id.
The 1985 contribution of groundwater to net water use is nearly identical to the earlier
figures. See Bulletin 160-87, supra, Statistical App. at 30 (sum of "groundwater" and
"overdraft," divided into total net water use.) Estimates of groundwater's relative
contribution to the total state applied water use varies. For example, the Department of
Water Resources concludes that groundwater provides 40 percent of the applied water
demands, while surface water supplies provide the remaining 60 percent. See, e.g., Bulletin
118-75, supra note 1, at 3; California Dep't of Water Resources, California's Continuing
Drought 1987-1991 16 (1991) (40 percent of applied water) [hereinafter, Continuing Drought
Ill. Professor Zachary Smith ascribes to groundwater 45 percent of applied water supplies.
Z. Smith, Groundwater in the West 53 (1989) (45 percent) [hereinafter Groundwater In The
West]. The differences in estimate between these and other studies stem from the lack of
documentation of much of the actual pumping occurring in the largely unregulated
groundwater basins. See Jaquette & Moore, supra note 1, at 8. n.11.
4. Water years begin on October 1 of the preceding calendar year. For example, water
year 1991 began on October 1, 1990. See, e.g., California Dep't of Water Resources,
California's Continuing Drought vii (1991). Since water year 1976, runoff in the important
Sacramento River system has been considered critically dry in seven of the sixteen
completed water years. See, e.g., California Dep't of Water Resources, The Hydrology of the
1987-1992 California Drought, Technical Information Paper (1992) (see charts 9 & 11). The
first two of these critically dry years formed the 1976-77 drought. The remaining five have
occurred during the 1987-1992 drought.
5. See, e.g., R. Howitt & C. Nuckton, Is Overdrafting Groundwater Always Bad?, Cal. Agric.
10 (1982) ("Like money in the bank, groundwater can be spent now or saved for the
future.").
6. The Department of Water Resources estimates that the usable storage capacity of the
underground basins is 143 million acre-feet. Bulletin 118-75, supranote 1,at 7. Many of these
basins are still full. Id. The usable storage space represents more than three times the total
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recharge can add net deposits to the account. 7 During dry years,
Californians withdraw this groundwater for municipal, industrial and
agricultural uses." If carefully managed, the water levels in the basin will
remain stable at optimal levels, and the resource can be used perpetual9
ly.
In many parts of the state, however, the groundwater account is
way overdrawn." State wide, average annual groundwater extractions

storage capacity of the state's surface reservoirs. Governor's Commission To Review
California Water Rights Law, Final Report 138 (1978) [hereinafter Final Report).
7. Each year, rainfall, snowmelt and stream seepage percolate an average of 5.8 million
acre-feet of natural recharge. Bulletin 160-87, supra note 3, at 31. In addition to natural
recharge, more than 65 artificial groundwater recharge projects have added to the "deposits"
in several areas of the state. Id. at 35-36. Annually, these projects add approximately 1.4
million acre-feet of water. Id. at 36. The averages do not demonstrate the relatively greater
contributions of wet years to the quantities of water available in the state's groundwater
basins. See, e.g., id. at 37; see also California Dep't Of Water Resources, Groundwater Trends
In The San Joaquin Valley 9-15 (1990) [hereinafter San Joaquin Groundwater).
The preceding pamphlet's title raises a nomenclature question. Consistent with
Department of Water Resources practice, the pamphlet spells "groundwater" as two words:
ground water. Many other authors, however, spell "groundwater" as one word. See, e.g.,
Howitt & Nuckton, supra note 5. Some hyphenate the word: "ground-water." See, e.g., J.
Holzschuh, Ground-WaterMining: An Often Misused Term, 25 Ground Water 346 (1987). The
legislative bodies considered in this article show no consistency. For example, the Imperial
County ordinance spells "groundwater" as two words. See, e.g., Imperial County, Cal.,
Codified Ordinances at § 56201 (a) (1972) (amended 1978). Other ordinances in other
counties spell "groundwater" as one word. See, e.g., Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And
Development Code § L-X 6.2 (F) (1988). Occasionally, ordinances spell "groundwater" both
as two words and as one word in the same sentence! See, e.g., Tehama County, Cal., Code §
9.40.010.10 (1992). The different spellings seem only different conventions, without any legal
or hydrological significance. For convenience and uniformity, this article spells
"groundwater" as one unhyphenated word regardless of the particular spelling in the
original source quoted.
8. During both the 1976-77 and the 1987-1992 drought, groundwater extractions increased
substantially. For example, during the 1976-77 drought, Californians drilled, deepened or
repaired an estimated 28,000 wells. Final Report, supra note 6, at 138. In the San Joaquin
basin, reliance on groundwater as a proportion of applied water demands went from 41
percent in 1975 to 66 percent in 1977. Id. at 139. In the Tulare Basin it went from 54 percent
to 84 percent during the same period. Id. Similarly, the 1987-92 drought also saw a doubling
of well drilling and considerable drops in groundwater levels in the San Joaquin Valley. See
Continuing Drought 11, supra note 3, at 16.
The integrated, active management of groundwater and surface water is called
"conjunctive operation" or "conjunctive use." See, e.g., Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 4; see
generally D. Jaquette, Efficient Water Use in California: Conjunctive Management of Ground
and Surface Reservoirs (1978); J.Anderson, Some Thoughts on Conjunctive Useof Groundwater
in California, 16 W. ST. U. L. REv. 559 (1989).
9. This assumes no water quality degradation. See, e.g., Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at
118,121-23. On "optimal" water table levels and basin "safe yield," see infra notes 86-109 and
accompanying text.
10. Groundwater is a "common pool" resource. See, e.g., Jaquette & Moore, supra note 1,
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have exceeded average annual replenishment by 2 to 2.5 million acre-feet
per year." The state has identified eleven "critically overdrafted"
groundwater basins. 2 In addition to these eleven basins, the state has
identified at least 42 basins where overdraft has occurred but has not yet
reached critical levels. 3 Prolonged overdraft can lead to long term
economic and environmental effects. Economic effects include increased
pumping expenses as water tables decline. 4 Environmental effects may
include land subsidence, surface vegetation reduction, and, along the
coast, saltwater intrusion into aquifers.s

at 12-13. As a "common pool" resource, groundwater lacks "clearly defined property rights
to its use when two or more pumpers extract water from the same aquifer or basin. Also,
each pumper's extraction costs depend, at least indirectly on all other pumpers' rates of
extraction .... Without a well-designed management program, individual extractors who
pursue their own self interests will cause an inefficient use of their common pool resource."
Jaquette & Moore, supra note 1, at 12.
11. Smith, supra note 3, at 54. Smith's figures come from a 1980 estimate. Id. This
represented an approximate 50 percent reduction from a 1955 estimate of 4 million acre-feet
per year of overdraft. Id.
The Department of Water Resources estimates average overdraft is 2 million acrefeet. Bulletin 160-87, supra note 3, at 31. About two thirds of this overdraft occurs in the San
Joaquin Valley. See id. at 33.
12. California Dep't Of Water Resources, Bulletin 118-80, Groundwater Basins In
California 4 (1980) [hereinafter Bulletin 118-801. A "critically overdrafted" groundwater basin
is one where "continuation of present water management practices would probably result
in significant adverse overdraft-related environmental, social, or economic impacts." Id. at
11.
13. Bulletin 118-80, supra note 12, at 5. Bulletin 118-80 identified 42 groundwater basins
"in which 1) studies have indicated overdraft, or 2) there is evidence of adverse impacts of
overdraft." Id. at 13.
14. Wells have to be deepened, pumps lowered, or more powerful pumps need to be
installed. See, e.g., Final Report, supra note 6, at 140. Pumping costs increase as water has to be
lifted higher from a declining water table. See, e.g., id.; San Joaquin Groundwater, supra note
7, at 1.Eventually, overdrafting can deplete a groundwater basin entirely, drying up the local
economy that had grown upon overdrafting the groundwater basin. Bulletin 118-75, supra note
1, at 115,119, & 129-31.
Once depletion of historical storage occurs, then all future extractions will never be
able to exceed the rate of replenishment. Z. Smith, Rewriting CaliforniaGroundwaterLaw: Past
Attempts and Prerequisitesto Reform, 20 Calif. W. L. R. 223, 255 (1984) [hereinafter Rewriting
CaliforniaGroundwater Law]. Since such a steady state eventually must occur, policy makers
need to determine whether that steady state arrives at relatively high or low aquifer levels, Id.
at 255-56. On the one hand, a steady state reached at relatively high aquifer levels can reduce
future pumping costs and provide a margin of safety for economic or environmental problems.
Id. It can also help avoid the boom/bust cycle that can accompany development and
exhaustion of "mined" groundwater basins. See Final Report, supra note 6, at 145. On the other
hand, a steady state arrived at a relatively lower aquifer level allows for greater short term
economic development. Such short term resource development may trigger infrastructural
investments that can attract long term economic investment for the overlying community.
15. See, e.g., Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 115-19; Rewriting California Groundwater Law,
supranote 14, at 223-24 (depletion, subsidence, saltwater intrusion); A. Gregory, Groundwater
and Its Future: Competing Interests and Burgeoning Markets, 11 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 229, 232-33
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Despite the importance of groundwater to the state's economy,
and the widespread evidence of overdraft, state regulation of
groundwater extraction has been minimal, especially when compared
with the extensive state legislation controlling surface water diversions.'
Calls for enactment of state groundwater control laws last reached a peak
during and shortly after the 1976-77 drought.17 The legislature was
unable to enact legislation recommended by a special governor's
commission, and a statewide groundwater management initiative was
soundly defeated." The sentiment remains strong that groundwater
should be managed locally, if at all.19
In response to the statewide regulatory vacuum, and concerned
over the local effects of groundwater extraction, local governments have
enacted local groundwater extraction regulations over the past 20
years." Many of their efforts have resulted in homegrown county
ordinances.2' In a few instances, counties have approached the
legislature for permission to create special local agencies to manage local
groundwater supplies.'
A central feature of both the county groundwater ordinances and
many of the special district acts has been provisions governing control of

(1992) (loss of surface vegetation and increased contaminant concentration).
16. See infra notes 176-214 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Rewriting CaliforniaGroundwater Law, supra note 14, at 240-42. The reform calls
following the 1976-77 drought were but one brief moment in the long history of calls for
state groundwater management. See R. Kletzing, Imported Groundwater Banking: The Kern
Water Bank-A Case Study, 19 PAC. LJ. 1225,1254-57 (1988) (outlining history of unsuccessful
efforts to develop state groundwater control legislation).
18. See A. Rossmann & M. Steel, Forging the New Water Law: Public Recognition of
"Proprietary"Groundwater Rights, 33 Hastings L.J. 903, 926-929 (1982) (reviewing failed
legislation). The failed referendum was 1982's Proposition 13. See Rewriting California
GroundwaterLaw, supra note 14, at 224.
19. See, e.g., S. Trager, California'sGroundwater: Who's in Charge?, 2 Cal. Water L & Pol'y
Rptr. (Jan. 1992) 81, 81-85. Drawing upon a University of California at Davis report,
Professor Smith cited five reasons for local opposition to groundwater management.
Groundwater in The West, supra note 3, at 65. These reasons include: 1) farmers in nonoverdrafted areas find groundwater regulation unnecessary; 2) true costs of overdrafting
may be hidden or mitigated by other trends; 3) farmers fear that groundwater management
rules will shift control to urban bureaucrats less sympathetic to agricultural needs; 4)
farmers fear reduction in irrigated acreage, and 5) new surface water supplies will offset the
overdraft before overdrafting becomes uneconomical. Id. Given these political realities, Smith
advocated that state control should be kept at a minimum. Rewriting California Groundwater
Law, supra note 14, at 252. For example, he urged that local managers should retain
authority over when and how to pump or conserve. Id.; cf. Final Report, supranote 6, at 146,
166-69, & 215.
20. See Kletzing, supra note 17, at 1261.
21. See infra notes 215-430 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 431-470 and accompanying text.
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groundwater exports from groundwater rich areas to areas of water
demand.' As drought continues, state population builds, and surface
water supplies remain inadequate to meet all demands, interest in
exporting groundwater has grown.24
These groundwater exports can take many forms. For example,
for over twenty years, the City of Los Angeles has exported groundwater
from Inyo County to Los Angeles.' During the 1976-77 drought, a Yolo
County farm proposed to pump groundwater into the Sacramento River
for transportation, via the state water project, for use in Kern County
orchards.2 In the mid-1980s, Nevada County worried that groundwater
might be exported from eastern Nevada County down the Truckee
River. ' In 1989, landowners in Mono County proposed exporting
groundwater to Southern California.' In 1991, the California Drought
Water Bank purchased the equivalent of over 250,000 acre-feet of
groundwater for transfer from Northern California to thirsty cities and
farmers along the coast and in the San Joaquin valley.29 Also in 1991,

23. See, e.g., Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-4 (Supp. 1978) (permit required to export

groundwater "outside the area in which said pumping affects the natural available water
supply"); Cal. Water Code-App. § 119-706 (West Supp. 1993) (permit needed to export water
beyond the boundaries of the Sierra Valley Groundwater Management District).
24. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 15.
25. See, e.g., Rossmann & Steel, supra note 18, at 915-16 & nn.82-85. For example, in 1970,
Los Angeles was pumping 90 cubic feet per second of water from the Owens Valley.
Rossmann & Steele, supra note 18, 916 n.85. But concerns over the effects of the City's
doubling and even quadrupling export pumping ultimately led Inyo County to enact a
groundwater management ordinance. Rossmann & Steele, supra note 18, at 914-33. See infra
notes 353-379.
26. See Anderson Farms Co., No. D14474 (Cal. St. Water Resources Control Bd. Sept. 22,
1977). The County of Yolo and others complained to the State Board over the proposed
transfer. As the Board acknowledged, ordinarily it has only "limited jurisdiction" over
groundwater. Id. at 2. Nevertheless, the Board concluded that it had jurisdiction to review
the transfer under a drought emergency delta export regulation, see 77 Cal. Regulatory
Notice Reg. 54.2 (1977) (codified at Cal. Code Reg. tit. 23, § 764.20(c)(3)) (banning exports
unless essential for emergency municipal, domestic or other "essential" uses), and under its
authority under California Constitution, art. X,§ 7, to prevent an unreasonable method of
water diversion. See Andersen Farms Co., supra, at 9, 13. Ultimately, the Board concluded
that there was insufficient evidence: 1) to exempt the proposed export from the emergency
delta export restrictions as an "essential use;" to find the proposed export was within the
public interest; and 3) to find that the proposed extraction was a reasonable method of
diversion. See Andersen Farms, Co., supra, at 14-15.
27. See Letter from Melanie K. Wellner, Deputy County Counsel, Nevada County, to
Gregory S. Weber (Oct. 29, 1992). This led to enactment of the Nevada County ordinance.
See infra note 380-402 and accompanying text.
28. See Letter from James S. Reed, Mono County Counsel, to Gregory S. Weber (Oct. 27,
1992). Ultimately, this proposal led to the enactment of the Mono County Tri-Valley
Groundwater Management District Act. See infra note 462.
29. California Dep't Of Water Resources, The 1991 Drought Water Bank 2 (1992). Almost
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Colusa County farmers drilled a well on land they owned in Tehama
County, hoping to export the water to their Colusa County fields. 3
Over the last 21 years, eight California counties have enacted
ordinances restricting groundwater exports.31 At least half of these
ordinances have been enacted in response to either the 1976-77 drought,
or the 1987-1992 drought.32 In addition to these county ordinances, over
the past twelve years, the legislature has created four special districts
with groundwater export control authority.' The pace of both state and

all of this "groundwater" came from parties who sold the Bank their surface water rights
and then pumped groundwater instead. Id. at 8. Less than 10,000 acre-feet represented
groundwater actually pumped for transfer to the Bank. Id. For the 1992 Drought Water
Bank, the Department of Water Resources purchased 150,000 acre-feet of this "groundwater."
California Dep't Of Water Resources, State Drought Water Bank (1993) at 7 (Draft Program
Envir. Impact Report) [hereinafter Draft EIR]. Many of the environmental effects of this
increased pumping in lieu of surface water use are the same as if the groundwater had been
sold directly. For example, the Department of Water Resources evaluates all such exchanges
for four "water level related impacts": "1)overdraft, 2) land subsidence, 3) effects on other
pumpers, and 4) effects on flows in the surface water system." Id. at 110.
In 1992, in recognition of the potential impact of these water bank transactions
that induce increased groundwater extraction in order to free surface water deliveries for
transfer, the legislature passed A.B. 2897. See Cal. Water Code § 1745.10 (West. Supp. 1993).
As codified, that bill states:
A water user that transfers surface water pursuant to this article may not
replace that water with groundwater unless the groundwater use is either
of the following:
(a) Consistent with a groundwater management plan adopted pursuant to
state law for the affected area.
(b) Approved by the water supplier from whose service area the water is
to be transferred and that water supplier, if a groundwater management
plan has not been adopted, determines that the transfer will not create, or
contribute to, conditions of long-term overdraft in the affected
groundwater basin.
Cal. Water Code § 1745.10 (West. Supp. 1993).
30. See Petition for Writ of Mandate at 2-4, Myers v. County of Tehama, No. 18498 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Tehama County, Mar. 3, 1992). This led to enactment of the Tehama County
ordinance. See infra notes 403-429 and accompanying text.
Another group of irrigators also have exported groundwater from Tehama
County. Baldwin Pacific Farms, a Glenn County almond rancher, and Magnesium Alloy
Products Farms (Mapco), a Colusa County almond rancher, both sought to export
groundwater from a Tehama County ranch owned by Haleakala Orchards, a general
partnership of which Baldwin Pacific is a partner. See Petition for Writ of Mandate, at 2-3,
Baldwin v. County of Tehama, Tehama No. 34446 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 27, 1992). Indeed,
Haleakala began pumping for Mapco in 1990 and continued in 1991. Id.
31. These include, in chronological order: 1) Imperial (1972), 2) Butte (1977), 3) Glenn
(1977), 4) Modoc (1978), 5) Sacramento (1980), 6) Inyo (1980), 7) Nevada (1986) and 8)
Tehama (1992). See infra notes 216-220 and accompanying text.
32. The Butte, Glenn, and Modoc ordinances were enacted during or soon after the 197677 drought. The Tehama ordinance was enacted during the 1987-92 drought.
33. These include, in chronological order: 1) Sierra Valley Groundwater Management
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county sponsored groundwater export legislative efforts has been
increasing. Indeed, since 1989, ten counties either have had groundwater
export legislation enacted (or amended) or have seriously reviewed
possible legislation or formal water export policies.'
To varying extents of intent and degrees of success, the local
export controls seemingly attempt to accomplish one or more of three
goals. First, where applicable, the local permit systems set up for
groundwater exports functions as a local equivalent to the state
administered appropriative rights permits for surface watercourses. As
described more fully below, no centrally administered permit system
governs state groundwater extraction rights.35 Pumpers wishing to verify

District (1980); 2) Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District (1989), 3)
Honey Lake Valley Groundwater Management District (1989), and 4) Ojai Basin
Groundwater Management District (1991). See infra notes 431-470 and accompanying text.
In addition, in October 1992, the governor vetoed two bills that would have established the
Glenn County Groundwater Management District. See infra notes 201 & 469.
34. Tehama County enacted an export control ordinance for the first time in early 1992.
See infra notes 403-429 and accompanying text. Glenn County amended its ordinance in
1990. See infra notes 324-335 and accompanying text. In addition, in 1992, Glenn County
sought express state legislative authority to create a groundwater management district with
export control authority. See infra note 201.
In 1989, Mono County got the Legislature to enact the Mono County Tri-Valley
Groundwater Management District Act in 1989. See infra note 461 and accompanying text.
In 1991, Ventura County residents in the Ojai Basin convinced the legislature to create a
special groundwater management district that had export authority. See infra note 464 and
accompanying text.
Since 1991, Butte County, which has had an export control ordinance since 1978,
has participated in the formation of the "Butte Basin Water Users Association." See infra note
487. This organization addresses "the need to manage the Butte Basin's surface and
groundwater resources to ensure that water transfers in or outside the Basin do not
adversely impact Butte Basin water users." Id.
In addition to these complete actions, several counties have reviewed or are
contemplating new ordinances or legislation. In 1992, Sutter County circulated a proposed
groundwater export ordinance. See infra note 430. Since 1991, Imperial County, the first
county ever to enact a groundwater export ordinance, has been reviewing legislation to
create a special district similar to the Mono County district. Letter from Joanne L. Yeager,
Assistant Count Counsel, Imperial County, to Gregory S. Weber (1992) (on file with author).
Yuba County has indicated interest in enacting water transfer ordinances. Response from
Yuba County Counsel to survey by Gregory S. Weber (Nov. 1992) (on file with author). In
1992, San Joaquin County announced a general policy opposing any transfers of water from
San Joaquin County where the water had not been offered first to other San Joaquin county
users, or where affected water agencies had not yet consented. San Joaquin County, Cal.,
Resolution 4-92-236 (Apr. 7, 1992). Yolo County has moved to create a new county wide
water agency charged with developing a water export policy. See County to Form Water
Agency, Davis Enterprise, (Oct. 14,1992), A-1 & A-5. Finally, Napa County has indicated that
it is working on a formal water export policy statement. Response from Napa County Flood
Control and Water Conservation District to survey by Gregory S. Weber (Nov. 12, 1992).
35. See infra notes 113-179.
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(or quantify) pumping rights thus must sue for a judicial determination
of rights.' The local groundwater export control ordinances provide an
administrative process, albeit locally supervised, that determines the
availability of groundwater for export and considers some of the impacts
on the environment from a prospective groundwater appropriation.'
Second, the ordinances provide a handle to allow local review of
transfers of groundwater use. Increasingly, state statutory law addresses
surface water transfers in great detail. ' For the most part, these statutes
do not address groundwater. Moreover, the common law on temporary
changes in place of groundwater use remains largely undeveloped."
Since the ordinances address all exports without distinguishing source of
pumping right or duration of proposed export, they arguably apply even
to short term transfers by a pumper traditionally exercising overlying
rights.40
Third, in varying degrees of explicitness, the local groundwater
export provisions exemplify local "area of origin" restrictions. 41 Such

36. See Final Report, supra note 6, at 143.
37. See, e.g., Tehama County, Cal., Code §§ 9.40.060, .40.060 (1992). The local efforts mimic
simplistically some of the broader range of factors that the State Water Resources Control
Board considers when reviewing a permit to appropriate water from a watercourse. For
example, the Board, too, must determine generally the availability of water in light of other
diversions and public interest considerations. See, e.g, Cal. Water Code §§ 1201 to 1203, 1253
to 1259 (West 1971 & Supp. 1993) (sections respectively addressing water available for
appropriation and public interest considerations).
38. See, e.g., Cal. Water Code §§ 109,475 (West Supp. 1993) (policy support for transfers).
See generally B. Gray, A Primeron California Water Transfer Law, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 745 (1989).
39. See infra notes 154-175 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 154-175 and accompanying text.
41. Tehama County's ordinance exemplifies the more explicit (if not necessarily coherent)
approach to reservation of water for future, in county uses. See Tehama County, Cal., Code
§ 9.40.010(10) (1992) (mining definition). This ordinance is discussed in detail infra, notes
413-421 and accompanying text.
"Area of origin" protections attempt to reserve water for use by an area at or near
the water's source. Such statutes, unique to water among the natural resources, are likely
a function of the lack of market pricing for most water rights. See, e.g., National Water
Comm'n, Water Policies For The Future 323-24 (1973). See generally L. MacDonnell & C.
Howe, Area-of-Origin Protection in Transbasin Water Diversions: An Evaluation of Alternative
Approaches, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 527, 539 (1986) (surveying the laws and concluding, to be
economically desirable, transbasin diversion must be "least-cost source of reliable water
supply to the prospective user" and "its benefits must exceed all related costs)."
California has several "area of origin" provisions. Initially, riparian rights, with
their limitation of water extraction to the parcel of land adjoining the watercourse,
themselves accomplish some "area of origin" protections. National Water Comm'n, supra,
at 323; MacDonnell & Howe, supra, at 530. Beyond riparian rights, the legislature has
enacted four main area of origin statutes. First, the "County of Origin" law prohibits the
assignment of appropriative rights applications filed by the state if required for the future
needs of a county in which the water originates. Cal. Water Code § 10505 (West 1971).
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provisions attempt to reserve water for future needs in the areas where
precipitation falls or groundwater is extracted. When enacted and
administered locally, without any state authorization, such provisions
serve parochial interests at the possible expense of the interests of the
state as a whole.
As a result of these local legislative efforts, a patchwork quilt of
groundwater export regulations has sprung up across the state. This
patchwork raises two principal sets of legal issues.'
First, the
ordinances raise important questions of statutory interpretation. Many of
the ordinances suffer from vagueness, ambiguity and incoherence.'
They frequently define hydrological terms imprecisely. By themselves,
many of the ordinances demonstrate a need for substantial revision.
Moreover, while most of the local legislative efforts share common
features, the various schemes differ in many critical ways. The differences
potentially force a prospective groundwater exporter, such as the state's
Department of Water Resources, to deal with four current and four

Second, the "Watershed Protection" law grants preferences to water users in the "watershed
of origin" and areas "immediately adjacent thereto." Id. § 11460. The Watershed Protection
law applies to "any agency of the state or federal government." Id. § 11128. Third, the Delta
Protection Act prohibits diversion of water from the delta of the Sacramento and San
Joaquin rivers to which delta users have legal entitlements. Id.§§ 12200 to 12204. For a
discussion of these three statutes, see R. Robie & R. Kletzing, Area of Origin Statutes--The
California Experience, 15 Idaho L. Rev. 419 (1979). The most recent California area of origin
statute involves seven specified river systems in Northern California. Cal. Water Code §§
1215 to 1222 (West Supp. 1993). These latter provisions are discussed in more detail infra,
notes 182-194 and accompanying text.
42. A third issue involves the power of California counties to pass their ordinances. In three
unpublished trial court decisions, county actions restricting groundwater exports have been
successfully challenged as preempted under the state constitution. See Judgment on the
Pleading, City of Los Angeles v. County of Inyo, No. 12908 (Cal. Super. Ct. Inyo County July
13,1983); Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Defendant's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Truckee-Donner Pub. Util. Dist. v. County of Nevada,
No. 35920 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sutter County Dec. 8,1988); Ruling on Motion for Summary
Judgment, Myers v. County of Tehama, Nos. 34147 & 34446 (Cal. Super. Ct. Tehama County
Aug. 11, 1993) (consolidated with Petition for Writof Mandate, Baldwin v. County of Tehama,
No. 34446 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 27, 1992)), appeal filed, No. 3 Civil C017301 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec.
3, 1993); see generally G. Weber, Forging a More Coherent Groundwater Policy in California: State
and Federal Constitutional Law Challenges to Local Groundwater Export Restrictions, 34 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 373,386-90 (1994). In addition, a partially successful challenge was raised against the
Imperial ordinance under the federal constitution's commerce clause. See Munoz v. County
of Imperial, 604 F.2d 1174,1175 (9th Cir. 1979), vacated, 449 U.S. 54 (1980), on remand, 636 F.2d
1189 (9th Cir. 1981), on remand, 510 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Cal. 1981), af/'d, 667 F.2d 811 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); see generally Weber, supra, at 448-51 & nn. 330-33. The
complexity of the preemption and dormant commerce clause analysis requires separate
treatment and is beyond the scope of this article.
43. See, e.g., Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.010(10) (1992) (defining "mining"); infra
note 413-421 and accompanying text.
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possible county groundwater export ordinances in the Sacramento Valley
alone. Thus, second, the patchwork raises important policy questions
about the role of state legislation in coordinating groundwater export
controls to balance local economic and environmental interests with
statewide needs.
The pace of local legislative efforts to address groundwater
exports is likely to accelerate even more markedly. At the end of the
1991-92 legislative session, the legislature enacted, and the governor
signed, A.B. 3030. 44 That legislation authorizes hundreds of local public
agencies to enact groundwater management programs.45
In an attempt to bring some coherence to the emerging
patchwork, this article surveys and criticizes the local groundwater export
legislative efforts to date. Part II of this article introduces several critical
hydrological concepts.* Part III summarizes state laws on groundwater
appropriation and export.47 Part IV surveys the county ordinances that
address groundwater export." Part V surveys the major legislative
alternative to county ordinances: state legislation to create special
groundwater management districts with export control authority. Part
VI summarizes the conclusions and considers the need for some central,
state wide control over groundwater transfers.'
II. GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY
The legal efforts to manage groundwater draw heavily upon
concepts addressed by groundwater hydrology.'1 Too often, the legal

44. See infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
45. For the A.B. 3030 definition of "local public agency," see infra note 199. As of 1977,
there were about 900 special districts in California that had some water utility functions.
Groundwater In The West, supra note 3, at 59. An admittedly incomplete March 1992
Department of Water Resources listing tallies 994 active, and 73 inactive, water agencies
statewide. California Dep't Of Water Resources, Interim Statewide Alpha Listing Of Water
Service Agencies (1992). Many of these agencies may have some authority to act under A.B.
3030.
46. See infra notes 51-109 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 110-214 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 215-430 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 431470 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 471-497 and accompanying text.
51. Broadly defined, "hydrology" is "the discipline dealing with the properties, occurrence,
distribution, and movement of water on and beneath the surface of the land." R. Kazmann,
Modem Hydrology 1 (1965). "Groundwater hydrology" is "concerned primarily with the
movement of potable subsurface water caused by a difference in potential or head." Id. at
129. "Hydrogeology" explores the "control and influence" of the "physical properties of rock
formations... [upon]... the movement of water within them." Id.
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system adopts such concepts imprecisely, 52 or, worse, adopts terms that
lack a firm hydrological foundation.' The following discussion explores
the hydrological basis for four sets of terms that permeate groundwater
legislation: 1) groundwater and water table; 2) groundwater basin and
aquifer; 3) cone of depression and well interference; and 4) overdraft, safe
yield, and mining.
1.

"Groundwater"& "Water Table"

In common parlance, all underground water is "groundwater."
Most hydrologists, however, use "groundwater" to refer to one class of

subsurface water: water in the "zone of saturation."

s

Hydrologists broadly divide subsurface water into two classes:
1) water in the unsaturated zone, formerly called "vadose" water, or
water in the zone of "aeration," and 2) "groundwater," or water in the

zone of saturation.' Water in the unsaturated zone does not flow freely
into wells, although knowledge of its complicated hydraulics is becoming

increasingly necessary in cleaning up toxic contamination.5 7 In contrast,
water in the zone of saturation will flow freely to supply wells and

52. For example, several of the ordinances discussed below fail to define the boundaries

of a "groundwater basin," even though hydrogeologists have offered numerous different
ways to indicate a basin's boundaries. See, e.g., Glenn County, Cal., Code §§ 20.04.03020.04.280 (1991) (no definition of "groundwater basin" even though the term is used in
several of the listed definitions). For a discussion of the possible boundaries of "groundwater
basins," see infra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
53. For example, groundwater ordinances are often enamored with addressing a
groundwater basin's "safe yield" and preventing groundwater "mining." See, e.g., Butte
County, Cal., Code §§ 33-2.12,-2.19 (Supp. 1978) (section respectively addressing "mining"
and "safe yield"). Groundwater hydrologists, however, question the value of either concept.
See infra notes 86-109 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Kazmann, supra note 5I, at 129 (groundwater "includes all of the waters
found beneath the surface of the ground").
55. See, e.g., R. Heath, Basic Groundwater Hydrology 4 (1982). "Water in the saturated
zone is the only underground water that is available to supply wells and springs and is the
only water to which the name ground water is correctly applied." Id. (emphasis added).
56. 1 California Dep't Of Water Resources, 1967 Groundwater Course, Groundwater
Geology, 49-50 (1967) (Asilomar Conference Grounds, Pacific Grove, Cal. 1967) [hereinafter
1967 Conference]. Hydrologists appear to use synonymously "zone of aeration," "soil zone,"
and "unsaturated zone" to refer to all vadose water. See E. Murphy & C. O'Neill, Geology and
Hydrology, in 3 Waters And Water Rights § 18.02, at 10-11 (R. Beck ed., 1991) [hereinafter
Waters and Water Rights]. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) no longer uses
"vadose water" or zone of "aeration." U.S. Geolological Survey, Definitions Of Selected
Groundwater Terms--Revisions And Conceptual Refinements 14-15 (1972) [hereinafter
Groundwater Terms] (Water Supply Paper No. 1988).
57. See M. Anderson, Hydrogeologic Frameworkfor GroundwaterProtection, in Planning For
Groundwater Protection 1, 3,6-12 (G. Page ed., 1987) [hereinafter, Hydrogeologic Framework].
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springs." Echoing the distinctions most hydrologists make, this article

will consider as "groundwater" only water in the zone of saturation.
Groundwater will reach different levels in wells drilled in
confined and unconfined aquifers." In a well drilled into an unconfined
aquifer, water' will reach the top of the zone of saturation, known as the
"water table.
In a tightly cased well drilled into a confined aquifer,
water will reach the "potentiometric surface."'"
The regulatory schemes considered below have also created
different classes of subsurface water. As discussed more fully below,
California courts have erected a common law of subsurface water
classification upon the foundation of the nineteenth century's poor

understanding of hydrology.62

For their part, the state and local

legislative schemes reviewed below generally follow hydrology's

classification of "groundwater" as "water in the zone of saturation."63
Similarly, while lawyers commonly may not distinguish between "water
table" and "potentiometric surface,"' the regulatory schemes considered

below generally follow the hydrological distinctions between the two
concepts.'
2.

"GroundwaterBasin" & "Aquifer"

In simplest terms, both "groundwater basin" and "aquifer"
connote a subsurface geological formation that can yield water to a
well." Indeed, hydrologists uniformly define an "aquifer" simply as "a

58. HydrogeologicFramework, supra note 57, at 3; Heath, supra note 55, at 4.
59. See A. Schneider, GroundwaterRights in California,Governor's Comm'n To Review Cal.
Water Rights Law 100 (1977) (Staff Paper No. 2, adapted from R. Richter, California
Groundwater Geology, in University of Cal., Davis Extension, Concepts Of Groundwater
Management 2-41 (1974)). See also Heath, supra note 5, at 6 (distinguishing "confined" and
"unconfined" aquifers).
60. See HydrogeologicFramework, supra note 57, at 3 (describing role of pressure on water

table).
61. See Heath, supra note 55, at 6 (discussing artesian wells).
62. See infra note 112.
63. See, e.g., Cal. Water Code § 10752(a) (West Supp. 1993); Butte County, Cal., Code § 332.6 (Supp. 1978).
64. Waters and Water Rights, supra note 56, at 11.
65. See, e.g., Glenn County, Cal., Code §§ 20.04.180,20.04.270 (1991) (defining respectively,
"piezometric surface" and "water table").
66. Two non-technical studies demonstrate the simplicity of the commonplace meanings
of "aquifer" and "groundwater basin." Describing an "aquifer," one author stated: "a] typical
aquifer... in some ways is similar to a bucket of sand half-filled with water. Drilling a well
is like digging a hole in this sand and allowing it to fill with water which can then be
removed." G. Widman, Groundwater-Hydrologyand the Problemof Competing Well Oumers, 14
Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 523,525 (1968). Similarly, another author described "groundwater
basins" as "elaborate [subterranean) lattice works of rock, [that) like giant sponges, store
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rock unit that will yield water in usable quantity to a well or spring."67
The reference to "usable quantity" imports some subjectivity into the
definition; usability may depend upon the extractor's purpose.' The
legal systems considered below generally adopt definitions of "aquifers"
virtually identical to the hydrological definition.69
Unlike "aquifer," "groundwater basin" does not command as
universal a following among hydrologists or as precise a definition. As
a leading survey of California groundwater law notes, "there is no single,
widely-accepted definition [of groundwater basin]."' Some hydrologists
speak only, or primarily, of "aquifers."' Others define "groundwater
basin" as: "an area underlain by one or more permeable formations
capable of furnishing a substantial water supply."' This definition
substantially overlaps the concepts of "aquifer" and "groundwater
basin."' It adds, however, two important notions. First, it focuses
attention on the surface area. Second, it notes that multiple aquifers may
underlie any given surface area.74 Despite the impreciseness of the

water in their passageways." Office Of Planning And Research, Offices Of The Governor Of
California, California Groundwater Management 7 (1982).
67. Heath, supra note 55, at 6. Heath notes that "[in geologic usage, 'rock' includes
unconsolidated sediments." Id. Thus, Anderson defines "aquifer" as "a unit of porous material
that yields economically significant quantities of water to wells." HydrogeologicFramework,
supra note 57, at 15. See also Kazmann, supra note 51, at 137; Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at
4. The USGS defines "aquifer" as: "a formation, group of formations, or part of a formation
that contains sufficient saturated permeable material to yield significant quantities of water
to wells and springs." Groundwater Terms, supra note 56, at 2.
68. See Hydrogeologic Framework, supra note 57, at 15.
69. See, e.g., Glenn County, Cal., Code § 20.04.030 (1991) ("aquifer" meaning a geologic
formation that stores, transmits and yields significant quantities of water to wells and
springs).
70. Schneider, supra note 59, at 98.
71. For example, Heath does not appear to use "groundwater basin" at all in his "Basic
Groundwater Hydrology." Rather, he appears to prefer "groundwater system" to include
both the "aquifers and confining beds that underlie any area." Heath, supra, note 55, at 14.
Kazmann speaks primarily of "aquifers." See, e.g., Kazmann, supra note 51, at 137-207 passim.
Still, he occasionally uses "basin," apparently synonymously with "aquifer." See, e.g., id. at
160-61, 181.
72. 1967 Conference, supra note 56, at 19; see also id. at 21 (identifying six types of
"groundwater basins" inCalifornia).
73. Indeed, the Governor's Commission's proposed legislation defined "groundwater
basin" as: "a geologically and hydrologically defined area which contains one or more
aquifers which store and transmit water and will yield significant quantities of water to
wells." Final Report, supra note 6, at 174.
74. The surface of groundwater basins, however, may be underlain by numerous separate
aquifers. For example, in two plates accompanying the Department of Water Resources'
study, "Evaluation of Groundwater Resources: Sacramento Valley," maps show elevations
of sections of the Sacramento Valley groundwater basin. California Dep't Of Water
Resources, Bulletin 118-6, Evaluation of Groundwater Resources: Sacramento Valley (1978)
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term--or perhaps because of it--drafters of water management schemes
frequently prefer to base their programs on "basin" rather than on
"aquifer."75
Whether based on "aquifer," "groundwater basin," or some
combination of the two, a regulatory scheme needs to delineate where
one aquifer or basin ends, and another begins. The same groundwater
survey that noted the disagreement over definition of "basin" also noted
that "[miany different lateral and vertical boundaries can be used to
define a groundwater basin."' Again, borrowing from one compilation,
the survey broke the potential lateral boundaries into three classes:
physical, hydraulic, and political.' Within each of these three broad
groups of boundary choices lie five to twelve specific choices.'
Similarly, multiple options exist for determining a basin's vertical
boundaries.' A complete discussion of the geological bases is beyond
the scope of this article. The variety of geological features that might lead
to distinctions between "basins" and "sub-basins," and the use of "political
boundaries" as basin boundaries, demonstrates the fluidity of "basin" as
a regulatory concept. With this fluidity comes the opportunity for gross
imprecision. When coupled with the even more fluid concept of a basin's
"safe yield," regulatory schemes based on imprecisely defined "groundwater basins" may become incoherent.'

[hereinafter Bulletin 118-61 (see plates 3 & 4).. A portion of "Diagram D," covering a section
in Colusa and Sutter counties, shows as many as a dozen different layers of predominantly
coarse grained materials, separated by layers of fine grained materials. Id. All of the separate
layers may yield small to large quantities of water to wells. Id.
75. See, e.g., Cal. Water Code § 10752(b) (West Supp. 1993) ("groundwater basin" defined);
Bulletin 118-80, supra note 12 (entitled "Groundwater Basins in California"). The Department
prepared Bulletin 118-80 in response to specific legislation asking it to identify the state's
groundwater basins. Cal. Water Code § 12924 (West 1992). The legislature instructed the
Department to identify basins by reference not only to geological and hydrological
conditions, but also, where feasible, to political boundary lines. Id.; see Bulletin 118-80, supra
note 12, at iii.
76. Schneider, supra note 59, at 101 (citing Richter, California Ground Water Geology, in
Concepts Of Ground Water Management 2-48 (1974) (Univ. of Cal. Davis Extension)).
77. Schneider, supra note 59, at 101. See also 1967 Conference, supra note 56, at 19 (three
groundwater basin categories based on basin underftow characteristics).
78. Schneider, supra note 59, at 101; see also 1967 Conference, supra note 56, at 19
(subdividing tripartite basin underflow characterizations).
79. Schneider identifies eight options for determining a basin's "vertical" boundaries.
Schneider, supra note 59, at 101.
80. For a discussion of "safe yield" see infra, notes 89-109 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the glaring analytical consequences of the failure to define the appropriate
"basin" central to a local regulatory scheme, see infra notes 275-281 and accompanying text
(discussing Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-3 (Supp. 1978)).
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3. Cone of Depression & Well Interference
"Cone of depression" and "well interference" are two concepts
that describe relatively immediate effects of groundwater pumping."
These concepts, uniformly embraced by hydrologists, have found their
way occasionally into regulatory schemes without substantial lawyerly
interpretation.' Heath states: "Iplumping a well causes a drawdown in
the groundwater level in the surrounding area. The drawdown in water
level forms a conical-shaped depression in the water table or potentiometric surface, which is referred to as a cone of depression."' He continues:
"Where pumping wells are spaced relatively close together,
pumping of one will cause a drawdown in the others. Drawdowns are additive, so that the total drawdown in a pumping
well is equal to its own drawdown plus the drawdowns
caused at its location by other pumping wells. The drawdowns
in pumping wells caused by withdrawals from other pumping
wells are referred to as well interference. "s4
Well interference from a large well may cause nearby smaller wells to
run dry if they are located within the large well's cone of depression.8
4. Overdraft, Safe Yield & Mining
Three enticingly simple, interrelated concepts-"overdraft," "safe
yield" and "mining"-have generated years of controversy among
hydrologists. In their popular sense, all three terms connote a management
choice between treating an aquifer as a renewable or a nonrenewable
resource.' Ultimately, however, hydrologists have been unable to agree
on what, if anything, the terms actually denote. Despite the substantial
misgivings of hydrologists over the terms' value as technical concepts, all
of the regulatory programs discussed below have placed "overdraft" and

81. See Final Report, supra note 6, at 150 ("well interference, however, sometimes
develops very quickly .... "); Heath, supra note 55, at 44.

82. See, e.g., Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.010(16) (1992) ("radius of influence" defined
in reference to a well's "cone of depression"). See infra notes 410, 426-429 and accompanying
text.
83. Heath, supra note 55, at 44 (emphasis deleted).
84. Heath, supra note 55, at 44 (emphasis deleted).
85. Final Report, supra note 6, at 150.
86. See, e.g., W. Balleau, Water Appropriation and Transfer in a General Hydrogeological
System, 28 Nat. Res. J. 269, 278 (1988) ("groundwater mining is generally described as the
opposite of safe-yield management and as appropriate for unrechargeable or nontributary
groundwater basins").
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"safe yield" at the heart of their legal schemes. Some understanding of the
hydrological significance of the terms will illustrate the conceptual limits
of the legal schemes themselves.
The definitions offered by the California Department of Water
Resources (DWR) exemplify the definitions that have found their way
into the regulatory schemes discussed below. In particular, the definitions
of "overdraft" and "mining" focus on the relationship between groundwater extractions and groundwater replenishment. In its principal groundwater publication, commonly referred to as "Bulletin 118-75," DWR
defines "overdraft" as "the temporary condition of a groundwater basin
where the amount of water withdrawn by pumping exceeds the amount
of water replenishing the basin over a period of time." 7 DWR then
defines "mining" as "pumping from groundwater bodies greatly in excess
of replenishment. "' s Finally, it defines "safe yield" as "the maximum
quantity of water that can be continuously withdrawn from a groundwater basin without adverse effect."
These three definitions appear in substantially similar form in
various hydrological discussions. 9° More significantly for purposes of
this article, they have been adopted virtually verbatim by several of the

87. Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 4; see also Bulletin 160-87, supra note 3, at 31
(elaborating on "overdraft").
In Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1309 (Cal. 1975), the California
Supreme Court defined "overdraft" as the point at which "extractions from the basin exceed
its safe yield plus any... temporary surplus." 'Temporary surpluses" occur during wet
years; in such years, extraction greater than long term safe yield is permissible in order to
create aquifer storage space for percolation of above normal precipitation or active spreading of increased surface water. See, e.g., Final Report, supra note 6, at 140 ('Temporary
surplus is the amount of water that can be extracted from a basin to provide storage space
for wet year runoff that would otherwise be lost").
88. Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 4. See also id. at 124, 129 (noting "mining"apparently
synonymous with "continued overdrafting" and "mining" involves "withdrawing substantial
quantities of water from storage in an underlying basin").
89. Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 5. DWR noted that, prior to the California Supreme
Court's opinion in Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975), California
groundwater law defined "safe yield" in terms of "average annual natural recharge of the
basin." Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 125 (fig. 26). In Los Angeles v. San Fernando, the
court agreed that a broader definition of "safe yield" would encourage the conjunctive use
of groundwater basins. Los Angeles, 537 P.2d at 1307-09. Accordingly, as the court approved
the "safe yield" definition now used by DWk, it glossed: "[tihe phrase 'undesirable result'
is understood to refer to a gradual lowering of the groundwater levels resulting eventually
in depletion of the supply." Id. at 1308. For a discussion of other portions of Los Angeles v.
San Fernando, see infra notes 141-150 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., R. Freeze & J. Cherry, Groundwater 364 (1979) (noting definitions of "safe
yield" and "overdraft"); Waters & Water Rights, supra note 56, § 18.04, at 16 (mining occurs
when an aquifer "is not capable of recharge or can recharge only in extraordinarily long
time periods").
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Nevertheless, none of the definitions have garnered

uniform support from hydrologists. For example, some hydrogeologists
would object that the "mining" definition is overly narrow or un-focused.92 The use of "safe yield" as a regulatory concept, however, has borne

the brunt of hydrologists' criticism. 3

Hydrologists have criticized the "safe-yield" definition for two
principal reasons. First, the definition is inherently subjective. If "safe
yield" is the amount of water that can be withdrawn from a groundwater
basin without causing an undesirable effect, hydrologists Mary P.
Anderson and C. Alan Berkebile ask: "what constitutes an undesired
result[?] The answer, of course, will vary with the respondent."'
Second, hydrologists question the traditional and still frequent linkage of
"safe yield" with pumping based on recharge to an aquifer.

91. See, e.g., Butte County, Cal., Code §§ 33-2.12, -2.13, -2.19 (Supp. 1978) (defining
respectively "mining", "overdraft", and "safe yield"); Glenn County, Cal., Code §§ 20.04.140,
.150, .210 (1991) (defining respectively, "mining", "overdraft", and "safe yield"); Tehama
County, Cal., Code

§§

9.40.010(11), .010(18) (1992) (defining "overdraft" and "safe yield").

92. Compare Holzschuh, supra note 7, at 346 (concluding "because ["mining"] is fraught
with psychological implications, we as groundwater professionals must take care to use it
correctly, and further, to educate those in related disciplines who misuse it") with Balleau,
supra note 86, at 280 ("[aIl groundwater developments initially mine water, and finally do
not"). For Balleau, "mining" is simply the removal of water from storage in an aquifer.
"Every groundwater development ... begins with 100 percent of withdrawals being derived
from storage. The timing of the change from storage depletion (mining) to induced recharge
from surface water bodies is key to the water policy question." Balleau, supra note 86, at 278
(emphasis added). In recognition that removal from storage marks the initiation of all
groundwater extractions, Balleau prefers to speak of the "mining phase" of groundwater
development. Id. at 278-80. He defines this "phase" as the period in which 98 percent or
more of the extracted water comes solely from storage. Id. at 278-79. Where the "mining
phase" will last for a "reasonable planning horizon," Balleau believes that "mining" is a
"reasonable" management option for unrechargeabie or nontributary water. Id. at 278-81;
accord, J. Bredehoeft et al., Groundwater:The Water-Budget Myth, in Scientific Basis Of Water
Resource Mgmt. 51, 52 (1988) ("Some water must be taken from storage in the system to
create gradients toward a well... [Thus] some water must always be mined to create a
development ....
) [hereinafter, The Water-Budget Myth].
93. See, e.g., M. Anderson & C. Berkebile, Hydrogeology of the South Forkof Long Island, New
York: Discussion and Reply, 88 Geolological Soc'y Am. Bull. 895, 895 (1977). Materials
distributed by DWR in its "1967 Conference' summarized ten definitions proffered by
hydrologists over forty years. See 1967 Conference, supra note 56.
94. Anderson & Berkebile, supra note 93, at 895. See also Hydrogeologic Framework, supra
note 57, at 16-17. As support for their conclusions, Anderson and Berkebile quote from the
landmark 1951 work by Harold E. Thomas. Anderson & Berkebile, supra note 93, at 895.
Thomas discussed extensively hydrologists' concerns with the legal system's adoption of
"safe yield." H. Thomas, The Conservation Of Groundwater 261-64 (1951) ("'Safe Yield' is
an Alice-in-Wonderland term which means whatever its user chooses"); cf. C.W. Fetter, Jr.,
Reply, 88 Geolological. Soc'y Of Amer. Bull. 896 (1977) (using "safe yield" but acknowledging
that the term is "a subjective phenomena based upon human values").

Summer 19941

GROUNDWATER EXPORT LEGISLATION

According to Anderson, safe yield has been approximated to
be equal to some fraction of the net annual precipitation using
the flawed rationale that safe yield is equal to groundwater recharge. While such an approach may be justified on a regional
scale to get a rough estimate of this type of parameter for
comparison purposes . . . the weaknesses inherent in the
approach should be fully recognized. Specifically, groundwater
recharge is very difficult to estimate accurately... equating
recharge to some fraction of precipitation is at best only a
rough approximation of the actual groundwater recharge.
Furthermore, it is physically impossible to capture 100 percent
of the natural groundwater recharge by pumping. Finally, the
true basin yield depends on interaction of the unsaturated and
surface water zones with the groundwater zone.'
Similarly, hydrologist W.P. Balleau summarizes the fallacy of
equating natural recharge and safe yield: "[niatural recharge is a spurious
part of the wellfield water budget and is irrelevant to the magnitude of
an artificial groundwater development."' In short, critics brand "safe
yield" as a "myth"' or a "shibboleth."98 Indeed, for nearly 40 years,
hydrologists have attempted to eliminate the term from their literature.'
In place of the regulatory preoccupations with "safe yield," and
its cousins "mining" and "overdraft," several hydrologists have proffered
new, hopefully more quantifiable terms. For example, R. Allan Freeze and
John A. Cherry offer two new terms: "maximum stable basin yield" and
"optimal yield.""I00 Both concepts allow greater integration into management schemes of the relationship between groundwater pumping and
surface water flows.'
"Maximum stable basin yield" describes the
point at which pumping from a basin lowers the water table to "a depth

95. Hydrogeologic Framework, supra note 57, at 22-23 (citations omitted).
96. Balleau, supra note 86, at 280 (natural recharge is "generally already appropriated at
downstream discharge point as the reliable baseflow of springs, wetlands and rivers"). See
Freeze & Cherry, supra note 90, at 364; The Water Budget Myth, supra note 92, at 51-57. See
also J.Emel, Effectiveness and Equity of GroundwaterManagement Methods in the Western United
States 16-18 Ariz. St. U., Center For Envir. Studies (1984) [hereinafter Effectiveness & Equity]
(Working Paper No. 3; basin wide estimates of discharge fail to account for temporal and
spatial effects of pumping from a location far from a basin's natural discharge site).
97. Hydrogeologic Framework, supra note 57, at 22.
98. Kletzing, supra note 17, at 1242-44. While not a hydrogeologist, attorney Kletzing has
a strong background in water regulation. See id. at 1225 (see the note at asterisk).
99. See, e.g., Anderson & Berkebile, supra note 93, at 895 (citing R. Kazmann, "Safe Yield",
in Groundwater Development, Reality or Illusion, 82 Am. Soc'y Civil Engineers Proc. J.
Irrigation & Drainage Divisions p. 1103-1). Indeed, the United State Geological Survey no
longer includes "safe yield" within its lexicon. See Groundwater Terms, supra note 56, at 11.
100. Freeze & Cherry, supra note 90, at 364, 367.
101. See, e.g., Freeze & Cherry, supra note 90, at 367.
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below which no stable recharge rate can be maintained."'0 2 According
to Freeze and Cherry, basin planners should set planned extraction rates
at some point below the maximum limit of stability, in order to allow a
for "a factor of safety."' 3 Determination of the precise point, however,
depends upon non-hydrological factors. "Optimal yield" recognizes that:
"groundwater has value only by virtue of its use, and the
optimal yield must be determined by the selection of the
optimal groundwater management scheme from a set of
possible alternative schemes. The optimal scheme is the one
that best meets a set of economic and/or social objectives
associated with the uses to which the water is to be put."'"
The combination of "maximum stable basin yield" and "optimal
yield," as conceived by Freeze and Cherry, improves upon the DWR "safe
yield" definition. Construed broadly, the DWR definition does allow
consideration of economic and social factors. The "undesirable effects"
might include the economic, social, and environmental costs of over--or
underdevelopment of a particular basin. 5 Nevertheless, "maximum
stable basin yield" offers a potentially quantifiable extraction limit that
suffers not from "safe yield's" patent vagueness and its historical reliance
on the irrelevant notions of "natural recharge.' 10 Moreover, "optimal
yield" replaces the psychologically charged, pseudo-technical "safe yield"
concept with one that expressly embraces human or ecosystem use
values."0 ' While the quantification of such values may ultimately suffer

102. Freeze & Cherry, supra note 90, at 366.
103. Freeze & Cherry, supra note 90, at 367. They note that '[olne dry year might cause
an irrecoverable water-table drop." Id. Moreover, development of a basin to this maximum
level might cause surface flows to drop, as extractions induced basin recharge from surface
watercourses. Id. Thus, Freeze and Cherry note that optimal watershed development
requires integration, or conjunctive use, of surface and subsurface waters. Id.
104. Freeze & Cherry, supra note 90, at 364-65. They continue:
In some cases and at some points in time, consideration of the present
and future costs and benefits may lead to optimal yields that involve
mining groundwater, perhaps even to depletion. In other situations,
optimal yields may reflect the need for complete conservation. Most often,
the optimal groundwater development lies somewhere between these
extremes.
Id. at 365. See also Hydrogeologic Framework, supra note 57, at 23.
105. Indeed, as the DWR itself has noted, the reformulation of "safe yield" from its
original meaning of "average annual natural recharge" recognizes that "the dangers of
permanent damage from overproduction have been oversold to the courts." Bulletin 118-75,
supra note 1, at 124.
106. Cf. Anderson & Berkebile, supra note 93, at 895 (noting that "[plerhaps the concept
of maximum stable basin yield ... is a step toward formulating a more rational approach
[than 'safe yield'].")
107. Cf. Balleau, supra note 86, at 280-81 (policymakers still find natural recharge based
"safe yield" an attractive regulatory concept).

Summer 1994)

GROUNDWATER EXPORT LEGISLATION

from imprecision, the imprecisions can be recognized properly as those
inherent in the environmental and social sciences.
Balleau cautions that "[there is no valid generic rule, such as
pumping the natural recharge, that will lead to a desirable economic or
stable (non-depleting) level of groundwater development.""~ Still,
policymakers continue to look for such a fix. Anderson notes that "safe
yield" appears "to be immortal despite repeated death blows."'" Only
if "safe yield" denotes a broad optimization approach will the term allow
responsible groundwater resource management.
III. GROUNDWATER RIGHTS & REGULATION
UNDER STATE LAW
A.

Private Rights to Groundwater Extraction and Use in California

1. Acquisition & Loss of Rights
California law divides subsurface water into two classes: 1) water
flowing in defined subterranean channels; 0 and 2) percolating waters.' These largely arbitrary, nonscientific distinctions are relics of the
nineteenth century legal and scientific communities' poor understanding
of hydrology." 2 Under the California Water Code, private rights to use

108. Balleau, supra note 86, at 280. Once optimization determines the extent to which a
basin should be managed as a renewable resource, a variety of management options occur.
For example, Emel suggests as a paradigm for managing a basin as a renewable resource
"asteady-state equilibrium wherein withdrawals capture rejected recharge and natural
discharge." Emel, supra note 96, at 16; see Groundwater Terms, supra note 56, at 3 (defining
"capture"). According to Emel, if "capture" equals "withdrawal" for a small enough unit area,
then "over" and "under"development may be avoided. Emel, supra note 96, at 16-18.
Nevertheless, Emel does not offer this equation as a rigid formula appropriate to all basins.
Rather, he recognizes that "[mnlanaging withdrawals to achieve or approximate capture
ignores the fostering of equity in property right protection. Rates of water level decline are
not necessarily uniform (and optimal safe-yield management may dictate their nonuniformity) and the economics of pumping are ignored." Id.
at 20. Managing a basin to limit
withdrawals to an approximation of capture "gives value to property rights and leads to the
development of a water market." Id. at 21; cf. id. at 33-36 (summarizing effectiveness and
equity of various management alternatives.)
109. Hydrogeologic Framework,supra note 57, at 17.
110. "[A]ll hydrologists agree that almost none of California's groundwater resources
flows in subterranean streams." Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 124 n.1.
111. W. Hutchins, The California Law Of Water Rights 419 (1956). See generally Widman,
supra note 66, at 530-31 (noting similar dichotomy in other states). In addition, the law of
surface watercourses determines the rights to a surface stream's underflow. Hutchins, supra,
at 422. In general, California law recognizes two types of rights to surface watercourses:
riparian and appropriative. See infra note and accompanying text.
112. Rossmann & Steel, supra note 8, at 113, 905-06. To little avail, lawyers and
hydrologists have urged greater integration of the laws of surface and subsurface water. See,

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

the first class of subsurface waters are created under the same appropriative system otherwise applicable to nonriparian surface waters." 3 Only
the second class of subsurface waters are governed by the largely judge
made body of "groundwater" rights law. 4
California law recognizes three types of private rights to extract
and use groundwater: 1) overlying rights, 2) appropriative rights and 3)
prescriptive rights." 5 Extensive dicta in the 1903 case of Katz v. Walkin-

e.g., Waters & Water Rights, supra note, § 18.01, at 6; E. Murphy & C. O'Neil, Economics and
Groundwater Interconnections, in 3 Waters and Water Rights § 19.03, at 30-31 (R. Beck ed.,
1991).
113. Calif. Water Code § 1200 (West 1971). California recognizes two main classes of
private rights to divert and use surface waters: riparian and appropriative rights. Hutchins,
supra note 111, at 40-55. For an overview of these two systems, see W. Attwater &J. Markle,
Overview of California Water Rights and Water Quality Law, 19 PAC. L.J.
957, 959-75 (1988)
[hereinafter Overview). In addition to these two main classes of private rights, California
recognizes prescriptive and pueblo rights. Overview, supra, at 969. Property law notions of
adverse possession underlie prescriptive rights. Id.; see generally Rewriting California
Groundwater Law, supra note 14, at 227 (discussing doctrine). Pueblo rights trace their origin
to Spanish and Mexican law. Id. at 252. Paramount to all other rights, they allow a
municipality formed under Mexican or Spanish law to "use the waters of sources that ran
through the pueblo, both surface and underground, from their source to the sea." Overview,
supra, at 969. See generally Rewriting California Groundwater Law, supra note 14, at 232-33
(discussing doctrine).)
The California law of appropriative rights generally follows the broad contours
of the prior appropriation doctrine prevalent throughout the western United States. See
generally R.Beck, Prevalence and Definition, in 2 Waters And Water Rights, §§ 12.01-12.04 (R.
Beck ed. 1991). Prior to 1872, appropriative rights in California were almost entirely
governed by judicial decision. Overview, supra, at 966. Between 1872 and 1914, the California
Legislature enacted a number of provisions that created a statutory mechanism for obtaining
appropriative rights. Id. Since 1914, appropriative rights have been obtained under a permit
and license system now administered by the State Water Resources Control Board. Id. at 983;
see Calif. Water Code §§ 1003.5, 1200-1851 (West 1971 & Supp. 1993).
114. See Schneider, supra note 59, at 2-3. All references to "groundwater" in this article
include only those subsurface waters that do not flow in known and definite underground
channels. "Percolating waters" simply means any water that does "not constitute part of a
definite underground stream." Hutchins, supra note 11, at 426.
115. See, e.g., Hutchins, supra note 111, at 431-61. "Overlying rights" are the rights of an
overlying owner to extract groundwater from its property and use it on, or in connection
with, the land overlying the basin. See Schneider, supra note 59, at 6-7. "Appropriative
rights" involve extractions for use on non-overlying land. Hutchins, supra note 111, at 45458; see also Rossmann & Steele, supra note 18, at 906-09. "Prescriptive rights" refer to rights
against either overlying or appropriative rights holders that ripen under adverse possession.
See Hutchins, supra note 111, at 503-06; see also infra note 133 (prescriptive rights described).
The precise contours of "overlying" land and "overlying use" remain unclear.
Schneider, supra note 59, at 7-8. For example, one court has implied that an overlying right
allows an owner of land overlying a groundwater basin to extract water from a parcel and
use it on other land that owner owns that also overlies the groundwater basin, even if the
owner could not extract groundwater from the second parcel itself. Id. at 7 (citing City of
Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P. 2d 17, 28 (Cal 1949)). In addition, the meaning of
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shaw established the foundations of the modern law governing the
acquisition of overlying and appropriative rights in California groundwater."6 Katz rejected the English rule that "percolating groundwater was
governed by the rule of land law that the landowner owns everything
that lies beneath the surface of his land.""7 In its place, Katz adopted
"the doctrine of reasonable use of percolating waters.""18 As a corollary,
the court also announced a "rule of correlative rights.""9 Under this
corollary, "Idlisputesbetween overlying landowners, concerning water for
use on the land, to which they have an equal right, in cases where the
supply is insufficient for all, are to be settled by giving to each a fair and
just proportion. " "O
As developed in later opinions,
each owner of land overlying a groundwater supply enjoys the
privilege of making reasonable and beneficial use of that
supply of water, in connection with that land. This 'correlative' privilege is shared equally by all other owners of land
overlying the same groundwater supply. Thus, in periods of
shortage, the privilege of withdrawing water is apportioned
pro rata among the various overlying privilege holders. 2'

"groundwater basin" for purposes of defining "overlying use" also remains unclear.
Schneider, supra note 59, at 7-8. A recent lawsuit considered whether land within the same
watershed as a groundwater basin was "overlying" land, even if no portion of the land in
question actually overlay the basin. San Benito County Water Dist. v. Del Piero, No. 18123,
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 1991); see New Lawsuit Would Define Overlying GroundwaterRights, 2
CAL. L. & PoL'Y REP. 65 (1992).
In general, extraction for use by a public water system is an appropriative use,
even if the municipality overlies the groundwater basin. Schneider, supra note 59, at 8; see
also Hutchins, supra note 111, at 458-60.
116. 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903), aff'g on reh'g, 70 P. 663 (1902); see Schneider, supra note 59, at
3-6.
117. Schneider, supra note 59, at 3-4 (noting Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex.
1843)).
118. Katz, 74 P. at 766-67; see Hutchir.s, supra note 111, at 434 (in effect, Katz adopts
reasonable use rule).
119. Katz, 74 P. at 772.
120. Id.
121. Rossmann & Steele, supra note 18, at 908 (footnotes omitted). See also Burr v. Maclay
Rancho Water Co., 98 P. 260, 263 (Cal. 1908); Kletzing, supra note 17, at 1233-35. As such,
the correlative rights of overlying owners are analogous to the rights of riparian landowners
to surface waters. See, e.g., Hutchins, supra note 111, at 446-54.
Katz has been criticized as "unintentionally establish[ing] principles that were prone
to produce overdrafted groundwater basins." Kletzing, supra note 17, at 1234 (citing F.
Trelease, Legal Solutions to Groundwater Problems, A General Overview, 11 Pac. L.J. 863, 873
(1980)). The only enforcement mechanism for these rights is costly and slow judicial action.
Kletzing, supra note 17, at 1234. Kletzing notes that the Katz court, however, even if it had
been "prescient" about the effect of its rule, nevertheless lacked the power to create the kind
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Thus, "lain overlying user does not obtain any priority over adjacent
overlying users solely by pumping first from the common supply.""
In addition to addressing the relative rights of overlying users,
Katz discussed the relative rights of appropriators. The court distinguished two classes of overlying rights holders: 1) "those who have used
the water on their land before the attempt to appropriate"" and 2)
"those who have not previously used it, but who claim the right
afterwards to do so."1 As between the first class of owners and
appropriators, Katz gave the overlying owners priority to "the quantity
of water that is necessary for use on [the owner's] land, and the
appropriator may take the surplus."'" Katz did not determine the
relative rights between appropriators and the second class of overlying
users.126 Later cases, however, suggest that the initiation of overlying
rights will normally take priority over prior appropriations. 2 As
between appropriators, however, "priority in time applies; the appropriator 'first in time' is entitled to all reasonably and beneficially used
surplus water, to the exclusion of subsequent appropriators."2 8

of administrative system Trelease prefers. Kletzing, supra note 17, at 1234.
122. Schneider, supra note 59, at 9. The protection extends even to unexercised overlying
rights. Id. (citing Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 116 P. 715, 721.
123. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 772 (Cal. 1903).
124. Id.
125. Id. As against an overlying owner, an importer of water that is added to (spread
across) a basin for storage, however, has priority to extract that added water. See Los
Angeles v. San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975). In addition, under the doctrine of
"intervention of public use,":
a water user who is junior in right to other water users, but who puts the
water to a public use, acquires a permanent right to the water. Damages
may be available to the injured senior parties, but the potential danger to
the health and welfare of the public justifies a grant of continued use.
Final Report, supra note 6, at 162 (citing, inter alia, Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486
(Cal. 1935)).
126. Katz, 74 P. at 772.
127. At least two qualifications exist. First, the "intervening public use" doctrine may
allow a junior appropriator for a public water supply to continue pumping if it compensates
the overlying owner. See supra note 125. Second, an enjoinable extraction may ripen into
prescriptive rights. Absent these qualifying circumstances, overlying rights will take priority
over appropriative rights. See Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1318 n.100 (Cal.
1975); see also Wright v. Goleta Water District, 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 746-51 (Cal. App. 1985).
An overlying owner may get a judicial declaration to prevent an appropriative extraction
from ripening into a prescriptive right, even against an unexercised, prospective overlying
use. See Schneider, supra note 59, at 15 (citing Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 98 P. 260,
263 (Cal. 1908)); see also Hutchins, supra note 111, at 457 n. 35 and accompanying text.
128. Rossmann & Steel, supra note 18, at 909; see Katz, 74 P.at 772. A prior appropriator,
however, has to endure reasonable inconveniences resulting from a junior appropriator's
reduction of the groundwater level. City of Lodi v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439,
450-51 (Cal. 1936); see C. Schulz & G. Weber, Changing Judicial Attitudes Towards Property
Rights in California Water: From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 PAC. L.J. 1031,
1077-82 (1988).
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A groundwater appropriator's rights thus depend upon the
In its most
determination of the water "surplus" to prior rights."
recent decision, the California Supreme Court stated that "surplus"
occurred "when the amount of water being extracted from it is less than
the maximum that could be withdrawn without adverse effects on the
basin's long term supply."'" As noted above, to the extent that "overlying use" and "groundwater basin" remains unclear, "surplus" will remain
"'
In an action brought to challenge the
correspondingly unclear.13
validity of an appropriation, the burden of proof that appropriated water
is "surplus" lies with the appropriator. 32 If there is no "surplus" water
beyond the needs of overlying users, then an appropriator can only
establish a prescriptive right."
In two major decisions, the California Supreme Court has
addressed the acquisition and scope of prescriptive rights in overdrafted
groundwater basins." In City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, the court
faced two problems in a long overdrafted basin: 1) what overall pumping
apportion
the reductions
among the
limit
to set;appropriative,
and 2) how toand
prescriptive
rights holders.
Thevarious
court
overlying,
announced that, as against both overlying owners and prior appropriators, prescriptive rights could attach to appropriations initiated after a
basin became overdrafted."1 Addressing its first problem, the court

The "reasonable burden" rule, apparently mandated now by the 1928 amendment
to the Constitution, likely prevents overlying users from complaining about a minor drop
in pumping lift. See Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 116 P. at 721; see also Rancho Santa
Marguarita v. Vail, 81 P.2d 533, 561-63 (Cal. 1938); Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 76 P.2d 681, 686-87 (Cal. 1938).
129. "Prior rights" holders thus include both all overlying users and any prior groundwater appropriator. See Hutchins, supra note 111, at 455 (text accompanying note 22).
130. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250,1307 (Cal. 1975); see supra
notes 89-109 and accompanying text (hydrologists' discussion of "safe yield," "mining," and
"overdraft").
131. See supra note 115.
132. Hutchins, supra note 111, at 455 & n.23. The holder of a prior right must first
establish the extent of that prior right. Id.
133. See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 28-29 (Cal. 1949). "[Aln
appropriative taking of water which is not surplus is wrongful and may ripen into a
prescriptive right where the use is open and notorious, hostile and adverse to the original
owner, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of five years, and under claim
of right." Id. at 29.
134. In Los Angeles v. San Fernando,the court defined "overdraft" as: "extractions from the
basin [that] exceed its safe yield plus any .. .temporary surplus." 537 P.2d at 1309.
'Temporary surplus" is "the amount of water that can be pumped from a basin to provide
storage space for surface water that would be wasted during wet years if it could not be
stored in the basin." Schneider, supra note 59, at 32; see supra notes 89-109 and accompanying
text ("overdraft," "safe yield," and "mining" discussed).
135. 207 P.2d 17; see Kletzing, supra note 17, at 1236-37; Rewriting CaliforniaGroundwater
Law, supra note 14, at 228-29.
136. Pasadena,207 P.2d at 29.
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upheld a judgment that limited overall pumping to "safe yield." 137 The
court apparently used a "safe yield" definition that approximated "safe
yield" with annual average recharge."a In addressing its second problem, rather than applying a strict rule of temporal priority in determining
the relative rights among the various pumpers in the long overdrafted
basin, the court refused to eliminate entirely any prior rights holder's
pumping. Rather, the court limited each pumper's extractions in
proportion to the amount of water each party had withdrawn during the
five year prescriptive period.'" Although the Pasadenav. Alhambra court
does not adopt the term, its holding has been characterized as the
"mutual prescription" doctrine.'
In City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando,the court modified
the scope of the prescriptive rights doctrine's applicability to groundwater extractions from overdrafted basins. 1 The court refused to allow
prescription against municipalities. 2 It rejected mechanical application
of the Pasadena v. Alhambra notion of "mutual prescription.' 43 That
doctrine had been criticized as encouraging a "race to the pumphouse."'" Instead, the court opted for apportionment based on broader,
equitable factors. 4 s Under Los Angeles v. San Fernando, temporal
priority among appropriative and prescriptive rights holders can play a
substantial part in determining which pumpers have their rights
curtailed." The court also concluded that, to trigger the running of the
limitations period, the prior rights holder must have actual notice of
overdraft. 4 The court excluded years of surplus from the five year
period.'" It reformulated the standard for determining the scope of a

137. Pasadena,207 P.2d at 27-28.
138. See Pasadena,207 P.2d at 30.
139. Id. at 31-33; see Hutchins, supra note 11, at 504.
140. See Hutchins, supra note 111, at 504. See also Los Angeles v. San Fernando,537 P.2d at
1298-99 (noting so-called mutual prescription doctrine).
141. 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975); see generallyRewriting California Groundwater Law, supra note
14, at 229-35.
142. Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1298. The court, however, did allow
municipalities to establish prescriptive rights against private persons. Id. at 1319 n.101.
143. Id. at 1298-99.
144. Id. at 1299. See Groundwaterin the West, supra note 3, at 231. At the same time, the
doctrine provided a formula parties could use to negotiate settlements of pumping
limitations. See Schneider, supra note 59, at 23-24.
145. Los Angeles v. San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1298 n.61 and accompanying text. The court
cited the "equitable apportionment" factors used by the United States Supreme Court to
apportion water between states. Id. (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618
(1945)).
146. Los Angeles v. San Fernando,537 P.2d at 1298 n.61 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 1310-11. Overdraft alone does not trigger the running of the prescriptive rights
period. Rather, prior rights holders need notice of "adversity in fact caused by the actual
commencement of overdraft." Id. at 1311.
148. Id. at 1311-12.
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prescriptive right. 49 Finally, the court redefined "overdraft" to mean
"extractions from [a] basin that exceed its safe yield plus any . . .
temporary surplus."'w
In summary, the law governing the acquisition of groundwater
pumping rights is fraught with uncertainty.'
Since the law is judge
made, and judges have not had the opportunity to iron out all the
doctrinal wrinkles, basic uncertainty remains in such critical concepts as
"overlying user," "groundwater basin," "surplus," and "safe yield."52
Even where the concept is clear, lack of data in many groundwater basins
makes application uncertain. Beyond these limitations, uncertainty stems
in large part from the correlative rights doctrine itself. Like riparian rights
to surface water, overlying rights are not quantified. Moreover, because
correlative rights depend upon other overlying owners' actions, the
amounts that can be pumped may change dramatically over time. Finally,
no administrative system exists to coherently, consistently, and inexpensively determine the scope of an overlying right, or the availability of a
"surplus."
The great uncertainty has not prevented the development of the
groundwater resource. It may well have made development sub-optimal.
The expense, delay and difficulty of basin adjudication may well have
encouraged pumpers to deepen or enlarge their wells, or to increase their
extractions, rather than to attempt to quantify and thus limit all pumpers'
extractions. 3 Still other pumpers may have decided not to invest in
expensive pumping equipment if water levels were going to continue to
decline over time. Finally, uncertainty in the nature of the right has likely
inhibited the creation of markets for transferring such rights.
2. Transfer & Change in Place of Use
Compounding the market-inhibiting inherent uncertainty in the
scope of the groundwater extraction right itself, state law provides neither
much substantive law, nor a centralized administrative body, for
evaluating a proposed sale or transfer of groundwater for a new, use. s4
149. Id. at 1313.
150. Id. at 1309. The trial court had found "safe yield" as "equivalent to an adjusted figure
for net groundwater recharge." Id. at 1308. In wet years, however, extractions that exceeded
the basin's safe yield could make room for storage of additional recharge. Id. at 1308-09.
This ability to extract groundwater in wet years in order to use above normal precipitation
for basin recharge formed the "temporary surplus." See supra note 87.
151. See, e.g., Final Report, supra note 6, at 143 (only holders of rights in adjudicated
basins have any certainty).
152. See supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 59, at 18.
154. Final Report, supra note 6, at 163-65. In one case, upon the DWR's request, the State
Water Resources Control Board reviewed the proposed transfer of groundwater from a Yolo
County farm to a Kern County water district via the state water project. The state board
assumed jurisdiction both under a temporary regulation barring nonessential exports of
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Three scenarios relevant to this article may occur.'5 5 First, an overlying
user may wish to use groundwater on an overlying parcel that was
extracted from a different, noncontiguous overlying parcel. Second, an
overlying user may wish to sell water for ultimate nonoverlying use.
Third, an existing appropriator (or holder of a prescriptive right) may
wish to sell or use the extracted groundwater for a different, nonoverlying use.
The situation of the overlying users who wish to use groundwater on one overlying parcel that was extracted from a different, noncontiguous overlying parcel raises questions inherent in the uncertain
overlying right itself. Two situations might set up this uncertainty. First,
an overlying user might wish to use water pumped from one parcel it
owns on another parcel owned by the same pumper.'- 6 Second, an
overlying owner might simply wish to purchase groundwater extracted
by another overlying owner.'57
Both of these situations require determination of the ability of an
overlying user to use water on a noncontiguous overlying parcel.'s In
Pasadenav. Alhambra, the court stated: "an overlying right.., is the right
of the owner of the land to take water from the ground underneath for

use on his land within the basin or watershed."" This definition would

appear to sanction the first situation."s° The qualification of "on his
water from the delta, and under the California constitution. See supra, note 26.
155. A fourth scenario involves the transfer of adjudicated rights to groundwater. See C.
Lee, Governor's Comm'n To Review California Water Rights Law, The Transfer of Water
Rights in California 28-29, (1977) (Staff Paper No. 5). Lee suggests that, after Los Angeles v.
San Fernando,"even after a basin adjudication, overlying users may be required to meet the
place of use restrictions that are characteristic of unadjudicated overlying rights." Lee, supra,
at 30. Full treatment of local regulation of the transfer of adjudicated rights is beyond the
scope of this article.
156. This is the circumstance presented by the Colusa County farmers who pumped water
from the Sacramento Valley groundwater basin from parcels they owned in Tehama County
for use on parcels they owned that overlie the same basin in Colusa County. See supra note
30.
Several localized differences in basin conditions might trigger such pumping and
use patterns. Water quality might be better in one part of the basin than in another. See, e.g.,
Bulletin 118-6, supra note 74, at 75-79 (describing localized groundwater quality in
Sacramento Valley groundwater basin). Pumping lifts may be lower in one part of the basin
than in another. For example, one part of the basin may overlie a shallower aquifer than
another. See id. (Plates 3 & 4). Or, localized pumping patterns might create different cones
of depression in different parts of the same aquifer.
157. If an irrigator did not already have sufficient pumps installed, it might be cheaper
to purchase water from an irrigator who had excess capacity, or who found it otherwise
more profitable to fallow some land and sell water.
158. As noted above, case law has not yet answered this question definitively. See supra
note 115.
159. Pasadenav. Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 28 (Cal. 1949) (emphasis added).
160. Even if the definition encompasses this first situation, further uncertainties exist over
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the ability of other water rights holders to challenge the extraction. In general, water rights
holders might challenge either a change in place of use of groundwater, a change in place
of diversion, or a change in means of diversion. As an example of the first, assume that an
irrigator has been pumping 10,000 acre-feet of groundwater on Parcel A, which drains into
Stream A, and wants to pipe it for use on Parcel B, which drains into Stream B. Assume
further that 10 percent of the 10,000 acre-feet drains off the field of Parcel A into stream A,
and another 10 percent percolates back into the basin under Parcel A. If both parcels overlie
the same aquifer, can the irrigator move the entire 10,000 acre-feet to the other overlying
parcel, or only the 80 percent portion "consumptively" used (either incorporated into a plant
or lost to the atmosphere through evapotranspiration)? Surface water diverters downstream
of Parcel A might complain that the change in place of use was interfering with their rights
to use the 1,000 acre-feet of tailwater. Other overlying users near Parcel A might complain
about the localized effects loss of the 1,000 acre-feet of recharge.
As for the potential complaints of overlying owners to the drop in well water
level, California case law has not addressed in any detail the rights of one overlying owner
to complain about the drop in well water levels caused by another overlying owner's
pumping of a correlative share. See Hutchins, supra note 111, at 484 (concluding "it is
difficult to see why there should be priority in the means of diversion, which is essentially
a means of effectuating use of the water"). Ultimately, the reasonable "method of use"
provisions of Article X of the California Constitution probably provide a standard for
determining the correlative rights of overlying owners to maintenance of a static well water
level. See id. at 485. Other states have addressed well water levels in great detail statutorily.
See generally D. Grant, Reasonable Groundwater Pumping Levels Under the Appropriation
Doctrine: The Law and Underlying Economic Goals, 21 Nat. Res. J. 1 (1981); Effectiveness &
Equity, supra note 96, at 5-10, 24-30.
As for the potential challenge of the downstream appropriator to the 1,000 acrefeet of tail water, again, the California cases do not address the relative legal rights. Between
appropriators to surface water, a junior appropriator has at least a limited right to insist that
a senior maintain the conditions extant at the time the junior began appropriating. See
Hutchins, supranote 111, at 157. For two reasons, however, this rule should not apply to an
appropriator's right to take tail water added to a surface stream by an overlying owner.
First, such a rule would force a pumper to keep pumping perpetually. In contrast, in the
case of junior and senior appropriators to a surface watercourse, if the senior wishes to stop
diverting, it makes more water available to the junior. Second, the water added to the
stream system-at least at the point where the tail water discharges into the stream-is
functionally equivalent to "foreign water." As noted below, infra note 169, an importer of
water into a watershed has absolute right to recapture that water and change its use or
place of use. Unless the 1,000 acre-feet of tail water would have discharged naturally from
the aquifer into the surface stream above the junior appropriator's point of diversion, that
water is in effect water that would otherwise never have been available for appropriation.
Commentators have also noted that even were the "consumptive use" limit to
apply, that standard "does not internalize all third-party effects. Effects not internalized
include those resulting from changes in timing of use, in water quality, and in patterns of
use." G. Gould, Transfer of Water Rights; 29 NAT. RES. J.457, 467 (1989)[hereinafter Transfer
of Water Rights]; see also J. Emel, Groundwater Rights: Definition and Transfer, 27 Nat. Res. J.
653, 666-67 (1987) [hereinafter Definition & Transfer).
Similar challenges might occur to changes in place of extraction. If localized
differences make it more economical for our hypothetical irrigator to stop pumping on
Parcel A and pump instead from Parcel B, this change may lower water levels in wells
adjoining Parcel B.
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land," however, would appear to prohibit transfers under overlying rights
in the second situation.'6
The second category of changes relevant to this article involves
an overlying user who wishes to sell all or part of its previous extractions
for a nonoverlying use. As noted above, an overlying owner's rights are
analogous in many instances to riparian rights of surface water users.,6
Riparian owners are limited to using their water on judicially defined
riparian lands; generally they have no ability to transfer water to nonriparian lands." Thus, a riparian owner who wished use water on nonriparian lands would have to initiate a new appropriation. By analogy,
an overlying user who wished to sell water for use on nonoverlying
lands would need to initiate a groundwater appropriation. As such, the
legal parameters of that right would appear to be governed by groundwater appropriation law.'"
The third category of cases involves an appropriator who wishes
to change the place of use from one nonoverlying site to another nonoverlying site. Groundwater law places uncertain limits, if any, on that
change. An appropriative surface water rights holder may not change the
place of use if such a change would harm other legal users."" Older
Finally, additional uncertainty attends the ability of persons other than water
rights holders to challenge the effects. Although unlikely, in a basin as big as the Sacramento Valley, a change in place of use or extraction might impact local agricultural
economies or the local environment. See infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
A complete analysis of all of these matters is beyond the scope of this article.
161. If "surplus" groundwater existed, such a transfer could probably qualify as a new
appropriation. Such an appropriation would have the most junior priority date in the event
the basin became overdrafted.
If the actual pumper were extracting no more than enough water to meet the
combined correlative rights of both overlying owners, little justification exists for restricting
either overlying owner's rights to find the most economical way to extract the water. The
only possible concerns might be the localized effects of the actual pumper increasing its
extractions from that necessary to satisfy its own correlative rights to that necessary to
satisfy both overlying owners' rights. For example, since the pumper would have to run its
pumps longer, or install more powerful pumps, water levels in wells on nearby parcels
might drop or stay lower longer. These potential concerns, however, would evaporate
entirely if the overlying pumper were simply selling the water it had used. Such a sale,
however, would raise the issues involved in a change of place of use. See supra note 160.
162. See supra note 121.
163. Lee, supra note 155, at 23-26. A riparian can sell to an appropriator a promise not to
divert. Lee, supra note 155, at 23-26.
164. Such a result, while compelled by groundwater law, does nothing to further the
state's expressed policy of encouraging voluntary water transfers. See, e.g., Cal. Water Code
§§ 109, 1244 (West Supp. 1993).
165. See, e.g., Cal. Water Code §§ 1702, 1706 (West 1971) (addressing respectively, post
1914 appropriations and pre-1914 appropriations). These provisions codified prior case law.
See, e.g., Hutchins, supra note I1, at 175-78. Appropriative rights permitees or licensees
must get permission of the State Water Resources Control Board prior to changing the point
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cases involving changes in the point of extraction analogized to the law
governing changes in points of surface water diversion.'" By analogy,
then, changes in place of groundwater use would be permissible
provided no other legal water rights holders are injured. 67
If the groundwater appropriator had always taken the pumped
water completely out of the watershed from which it was pumped, then
no water rights holders would have standing to complain about any new
place of use.'" California law gives the importer of water to a basin the
absolute right to recover and use that water as the importer sees fit.'"
As such, the only possible claims might be by third parties economically
or environmentally impacted by the appropriator's change in place of
use.
The ability of persons other than water rights holders to raise
economic or environmental concerns in any proposed change in place of
groundwater use or extraction is almost completely unaddressed by
California law." The ability of third parties to raise such concerns over
proposed surface water transfers has received a lot of attention in recent
years.' Indeed, recent legislation has broadened the factors the State
Water Resources Control Board considers when reviewing such surface
water transfer proposals."r These statutes, however, have not been

of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use. Cal. Water Code § 1702 (West 1972). The Water
Code details separate provisions for temporary and long term transfers of rights under state
appropriative permits or licenses. Id. §§ 1725 to 1737.
166. See, e.g., City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198 P. 784, 793 (Cal. 1921); see
generally, Hutchins, supra note 111, at 475-76.
167. Cf. San Bernardino v. Riverside, 198 P. at 793. In dicta the court notes, "neither the
particular place of use, the character of the use, nor the place of taking is a necessary factor"
in acquiring an appropriative right. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Arguably, the same result should apply with an appropriator who returned tail
water to the watershed from which it was extracted, but at a place above where the tail
water would have discharged naturally. See supra note 160. Thus, a change in place of use
of an appropriative groundwater right that still returned water above its place of natural
discharge should be allowed over the objections of a surface water appropriator. Where a
groundwater appropriator sought to change the place of use and thus remove water entirely
out of a watershed, or below its point of natural discharge, then downstream appropriators
would have standing to challenge the change. Resolution of such a challenge, of course,
might place great practical difficulties on the party with the burden of proof.
169. See, e.g., Hutchins, supra note 111, at 69-70 (discussing "foreign waters).
170. See B. Gray, A Primer on California Water Transfer Law, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 745 (1989).
171. See, e.g., G. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third Party Effects, 23 Land & Water L.
Rev. 1, 27-35 (1988); Transfer of Water Rights, supra note 170, at 473-75; D. Grant, Public
Interest Review of Water Right Allocation and Transfer in the West: Recognition of Public Values,
19 ARIz. ST. L. J. 681 (1988); Gray, supra note 170, at 749-54.
172. In recent years, the Legislature has added provisions that protect the public's
interest, particularly in beneficial instream uses for fish and wildlife, from the effects of a
water transfer. See, e.g., Cal. Water Code §§ 1435(b), 1727(a), 1736 (West Supp. 1993)
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applied to evaluate proposed groundwater transfers. Moreover, with rare
exception, the State Water Resources Control Board has not asserted
jurisdiction over proposed groundwater transfers. 73
Protection of third parties from the effects of proposed groundwater transfers has begun to receive attention from commentators." 4
In addition, the Department of Water Resources has begun to look at the
environmental and economic consequences of proposed conjunctive use
transfers of surface water that irrigators replace with groundwater.7"
Nevertheless, there remains little law governing groundwater transfers,
and little assurance that third party effects, both to water rights holders,
and to the environment or local economies, will be reviewed efficiently
and coherently by the State Board.
B. Legislative Regulation of PrivateRights to Groundwater
Extraction and Use
Unlike the extensive statutory provisions governing private rights
to surface water, no comprehensive state legislation addresses private
rights to groundwater in California.' 7 ' The state Constitution's prohibitions against unreasonable or wasteful water use apply to groundwater.'" Similarly, the Water Code's general policy statement about the
state's "paramount interest in the use of all the water of the State" also
expressly extends to "underground" waters. 78 Only a handful of
statutes, however, address groundwater extraction." In none of these
(addressing respectively, temporary urgent changes, temporary changes, and long term
transfers).
173. The rare exception to date has been the proposed transfer in 1977 from Yolo County
farmers to Kern County farmers via the State Water Project facilities. See supra note 26; cf.
Lee, supra note 155, at 67-70 (concluding that the decision increases the uncertainty attendant
to interbasin groundwater exports).
174. See, e.g., Gregory, supranote 15, at 237-39; see also Definition & Transfer, supra note 160
(focusing on clarification of property rights in groundwater pumping levels).
175. See Draft EIR, supra note 29, at 35-39, 68-69, 110-16, 136-37, 143-44, 172-75.
176. Final Report, supra note 6, at 145. Groundwater pumpers who extract more than 25
acre-feet annually from aquifers in four Southern California counties must file an annual
"notice of extraction and diversion of water" with the State Water Resources Control Board.
Cal. Water Code §§ 4999-5008 (West 1971 & Supp. 1993).
177. This provision applies to groundwater extractions. See Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40
P.2d 486 (Cal. 1935) (construing Cal. Const. art. X, § 2, repealed and replaced by Cal. Const.
art. 10, § 2).
178. Cal. Water Code § 104 (West 1972).
179. While the legislature has not adopted uniform groundwater appropriation, use, or
transfer legislation, it has addressed statewide concerns with groundwater quality, basin
conditions, and recharge projects in four types of statutes. Three sets of water quality
statutes address groundwater. These include: a) the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control
Act, addressing water quality planning, see, e.g., Cal. Water Code §§ 13050(e), (j), 13142(a)
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has the legislature created a uniform scheme for establishing and transferring rights to extract and use groundwater. Instead of regulating groundwater rights comprehensively at the state level, the legislature's few
efforts to regulate private rights to groundwater uses have generally
taken one of three paths. First, some statutes have created specific classes
of agencies, subject to local formation, with power to manage groundwater.'" Second, the legislature has created special groundwater management districts.1"' Finally, three statutes enacted over the last nine years
generically allow some local groundwater regulation by existing local
entities.
In 1984, the legislature enacted sweeping "area of origin" protections for over a dozen identified Northern California stream systems.'"
The legislation bars groundwater pumping for export "from within the
combined Sacramento and Delta-Central Sierra Basins... unless the
pumping is in compliance with a groundwater management plan that is
adopted by [county] ordinance ....""It expressly announces: "Inloth-

(West. 1971 & Supp. 1993); b) the statewide water well drilling standards legislation, id.
13700-13806; and c) the State Water Resources Control Board's authority to initiate a
groundwater basin adjudication to preserve water quality; see id. §§ 2100-2102. The PorterDolwig Groundwater Basin Protection Law announces the State's concern with overdraft.
See id. §§ 12920-12924. The Porter-Dolwig law allows the Department of Water Resources
to review local groundwater management "projects," but funding provisions have been
eliminated. Id. § 12923; see also 1961 Cal. Stat. 3315 (repealed by 1967 Cal. Stat. 969,970). The
Porter-Dolwig act's principal contribution was the preparation of a report issued in 1980
addressing groundwater problems. Bulletin 118-80, supra note 12; see Calif. Water Code §
12924 (mandating report). Other state legislation has included studies of groundwater
conditions and use. See, e.g., Cal. Water Code §§ 10825-26 (West 1992) (a survey of
groundwater resources and uses is required as part of mandatory agricultural water
management plans). And, the legislature has authorized funding for certain groundwater
recharge pro"-ts. See, e.g., id. §4 12925 to 12928.6.
180. Three examples of general legislation establishing classes of agencies with
groundwater management include: 1) Groundwater replenishment districts. Cal. Water Code
§§60000-60449 (West 1966 & Supp. 1993). Such districts have express authority to commence
"actions and proceedings" to, inter alia, "prevent unlawful exportation of water from the
district." Id. § 60230(g) (West Supp. 1993). The statutes do not address the circumstances
constituting "unlawful exportation." 2) Water conservation districts. Id. §§ 74000 to 76501.
These statutes authorize groundwater replenishment funded by groundwater management
charges, id. at §§ 75500-75523, but the enabling statutes do not expressly mention
groundwater export restrictions. 3) Metropolitan water districts. Id. §§ 71000 to 73001. These
districts also have power to replenish groundwater and assess charges for groundwater
pumping, id. §§ 71682 to 71689.6, but the enabling legislation does not directly address
groundwater exportation.
181. For a discussion of one of these acts, the Sierra Valley Groundwater District Act, and
its progeny, see infra notes 431-70 and accompanying text.
182. Cal. Water Code §§ 1215 to 1222 (West Supp. 1993).
183. Cal. Water Code § 1220 (a) (West Supp. 1993). The section defines "Sacramento and
Delta-Central Sierra Basins" by reference to California Dep't of Water Resources, The
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withstanding any other provision of law, a county board of supervisors
whose county contains part of the combined Sacramento and DeltaCentral Sierra Basins may adopt groundwater management plans to
implement the purposes of this section."'" The statute says nothing,
however, about the elements of such a plan."

California Water Plan Outlook, Bulletin 160-74 (1974) [hereinafter Bulletin 160-741. Bulletin
160-74, however, does not "define" these two basins; rather, it indicates on a map the general
location of two "hydrologic study areas" bearing the same names. Bulletin 160-74, supra, at
3-4, 6. Thus, as the Department of Water Resources noted prior to the statute's enactment,
"the bill technically applies to nothing." N. Waters, California Dep't Of Water Res., Enrolled
Bill Report A.B. 178 1 (1978) [hereinafter Enrolled Bill Report]; see also N. Waters, California
Dep't Of Water Resources, Bill Analysis A.B. 178 3 (1974) [hereinafter Enrolled Bill Analysis].
These technical flaws, and the host of unanswered questions raised below about
the statute's scope, demonstrate that the counties have no monopoly on poor statutory
drafting. They also temper hopes that the state legislature is more likely to produce a
coherent groundwater plan than the sum total of efforts by individual counties. At the very
least, even a poorly drafted state scheme would allow for greater consistency throughout
the state, at least after judicial interpretation.
184. Cal. Water Code § 1220(b) (West Supp. 1993). It precludes the exercise of such
powers, however, "within the boundaries of another local agency supplying water to that
area without the prior agreement of the governing body of that other local agency." Id. §
1220(c).
Section 1220 imposes two additional requirements that greatly confuse the
groundwater management planning process. Subsection (a) requires the appropriate county
board of supervisors to consult with "affected water districts" before adopting a groundwater management plan. Id. § 1220(a). The same subsection also requires approval of such a
plan by "a vote in the counties or portions of counties that overlie the groundwater basin."
Id. These two provisions raise a host of unanswered questions, and might combine to make
enactment of any groundwater management plan impossible.
The "consultation" requirement neither defines "district" nor indicates the statute's
geographic reach. As to the definition of "district," does it apply only to local public agencies
that supply water? As noted above, subsection (c) allows other local agencies who supply
water to veto the enforcement of any such plan within the water supplier's service area.
This veto power would seem to adequately protect these public agency water suppliers.
Arguably, the consultation requirement should extend to any agency concerned with water
management activities, such as flood control. Even if such other agencies lack a veto power
under subsection (c), they may still be "affected" by the plan, and deserve consultation. As
to the statute's geographic scope, does a county who wishes to manage groundwater under
section 1220(b) have to consult only with those "affected districts" within the county itself?
Arguably, a district in a different county that nevertheless overlies a different portion of the
same aquifer might also be "affected" by a proposed groundwater management plan.
Indeed, the consultation requirement's reach might extend even further, to any water district
within the state that proposed to import groundwater, or surface water replaced by
groundwater. To date, no court has addressed any of these requirements.
The "voting" requirement further confuses the statutory scheme. Assume that
County A wishes to use its powers under section 1220(b). Further assume that Counties B
through X also overlie a portion of the combined basins identified by section 1220(a). Who
votes to approve the ordinance adopting the groundwater management plan? The statute
seems to imply a public referendum. Do all registered voters in County A vote, or only
landowners in County A? or only those voters (or landowners) who live in the portion of
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Several circumstances may limit the otherwise broad reach of this
statute. First, it does not apply to exports by either the federal Bureau of
Reclamation or the state Department of Water Resources.lss Second, the
the county that overlies the designated basins? Section 1220(a) refers to a vote "in the
counties or portions of counties that overlie the groundwater basin." Id. § 1220(a) (emphasis
added). Does that mean that citizens of the other 23 counties (i.e., Counties B through X)
also get to vote on County A's ordinance? To approve the plan, must a majority of eligible
voters in each eligible county vote to approve it? If so, that would give any one county veto
power over all the other counties' plans. Alternatively, will the ordinance pass if a majority
of all voters (from all counties combined) vote to approve it? That would give the more
populated counties the power to control the outcome.
During the legislative process, the Department of Water Resources noted some
ambiguity in the voting requirement. Its report to the governor states: "[Section 12201 also
requires the plan to be approved by one county board of supervisors, but there is no way
of determining which one. This establishes a condition that cannot be met. These problems
were called to the attention of the author's staff during the session." See Enrolled Bill Report,
supra note 183, at 1.
These latter two points demonstrate the practical absurdity of allowing a vote on
County A's groundwater management plan outside of County A. Indeed, in a letter urging
the governor to sign the bill, the statute's principal author suggested that "the county" that
proposed the ordinance would be the county that voted on it. Letter from Norman S.
Waters, California Assemblyman, to George Deukmejian, Governor, California I (Sept. 5,
1984). "A local groundwater management plan adopted by ordinance by the county board
of supervisors . ..and subsequently approved by a vote in the county." Id. (emphasis
added). If this view were to prevail, the "portions of counties that overlie the groundwater
basin" might simply mean that if a county overlies only part of the basin, it, too, may
manage groundwater in that portion of the county that overlies the basin. See Cal. Water
Code § 1220(c) (West Supp. 1993). If such a county only overlay a portion of the basin,
under this narrower interpretation of the voting requirement, only those citizens who lived
in the portion overlying the designated basins would be able to vote.
A glance at Bulletin 160-74 demonstrates that only ten counties entirely overlie the
"combined Sacramento and Delta-Central Sierra Basins:" Shasta, Tehama, Butte, Plumas,
Colusa, Sutter, Yuba, Yolo, Sacramento and Amador. Seventeen counties overlie a portion
of the combined basins, but also overlie other "basins" (i.e., "hydrologic study areas"):
Modoc, Siskiyou, Glenn, Lassen, Sierra, Nevada, Alpine, Placer, El Dorado, Calaveras, San
Joaquin, Stanislaus, Lake, Napa, Solano, Contra Costa, and Alameda.
185. See Cal. Water Code § 10753.7 (West Supp. 1993) (A.B. 3030 groundwater management plan legislation may include any of twelve specified elements).
186. Section 1215 exempts appropriations that are "subject to [Water Codel Section 11460."
Id. § 1215. Section 11460 is part of the "Watershed Protection Act." Id. §§ 11460-11465 (West
1992). Section 11128 makes section 11460 apply to "any agency of the State or Federal
Government which shall undertake the construction or operation of the [Central Valley
Project]." Id. at § 11128. While the "Central Valley Project" often refers to only that portion
of the massive dam and aqueduct empire constructed and operated by the Bureau of
Reclamation, sections 11200-11295 demonstrate that "Central Valley Project" includes all the
elements associated with both the Bureau's "CVP" facilities and the Department of Water
Resources' "State Water Project" (SWP) facilities. See id.
§§ 11200 to 11295.
Two possible interpretations of the interplay of this exemption and the other area
of origin exemptions exist. First, in enacting sections 1215-1222, the legislature may have
concluded that the state and federal projects were burdened enough by section 11460 to
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legislation applies only "to a water supplier exporting or intending to
export water for use outside a protected area pursuant to... groundwater
appropriations initiated after January 1, 1985."" On its face, then, the
statute apparently does not limit, or authorize limitation of, the transfers
of groundwater out of the county of extraction for use in another county
on land that is also within the same protected area."' Similarly, on its
face, the legislation does not apply to "groundwater appropriations" that
had been initiated before 1985. The undefined reference to "appropriations" creates confusion. If, on the one hand, the legislature used it
make undesirable additional restrictions. Alternatively, the legislature may have concluded
that the restrictions of sections 1215-1222 duplicated the restrictions of section 11460, and
thus made unnecessary the additional restrictions. Under this latter interpretation, section
11460 already prohibits groundwater export by the Bureau and Department. Under the
former interpretation, no export bar exists directly, so long as the two projects do not
deprive the watersheds of origin of the water they otherwise need.
An additional question arises from DWR's operation of the Drought Water Bank.
To the extent the Water Bank transactions do not involve the use of SWP or CVP facilities
to store or wheel water, then, arguably, sections 1215-1222 might apply and restrict the
export of groundwater. For example, purchases from the Yuba County Water Agency could
be sold to the City of San Francisco without use of SWP or CVP facilities. See Draft EIR,
supra note 29, at xxv-xxvi. Two quick answers to this problem appear. First, so far, little
actual groundwater has been pumped for the Drought Water Bank. See supra note 29.
Second, all the Water Bank purchases collectively could be considered to create a unified
pool of water inevitably stored or transported in part in some SWP or CVP facility.
187. Cal. Water Code § 1215 (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). The "protected areas"
are those stream systems specifically identified in section 1215.5. See id. § 1215.5.
188. Thus, the statute would not bar the proposed transfer of water by the Colusa County
farmers, supra note 30, from their Tehama County property to their Colusa County property
as both parcels are within the same protected area.
Arguably, the statute also might not prohibit a transfer from within one protected
area for use on land in another protected area. Section 1215 limits the legislation to export
for use "outside a protected area." Cal. Water Code § 1215 (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis
added). In this context, "'a' protected area" is ambiguous. On the one hand, removal of
groundwater from any one listed protected area involves use outside of that protected area.
As such, the prohibitions would apply. On the other hand, however, groundwater
transported from one protected area for use in another protected area is not being used
outside of "a" protected area. Rather, the groundwater is simply being used outside of the
original protected area. Under this interpretation, the export restrictions might not apply.
References to "a" protected area pepper the statutes. See, e.g., id. §§ 1215.6, 1216,
1218, 1219 and 1219.5. In section 1217(a), however, the legislature gives water users in "a
protected area" the right to purchase from a water supplier who is intending to export water
from "the" protected area. Id. § 1217(a) (emphasis added). Similarly, subsection (b) allows
water users from "a" protected area to require a potential water exporter from "the"
protected area to meet and negotiate a potential water supply contract. Id. § 1217(b)
(emphasis added). Arguably, the legislature's use of "the" demonstrates that it knew how
to specify a protected area when it so intended. Section 1217(d), however, blunts this
conclusion. In that section, the legislature allows the proposed exporter from "a" protected
area and the water users of "a" protected area to set up their negotiations as they choose.
Id. § 1217(d). Thus, the legislature itself is inconsistent in its use of "a" and "the."
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generically to refer to any groundwater extractions, the statute would
exempt all pre-1985 extractions from the export restrictions." On the
other hand, the legislature might have used "appropriations" in a
traditional legal sense to distinguish overlying from nonoverlying uses.
Under such an interpretation, a pre-1985 nonoverlying use would appear
exempt from the export restrictions. Post-January 1,1985, conversions to
non-overlying use of pre-existing extractions made under overlying rights
would appear to be within the export restrictions.'" Finally, the statute
does not define "water supplier." On the one hand, this might apply to
any one who diverts or extracts groundwater. On the other hand, it might
apply only to an organization or entity proposing to sell water. 91
An additional aspect of the legislation's scope also requires
clarification. As noted above, section 1220 requires the relevant groundwater export pumping to be "in compliance with [an adopted] groundwater management plan."" The legislation does not directly address the
effect on potential exports of a county's failure to adopt a groundwater
management plan. On the one hand, if no such management plan exists,
exports are not not in compliance. If there is no such plan, then there is
nothing with which to comply. Such an interpretation would appear to
allow exports until such time as a county enacts an applicable management plan." On the other hand, the statute arguably bans all export

189. Of course, common law may otherwise limit an overlying owner's ability to sell
groundwater for use off basin. See supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
190. The legislative history sheds no light on the meaning of "appropriations."
191. Under this narrower interpretation, the statute would not bar export from land
owned by one owner for use outside the protected area on land also owned by that same
overlying owner. Support for this narrower reading comes from the subsequent definition
of "water user or users." Section 1215.6 states: "For the purposes of this article, 'water user
or users' within a protected area means an appropriator or appropriators, a riparian user
or users, or a groundwater user or users of water on land owned or controlled by them
within a protected area." Cal. Water Code § 1215.6 (West Supp. 1993). By separately defining
"water user" without reference to "water suppliers," arguably the legislature intended the
two terms to have different meanings.
In its "Bill Analysis," DWR concluded that "[tihe only likely agencies that would
be brought under the law are the East Bay Municipal Utility District, City of San Francisco
and Los Angeles. Department of Water and Power when they seek new permits." Enrolled
Bill Analysis, supra note 183, at 2.
192. Cal. Water Code § 1220(a) (West Supp. 1993).
193. More precisely, such an interpretation would mean that section 1220 does not itself
independently restrict groundwater exports. Several counties have argued that their inherent
police powers support groundwater export restrictions. See, e.g., Rossmann & Steel, supra
note 18, at 933-50 (arguing that the Inyo County groundwater management ordinance,
restricting exports without permits, is within the county's police power). To date, while no
California appellate court has addressed the matter, the three state trial courts that have
considered the matter have not upheld these claims. See supra note 42 (noting decisions on
exporting in Inyo, Nevada, and Tehama counties).
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pumping until authorized by an appropriate management plan. Only after
such a plan's enactment would export pumping "comply.""
In 1991 and 1992, the legislature expanded its generic authorization of groundwater management plans beyond the local agencies
permitted to act by section 1220. In 1991, it enacted A.B. 255.195 That
statute allowed specified "local agencies" in the 11 basins identified as
"critically overdrafted" to adopt "programs for the management of
groundwater resources" within their service areas."
In 1992, with A.B. 3030, the legislature repealed A.B. 255." In
its place, the legislature extended the authorization to enact "groundwater
management programs " " to specified local agencies in all major
groundwater basins within the state.'" The statute applies to those

194. A review of the statute's legislative history supports this latter interpretation. For
example, a bill analysis prepared by the staff of the Assembly Water, Parks, and Wildlife
Committee stated: 'his bill would prohibit the extraction and export of Sacramento Valley
groundwater unless there is a groundwater management plan adopted by the Board of
Supervisors." Assembly Water, Parks & Wildlife Committee, Staff Report: A.B. 178 1 (1984);
see also id. at 2 (uncertain whether measure will encourage local planning). Cf. Enrolled Bill
Analysis, supra note 183, at 1-2; Letter from Jim Nielsen, State Senator, to Norm Waters 1-2
(Mar. 26, 1984) 1-2 (inability to obtain agreement among overlying counties will preclude
all groundwater export).
195. Cal. Water Code §§ 10750-10767 (repealed 1992).
196. Cal.Water Code §§ 10750-10752 (repealed 1992). The statute provided absolutely no
legislative guidance about the features of such "programs."
197. Law of Sep. 26, 1992, ch. 947, § 1 [hereinafter A.B. 30301. Portions of A.B. 3030 allow
continuation of plans initiated under A.B. 255. A.B. 3030, supra (adding § 10750.9 to the
California Water Code).
198. A.B. 3030 defines a "groundwater management program" as: "a coordinated and
ongoing activity undertaken for the benefit of a groundwater basin, or a portion of a
groundwater basin, pursuant to a groundwater management plan adopted pursuant to this
part." Cal. Water Code § 10752(e) (West Supp. 1993). It defines a "groundwater management
plan as "a document that describes the activities intended to be included in a groundwater
management program." Cal. Water Code § 10752(d) (West Supp. 1993).
199. A.B. 3030, supra note 197 (adding Cal. Water Code § 10753). The legislation excludes
two types of basins and one type of well. First, it excludes any portion of any basin "that
is subject to groundwater management by a local agency or a watermaster pursuant to other
provisions of law... unless the local agency or watermaster agrees...[to be subject to a new
plan]." Cal. Water Code § 10750.2(b) (West Supp. 1993). Second, it exempts any basin "in
which the average well yield is less than 100 gallons per minute." Id. Finally, except in
critically overdrafted basins, it excludes groundwater extraction facilities that are "used to
provide water for domestic purposes to a single-unit residence (and any additional
authorized attached dwellings)." Cal. Water Code § 10755.4 (West Supp. 1992).
The statute specifies two classes of "local agencies" authorized to undertake
"groundwater management programs." First, it expressly defines "local agencies" as: "any
local public agency that provides water service to all or a portion of its service area." Id. §
10752(g). Second, it also allows other "local public agencies" that do not meet the criteria of
section 10752 (g) also to undertake such programs if: a) "water service is not provided by
a local agency", and b) "Ithe local public agency provides flood control, groundwater
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"groundwater basins" as defined by the Department of Water Resources
in Bulletin 118-75.' Like A.B. 255 "programs," A.B. 3030 programs have
no mandatory requirements.2°1 Rather, the statute specifies twelve
provisions that such a program may contain."

quality management, or groundwater replenishment." Id.§ 10753(b)1-2.
These definitions would thus not authorize a county to manage groundwater
unless that county either provided water service itself, or, in some circumstances, provided
flood control, groundwater quality management, or groundwater replenishment. The statute
only authorizes county management in the latter instances if no other local public agency
supplies water service within the groundwater basin.
The statute addresses some of the problems of overlapping jurisdictions. In
critically overdrafted groundwater basins, "a local agency may not manage groundwater
[under A.B. 30301 within the service area of another local agency without the agreement of
that other entity." Id. § 10750.8. In basins that are not critically overdrafted, a local agency
that seeks to regulate groundwater must get the approval not only of any other local
agency, but also of any "water corporation regulated by the Public Utilities Commission, or
a mutual water company." Id. § 10750.7.
In addition, it promotes "coordinated" basin planning where multiple empowered
agencies have jurisdiction over a portion of the basin. See id. §§ 10750, 10752(e), 10755.2(a),
10755.3 (noting respectively, interagency cooperation encouraged, "program" defined as a
"coordinated .. .activity", a coordinated plan intended, and empowered agencies with
jurisdiction meet annually).
200. By limiting the management powers to DWR identified groundwater basins, the
statute does not authorize regulation of groundwater resources not formally identified as
"basins." For example, some fractured rock groundwater in mountain regions would escape
regulation.
201. For a time during the 1992 session, the legislature was considering a bill that would
have created the "California Groundwater Management Act." See S.B. 867 (1992) (as
amended Jul. 29,1992). This bill would have established general duties and responsibilities
of groundwater management districts. See Assembly Committee on Local Government,
Digest-S.B. 867,1 (1992). These powers would have included, inter alia: 1) imposition of well
spacing requirements and well operation regulations; 2) export restrictions, including a
permit; 3) well registration requirements; 4) and extraction fees. Id. at 1-3. Ultimately, the
legislature removed the sweeping, state wide provisions, and passed the bill as special
legislation creating the Glenn County Groundwater Management District. S.B. 867 (1992)
(version enacted). Governor Wilson, however, vetoed both that bill and S.B. 207, a
substantially identical, subsequently enacted bill that removed a provision that had earlier
offended the Governor. See Governor Pete Wilson to the California Senate Members, letter
note 469; see also A.B. 3030, supra note 197 (as
of Oct. 26, 1992, vetoing S.B. 207; see also infra
amended in Assembly April 20, 1992, requiring four components of all groundwater
management plans).
202. Cal. Water Code § 10753.7 (West Supp. 1993). The express list includes: 1) saltwater
intrusion control; 2) wellhead protection and recharge area management; 3) contaminated
groundwater migration control; 4) well abandonment and destruction management; 5)
overdraft mitigation; 6) groundwater replenishment; 7) groundwater levels and storage
monitoring; 8) conjunctive use facilitation; 9) well construction policy identification; 10)
authorization of projects for groundwater contamination cleanup, recharge, storage,
conservation, water recycling and extraction; 11) development of relationships with state
and federal agencies; and 12) land use planning coordination. Id.
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On its face, A.B. 3030 does not directly authorize groundwater
export controls. Arguably, such provisions are a component of a
groundwater management programs." Section 10753.7 (k) authorizes
the appropriate local agencies to "mitigate conditions of overdraft."'
"Mitigation" can mean "to lessen in severity or burden."' ° Reduction of
export pumping could be one component of an effort "to lessen [the]
severity or burden" of overdraft.' Moreover, section 10753.8 implicitly
allows an authorized agency to "limit or suspend extractions" when that
agency "has determined through study and investigation that groundwater replenishment programs or other alternative sources of water supply
have proved insufficient or unfeasible to lessen the demand for groundwater."' Finally, section 10754 extends the powers of water replenish-

203. Some authority, however, implicitly supports a conclusion that A.B. 3030 districts
have no export restriction authority. In the few special district acts that have expressly
created local regulatory bodies with authority over groundwater export, the legislature has
placed groundwater export provisions and groundwater management provisions in separate
sections. See infra notes 434-60 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra Valley Groundwater Basin Act); Cal. Water Code-App. §§ 119-706 to 119-709.7, 119-702 (West Supp. 1993)
(addressing export management and general management powers). The close proximity of
these sections only weakly supports a distinction between export and management
authorities. Equally plausible is an interpretation that has export restrictions merely one
instance, albeit one described in detail, of management powers. Supporting this conclusion
is the district's name: the Sierra Valley Groundwater Management District. The export
restrictions are thus simply one of this groundwater management district's management
powers.
204. Cal. Water Code § 10753.7(e) (West Supp. 1993).
205. Ballentine's Law Dictionary 808 (1969). Cf. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14 § 15370 (1990)
(CEQA guidelines definition of "mitigation").
206. If groundwater export controls are proper components of overdraft mitigation
exports, an additional question arises. Can the appropriate local public agencies enact a
groundwater management program that only contained an export ban? Section 10753.7 does
not mandate any particular component or set of components that such a plan must contain.
Similarly, even if such an export ban were a "plan," A.B. 3030 does not appear to validate
retroactively groundwater export ordinances that counties passed prior to the statute's
enactment. See Cal. Water Code §§ 10750.9, 10753.2 to 10753.6 (West Supp. 1993).
207. Cal. Water Code § 10753.8(c) (West Supp. 1993). The authorization is only inplicit
since the section begins: "Inlothing in this part shall be construed as authorizing the local
agency to limit or suspend extractions unless Ithe agency makes the two required
determinations]." Id. (emphasis added).
Section 10753.8 (b) states that A.B. 3030 does not authorize a local agency "to make
a binding determination of the water rights of any person or entity." Id. § 10753.8 (b)"
(emphasis added). Superficially, an appropriator whose export use was curtailed under a
groundwater management scheme might seek some solace under this provision. Most likely,
however, it provides little comfort. A.B. 3030 authorizes local regulation of rights otherwise
created under state law. Section 10753.8 (b) merely negates any suggestion that A.B. 3030
bestows adjudicative powers over the scope and acquisition of state created rights. The entire
scheme, however, expressly grants legislative powers to the identified local agencies. It is in
the exercise of such legislative powers that the local agencies can restrict the state created
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ment districts to public agencies who adopt groundwater management
plans under A.B. 3030. "For the purposes of replenishing the groundwater supplies within the district, a [water replenishment] district...
[may] conserve water within or outside of the district. "' Arguably,
such "conservation" powers authorize an export ban. Moreover, as noted
above, water replenishment districts also may "commence, maintain,
intervene in, defend and compromise . . . any and all actions and
proceedings... to prevent the unlawful exportation of water from the
district."21 0
The 1992 legislative session saw one additional law addressing
groundwater export and local groundwater management plans. In A.B.
2897, the legislature addressed water users who replaced transferred
surface waters with groundwater.21' In adding section 1745.10 to the
rights. A consideration of the constitutionality of such a grant of power, or the compensability under the takings clause of any appropriative rights curtailed as a result of the exercise
of such power, is beyond the scope of this article.
208. Cal. Water Code § 10754 (West Supp. 1993).
209. Id. § 60230(f).
210. Id. § 60230(g). As previously noted, nothing in the water replenishment district act
defines "unlawful exportation of water." See supra note 180.
211. See Cal. Water Code §§ 1745 to 1745.11 (West Supp. 1993). As noted above, many of
the environmental effects of such replacement pumping are identical to the effects of
outright pumping for export. See supra note 29. Since groundwater is pumped from the
basin, overdraft related problems may well be exacerbated. Some differences in the scope
and type of harms from such replacement pumping may reduce somewhat the magnitude
of problems when compared with the potential from literal pumping for export. First, some
return flows will percolate back to the aquifer from the replacement pumping, whereas no
such return flows will percolate back from an outright export. By itself, this distinction goes
only to the question of the quantification of the right to transfer groundwater out of a basin.
A second difference has also been raised by some, such as the noted Sacramento
attorney George Basye. Mr. Basye argues that replacement water users are limited in the
amount of water they will pump from the basin by the overlying uses to which they will
apply the water. Remarks of George Basye, CLE International, California Water Law
Conference, San Francisco, California (March 18, 1993). For example, a farmer who transfers
entitlements to 1,000 acre-feet of surface water that would normally irrigate a 250 acre parcel
is only going to pump I,00 acre-feet from the basin to irrigate that same parcel. In contrast,
he argues, no such practical limitations restrict the pumper for export. Only the capacity of
the literal export pumper's wells would limit its ability to remove groundwater out of the
basin.
This second distinction seems only a matter of degree, and not of true difference.
If the replacement water use is long enough.and widespread enough, it seems perfectly able
to have the same long-term environmental consequences as true export pumping. The main
difference between pure export pumping and replacement pumping seems to lie not in the
ability of the two schemes to overdraft a basin, but in the local economic consequences of
such depletion. Replacement pumping does keep local agro-economies operating. Pure
export pumping does not necessarily guarantee the economies at the water source that
locally circulating dollars will replace the waters overdrafted from the basin. The concerns
about local third party effects of water transfers demand attention. The attention, however,
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Water Code, the legislature prohibited such replacements "unless the
groundwater use is either . . . . (a) Consistent with a groundwater
management plan adopted pursuant to state law for the affected area. (b)
[or, if no such plan exists, the replacement is] [aipproved by the water
supplier from whose area the water is to be transferred."2" In the latter
instance, the water supplier must determine that the "transfer will not
create, or contribute to, conditions of long-term overdraft in the affected
groundwater basin."21 3 By its own terms, A.B. 2897 does not authorize
groundwater management authority; rather, it refers only to plans
adopted pursuant to other, unspecified "state laws."'2 4
IV. COUNTY ORDINANCES: A SURVEY
Given the lack of state attention to groundwater regulation, much
of the development of the law in this area has occurred as a result of
local legislative efforts. A survey of the these efforts serves at least two
purposes.215 First, as noted above, the legislature has recently and
increasingly granted express authority for counties and other local bodies
to regulate groundwater. The extent crop of ordinances, even if preempted completely or partially, nevertheless will likely serve as the
models for the new ordinances likely to be budding under A.B. 3030 and
its progeny. Several important lessons in legislative drafting can be
learned from the current ordinances. Second, the survey leads to some

should be as part of a coherent state plan to use resources wisely, and not to balkanize or
erect underground Berlin walls against the possibility of any groundwater export.
212. Cal. Water Code § 1745.10 (West Supp. 1993).
213. Id.
214. It is unclear whether A.B. 2897, like Water Code § 1220, is a disincentive to enacting
a groundwater management plan in an area that is opposed to groundwater exports. As
noted above, Water Code § 1220 purports to ban groundwater exports until a water plan
exist. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. Thus, if an area of origin is opposed to any
exports, section 1220 gives such an area an incentive not to enact a plan. Similarly, the first
subsection of section 1745.10 gives an area of origin a similar disincentive to enact a plan
that would authorize such replacement pumping. The second subsection, however, tempers
this disincentive by allowing the surface water supplier to authorize replacement pumping
even without going to the trouble (and potential controversy) of enacting a groundwater
management plan.
The interaction of A.B. 2897 and A.B. 3030 is not addressed directly by either
statute. Presumably, in most instances, the "water supplier" addressed in A.B. 2897 will also
be a "local public agency" within the meaning of A.B. 3030.
215. To obtain the materials discussed in this section, the author surveyed the county
counsels for all 58 California Counties. The survey asked whether a given county has had,
now had, or is considering a groundwater export ordinance or policy statement. Of the 58
counties, 43 responded. The author appreciates the survey respondents' efforts in bringing
several useful matters to his attention.
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conclusions about the overall coherence and wisdom of the state's slow
motion progress towards groundwater management.
The counties surveyed represent three distinct regions: five
predominantly lie in the groundwater rich Sacramento Valley; 216 two lie
in the Eastern Sierra, 11"and the last lies in the southern desert. 218 Of
these eight counties, six still have ordinances on the books: Butte, Glenn,
Imperial, Modoc, Sacramento and Tehama.,1 9 The two remaining counties, Nevada and Inyo, have ordinances that are no longer enforced as a
result of settlements of litigation.?" For convenience, the article discusses the ordinances in the approximate order of their enactment.
A.

Imperial County: The Original GroundwaterExport Ordinance

As part of a long and tortuous effort to restrict groundwater
exports from Imperial County to Mexico, 21 in 1972, Imperial County
enacted the first county ordinance restricting groundwater export. m
Over twenty years later, the ordinance remains on the books, although its

216. These five counties include Butte, Glenn, Modoc, Sacramento, and Tehama. See
Bulletin 160-74, supra note 183, at 6 (dividing state into 11 Hydrologic Study Areas).
217. These two include Nevada and Inyo Counties. See Bulletin 160-74, supra note 183, at
6.
218. The desert county is Imperial County. See Bulletin 160-74, supra note 183, at 6.
219. Butte County, Cal., Code ch. 33 (Supp. 1978); Glenn County, Cal., Code ch. 20.04
(1991); Imperial County, Cal., Code §§ 56300-56315 (1978); Modoc County, Cal., Code ch.
13.08 (1978); Sacramento County, Cal., Code § 15.08.095 (1980); Tehama County, Cal., Code
title 9, ch. 9.40 (1992). The Tehama County ordinance was recently invalidated in Myers v.
County of Tehama, No. 18498 (Tehama County Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 1993). See also infra note
223 (Imperial County seeking special district legislation).
220. Inyo County, Cal., Code ch. 7.01 (1980) (added by Referendum Measure A); Nevada
County, Cal. Land Use And Development Code, ch. X, art. 6 (1988). After the trial court
struck down the Nevada County ordinance, the Nevada County Board of Supervisors,
sitting in their capacity as head of the Nevada County Water Agency, enacted a virtually
identical ordinance. See infra note 380.
221. See County of Imperial v. McDougal, 564 P.2d 14, 16, applicationdenied, 434 U.S. 899,
appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977) (for want of substantial federal question); Munoz v.
County of Imperial, 604 F.2d 1174, 1175 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 903, judgment
vacated, 449 U.S. 54 (1980), on remand, 636 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir.), on remand, 510 F. Supp. 879
(S.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 667 F.2d 811 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
222. Imperial County, Cal., Ordinance No. 432 (Nov. 21,1972). Section 2 of Ordinance No.
432 added Chapter 2 ("Ground Water Appropriations") to Division 6, Title 5 of the Codified
Ordinances of Imperial County. Id. § 2. In 1978, Imperial County renumbered the chapter
to Chapter 3. Imperial County, Cal., Ordinance No. 669, § 2 (Nov. 21, 1978).
Ordinance No. 432 replaced a similarly titled chapter that had been added by
Ordinance No. 420 only four months before Ordinance No. 432's enactment. Imperial
County, Cal., Ordinance No. 420 (July18,1972). Because the scheme set up under Ordinance
No. 420 was so short lived, and largely incorporated into the scheme set up under
Ordinance No. 432, the article focuses solely on Ordinance No. 432.
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immediate future looks dim.P Like the later ordinances from other
counties that also address groundwater export, the Imperial ordinance
makes findings,74 defines terms,' and establishes a permit process
affecting some water exporters.?
1. Findings and Definitions
The ordinance's initial section first notes the importance of
groundwater to portions of arid Imperial County. 7 It then announces
its principal concern: protection of the local water supply from "overdrafts."m It concludes strongly: "[tihe Board intends that the right to
appropriate water should be denied or limited where there is substantial
evidence of overdraft."'
After announcing its concern with overdraft, the Imperial
ordinance then defines ten terms.m Five of these terms are crucial to
understanding the ordinance's substantive provisions. First, it defines the
ordinance's central concern, "overdraft," as "any draft of water from the
groundwater basin in excess of the safe yield of the basin.""' It then
defines two components of "overdraft:" "groundwater basin" and "safe
yield."

223. Imperial County is currently reviewing possible state legislation that would create
an Imperial County Groundwater Management District. Letter from Joanne L. Yeager,
Assistant County Counsel, County of Imperial, to Brad Epstein, Legal Research Assistant
(Oct. 8,1992). The district's boundaries would be coextensive with the county's boundaries.
Id.; see Imperial County Groundwater Management Act § 102 (Feb. 20, 1992) (draft). The
possible legislation draws extensively from the Sierra Valley Groundwater Management
District Act, Cal. Water Code-App. §§ 119-101 to -1301 (West Supp. 1992), and the Mono
County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District Act, Cal. Water Code-App. §§ 128-1
to -901 (West Supp. 1992). See infra notes 434-60 and accompanying text.
224. Imperial County, Cal., Codified Ordinances § 56200 (1972) (amended 1978). See infra
notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
225. Imperial County, Cal., Codified Ordinances § 56201 (1972) (amended 1978). See infra
notes 230-53 and accompanying text.
226. Imperial County, Cal., Codified Ordinances §§ 56202-56212 (1972) (amended 1978).
See infra notes 254-59 and accompanying text.
227. Id. § 56200.
228. Id. Section 56200 also announces an intent to "gather and analyze data so as to
understand the effects of water appropriations on particular water basins and surrounding
areas." Id.

229. id.
230. Id. § 56201.
231. Id. § 56201(f). The ordinance does not separately define "draft."
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The ordinance defines "groundwater basin" as: "a water aquifer
or series of interrelated aquifers located in the County of Imperial." 2
It defines "safe yield" in detail:
the amount of groundwater which can be withdrawn from a
basin or series of interconnected basins annually without
producing harmful effects on the supply in the basin. Specifically, safe yield is the amount of water which can be withdrawn without either:
(1) Exceeding in any calendar year the long-term mean annual
water supply of the basin (considering all sources of recharge
and withdrawal);
(2) Lowering water levels so as to make further drilling of
water wells for local beneficial purposes uneconomical;
(3) Causing water pumped from the basin to deteriorate below
drinking water standards;
(4) Violating water rights or restrictions in pumpage in the
groundwater basin as established by court adjudication or
applicable state or federal law.'
In several ways, the Imperial definition of "overdraft," as clarified
by "groundwater basin" and "safe yield," leaves much less confusion than
later versions adopted in other counties.' As noted above, "safe yield"
is a hydrologically mushy and legally vague term that invites subjective
interpretations.'
The Imperial definition restricts the range of
subjectivity in several ways. Most importantly, it specifies four categories
of "adverse effects" that indicate that "safe yield" has been exceeded. In
addition, the first of the four alternative "safe yield" criteria both provides
an explicit time period in which to compare extractions and recharge, and
quantifies the standard to be applied during the comparison.
In
addition, the second "safe yield" criterion qualitatively equates "overdraft"
with an inability to drill wells economically for "local beneficial uses."' 7
232. Id. § 56201(a). Unlike most of the subsequent ordinances, the Imperial ordinance does
not separately define "aquifer" or "interrelated aquifers." In Bulletin 118-75, the California
Department of Water Resources identifies 16 "groundwater basins" located entirely or
partially in Imperial County. Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 95. Of these, ten cross county
boundaries. See Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 85.
233. Imperial County, Cal., Codified Ordinances § 56201(E) (1972) (amended 1978).
234. See, e.g., infra notes 271 & 407, and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 89-109 and accompanying text.
236. The "time period" for "extractions" is a "calendar year;" the time period for "recharge"
is also "annual," but as quantified by the "long-term mean annual water supply." Imperial
County, Cal., Codified Ordinances § 56201(e) (1972) (amended 1978).
237. Itf. In contrast, the Butte, Glenn, and Tehama ordinances' vaguer "safe yield" criteria
speak only of long term declines in water levels leading to depletion. See infra notes 271,
325, 407, and accompanying text.
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Of course, these definition are not entirely precise. For example,
the ordinance does not further indicate the length of the "Iong-term" used
for computing the "long-term mean annual water supply." Similarly,
the ordinance does not further define "uneconomical." Perhaps most
importantly, the "groundwater basin" definition does not precisely
address the problem of multiple county groundwater basins. The
ordinance applies to "a water aquifer . . . located in the County of
Imperial."' Ten aquifers, however, underlie both Imperial and some
other county.2' For these ten aquifers, the ordinance does not determine whether the "overdraft" definition looks only to the Imperial County
portion of the extraction and replenishment figures, or includes all
sources of extraction and replenishment in the aquifer, both within and
without Imperial County.
The biggest uncertainty created by the "safe yield" definition
comes from the second alternative's reference to "local beneficial
purposes." By itself, this term raises uncertainty about the scope of
"local."24 More significantly, however, is its apparent allusion to the
separately defined "beneficial local use."242 That definition, in turn,
opens the door to the largest area of confusion created by the Imperial
scheme.
The ordinance defines "beneficial local use" as: "the use of water
pumped or flowing from any water well within a defined 'area of
influence." '243 Fortunately, the ordinance separately defines "area of
influence" as: "that area within Imperial County in which either the
production, diversion, or use of water affects or is affected by, the natural
available supply of said area."2' Unfortunately, the ordinance gives little
hint about what the italicized portion of the definition means.2 Even

238. Ultimately, the length of the period for which water supply records existed would
likely provide the broadest measure of "long-term mean annual water supply." If suspected
inaccuracies, data gaps, or other record anomalies existed, a shorter period might properly
be used.
239. Imperial County, Cal., Codified Ordinances § 56201(a) (1972) (amended 1978).
240. See supra note 232.
241. It appears also to incorporate the "beneficial use" limitation of water appropriation
law. To perfect and maintain an appropriation, water must be put to "a beneficial use." See,
e.g., Hutchins, supra note 111, at 135. While not entirely free from imprecision itself, the
"beneficial use" limitation is well established in case law. Id. It is generally applied very
broadly, to refer to a non-wasteful use of water. The requirement is also restated in the 1928
amendment to the state Constitution. Cal. Const., art. X, § 2.
242. Imperial County, Cal., Codified Ordinances § 56201(i) (1972) (amended 1978).
Literally, "safe yield" refers only to "local beneficial purposes," not to "beneficial local uses."
As no meaningful distinction between these two phrases readily appears, they seem
synonymous.
243. Id. § 56201(i) (emphasis added).
244. Id. § 56201(b) (emphasis added).
245. The county apparently borrowed the term from the "Stipulation for Judgment" filed
August 11, 1970. See Stipulation for Judgment, Mojave Water Agency v. Abbey, Civil Nos.
130759 & 152413 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Bernardino County June 7,1976) [hereinafter, Stipulated
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more unfortunately, understanding the "area of influence" definition is
critical to understanding the definition of "appropriation." ' The
ordinance defines "appropriation" as: "causing or permitting of [sic) water
pumped or flowing from a water well to be used or sold for uses outside
of a defined 'area of influence."' 7 Since only an "appropriation" triggers
the need for a permit, the entire permit scheme turns on the meaning of
"area of influence."2'
The elusive definition identifies six different circumstances that
might define "area of influence." The definition first distinguishes "affects
..the natural available water supply" from "is affected by the natural

available supply." Either of these two circumstances, in turn, may be
caused by three factors: "production, diversion or use of water." In
combination, six permutations result.
Assuming that groundwater pumping is water "production," how
might such pumping "affect" the water supply in a given area? At the
very least, by removing water from the aquifer, the water removed is no
longer available in that aquifer as a supply to others.249 Thus considered broadly, the "area of influence" would be the entire aquifer. Under
such a definition, someone who wished to use the water outside of the
land overlying the aquifer would be an appropriator who required a
permit.
If this were the only plausible interpretation, the "appropriation"
definition would merely codify the common law distinction between
overlying and nonoverlying users. If that were what were intended, it
would have been much cleaner to simply use those terms.' The failure

Judgment]. See A. Schneider, supra note 59, at 26-27. Exhibit I to that Stipulated Judgment
defines "area of influence" as: "that area within the Mojave Water Agency which is
contiguous to the Mojave River and in which either the production, diversion or use of water
affects or is affected by the natural available supply of the Mojave River system." Stipulated
Judgment, supra,at4, (quoted in A. Schneider, supra note 59, at 27 n.110). Unlike the Imperial
ordinance, however, the Stipulated Judgment grounded its definition with two additional
exhibits, one map and one 50 page legal description of the precise area constituting the "area
of influence" of the Mojave River. Stipulated Judgment, supra, at 6. Thus, the complete
definition of "area of influence" in the Stipulated Judgment begins "the area shown on
Exhibit A and described in Exhibit B." Stipulated Judgment, supra, at 6. Unfortunately, the
Imperial County ordinance does not also contain a map or legal descriptions of the "area
of influence" addressed therein.
246. Imperial County, Cal., Codified Ordinances § 56201(g) (1972) (amended 1978).
247. Id. § 56201(g) (emphasis added).
248. Section 56202 prohibits appropriation from a water well without a permit. Id. §
56202.
249. To be more precise, the portion of the pumped water that is consumed or
evaporated, and does not recirculate to the aquifer, is removed from the supply.
250. Other counties have also struggled with imprecise geographic distinctions between
classes of groundwater extractors. See Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development
Code § L-X 6.2(D) (1988) ("export of groundwater."); see also Cal. Water Code Append. § 119709.7 (West Supp. 1993) (distinguishing between overlying users, nonoverlying but in
district users, and exporters in Sierra Valley Groundwater Management District).
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to use "overlying" and "nonoverlying" within the ordinance suggests
alternative definitions. For example, an "area of influence" narrower than
the entire aquifer might be only that portion of the aquifer where
pumping produces immediately perceptible effects. The land surface
above a well's "cone of depression" z' might circumscribe the "area of
influence" immediately impacted by water extraction. Under such a
narrow definition of "area of influence," any one who pumped water for
use beyond the cone of depression would need a permit. Alternatively,
a definition broader than "land overlying an aquifer" could be supported
by the reference in the findings to the county's desire "to understand the
effects of
2 water appropriations on particular water basins and surrounding

areas."

Full analysis of the range of interpretations between "cone of
depression" and "land overlying the aquifer," or beyond, is beyond the
scope of this article. "Area of influence," as defined so vaguely by the
Imperial Ordinance, exemplifies an extremely imprecise standard that has
no basis in law or hydrology.'
2. Substantive Provisions
As noted already, the Imperial ordinance requires "appropriators,"
as defined in the ordinance, to get a permit.2" The applicant must
provide, at its own cost, specified extraction data.2hs In reaching its
permit decision, the county Public Works Director must consider three
matters: 1) the basin's geology and hydrology; 2) the effects of past and
current appropriations; and 3) zoning and land use regulations.' The
ordinance allows for inspection."7 It also allows residents or property
owners within the "area of influence" to appear and object to the permit
application.'" Finally, the ordinance exempts "political subdivisions,

251. For a discussion of "cone of depression," see supra notes 82-85 and accompanying
text.
252. Imperial County, Cal., Codified Ordinances § 56200 (1972) (amended 1978) (emphasis
added).
253. Portions of the ordinance imply that the County Board of Supervisors might
determine "area of influence" by resolution. Cf. id. §§ 56201(g), (i) (noting "defined area of
influence") (emphasis added). See id. § 56214 (Board resolutions to determine chapter's
applicability). This suggestion begs the question: what criteria will the Board use in making
that determination?
254. The ordinance exempts then existing and otherwise lawful appropriators. Id. § 56202.
255. Section 56203 requires the applicant to furnish, inter alia, proposed well location,
extraction amounts, extraction purposes, places of use, and required hydrological data. Id.
§ 56203.
256. Imperial County, Cal., Codified Ordinances § 56204 (1972) (amended 1978).
257. Id. § 56205. Inspection includes the right to make water level tests and chemical
analyses. Id.
258. Id. § 56210.
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public entities [and] agencies formed pursuant to the provisions of the
State Water Code."'
B. Butte, Glenn & Modoc Counties: Three Sacramento Basin Counties
Respond to the 1976-77 Drought
The next three counties to pass groundwater export ordinances
were all primarily located in the groundwater rich, largely rural,
Sacramento Valley. In the summer of 1977, and within just two weeks of
each other, both Butte and Glenn Counties responded to the 1976-77
drought with substantially similar groundwater export ordinances.'
Just six months later, in early 1978, Modoc County enacted its ordinance.'
All three ordinances remain on the books, although Modoc
and Glenn have recently amended their ordinances. 2 In addition,
Glenn County recently sought express state legislation to create its own
groundwater management district.' The Butte, Glenn and Modoc
ordinances have influenced both the recent Tehama County ordinance
and a draft ordinance Sutter County circulated in 1992.2" Both the
Butte and the Glenn ordinances, however, have substantial flaws that
make them ill equipped as models for future legislation. In contrast, the
less ambitious Modoc ordinance avoids some of the problems plaguing
Butte and Glenn.
1. Butte County
The structure of the Butte County ordinance typifies the
Sacramento Basin counties' ordinances.' Like most of its counterparts,
the Butte County ordinance contains: 1) legislative findings; 2) definitions;
3) prohibitions on groundwater mining; and 4) a permit requirement.
As its legislative findings, the ordinance notes that groundwater
raises both general "health, welfare and safety" concerns and specific

259. Id. § 56212.
260. Butte County, Cal, Ordinance No. 1859 (Aug. 23, 1977) (codified at Butte County,
Cal., Code, §§ 13.08010-0.70 (1991)); Glenn County, Cal., Ordinance No. 672 (Sept. 6, 1977)
(codified at Glen County, Cal., Code §§ 20.04010-.0460 (1991)).
261. Modoc County, Cal., Ordinance No. 255 (Mar. 6, 1978).
262. Modoc County, Cal., Ordinance No. 255-A, § 1 (1987); Glenn County, Cal., Ordinance
No. 971 (1990).
263. Cal. S.B. 207 (1992) (vetoed October 26, 1992). See infra note 469.
264. See infra notes 403-29 and accompanying text (Tehama County); see also infra note 430
(draft Sutter County ordinance).
265. Only the short Sacramento County ordinance adopts a different structure. See infra
notes 346-52 and accompanying text.
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economic concerns.'" The ordinance then lists a series of 26 definitions
ranging alphabetically from "aquifer" to "zone of saturation. "267 Within
that series, the ordinance defines "mining" as: "[plumping from groundwater bodies greatly in excess of replenishment."'
It then prohibits
mining "when the water is transported from the basin."26 Finally, the
ordinance establishes a permit system to license groundwater pumping
where the pumper intends "to use it or sell it outside the area in which
said pumping affects the natural available water supply."'" The county
board of supervisors can only grant a permit if it concludes that "the
permit will not bring about an overdraft, will not bring about saltwater
intrusion, will not adversely affect transmissivity within the aquifer, and
will not adversely affect the water table." "' The ordinance requires the

266. Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-1 (Supp. 1978) (groundwater "of critical importance to
the economy of this county").
267. Id. § 33-2.1 to 33-2.26.
268. Id. § 33-2.12. See also supra notes 88-109 and accompanying text ("mining" as
hydrological term).
269. Id. § 33-3. More fully, section 33-3 states:
It shall be unlawful to conduct any mining for water within this county,
or for the owner of real property to allow groundwater of any nature, or
connate water, to be mined where the water pumped is transported from the
basin.
Id. § 33-3 (emphasis added). The ordinance does not expressly define "basin." Section 33-2.1
defines "aquifer" as: "A geologic formation that stores, transmits and yields significant
quantities of water to wells and springs." Id. § 33-2.1.
270. Section 33-4 states:
It shall be unlawful to pump groundwater of any nature or description, or
for a property owner to allow such pumping on his land, in order to use
it or sell it outside the area in which said pumping affects the natural available
water supply without first obtaining a permit as provided in this chapter.
Id. § 33-4 (emphasis added). Under section 33-5, the Butte County Health Department
receives permit applications. The county environmental director begins an environmental
review. The Health Department consults with county departments and state agencies.
Ultimately, the Health Department reports to the county board of supervisors (Board). Id.
§ 33-5.
Under section 33-6, the Board holds a hearing. In that hearing, the Board considers
evidence of "all effects the proposed permit would have, on the affected groundwater, and
the affected aquifer or aquifers, including, but not limited to, the hydraulic gradient,
hydrology, percolation, permeability, piezometric surface, porosity, recharge, safe yield,
saltwater intrusion, specific capacity, spreading water, transmissivity, usable storage
capacity, water table and zone of saturation." Id. § 33-6; see generally id. at §§ 33-2.9 to 33-2.26
(defining these terms). See also infra notes 320-21 (respectively addressing permits issuance,
annual review, amendments, and appeals).
271. Butte County, Cal., Code 33-7 (Supp. 1978). Section 33-2.13 defines "overdraft" as:
"[tihe condition of a groundwater basin where the amount of water withdrawn by pumping
exceeds the amount of water replenishing the basin over a period of time. Also as the point
at which extractions from the basin exceed its safe yield plus any temporary surplus." Id.
§ 33-2.13. Section 33-2.19, in turn, defines "safe yield" as: "[tihe maximum quantity of water
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board of supervisors to "impose such conditions upon the permit so as
to prohibit overdraft... . ."'
The mining prohibition and permit requirements thus provide
two separate limitations on a groundwater pumper's potential ability to
export groundwater beyond the county boundaries. The poorly drafted
provisions make difficult any attempt to determine their theoretical
impacts on groundwater exports.' Nevertheless, the two provisions
appear to set up a two level regulatory scheme. First, the ordinance
purports to ban entirely any pumping at rates "greatly in excess of
replenishment," at least where "the water pumped is transported from the
basin." The ordinance makes no provision for waivers of the basin export
ban, or mitigation in lieu of a ban. Second, where basin export pumping
may not reach the levels necessary to trigger the absolute mining ban, the
permit process allows only those exports that will not cause overdraft or
harm the aquifer's capacity to store groundwater of suitable quality.
a. Mining Prohibited
The mining ban provision raises five principal questions about its
impact on groundwater exports. First, does it apply even to those exports
from the county where the water will be used on land overlying the same
groundwater basin, but in another county? Second, over what time frame
must extractions from a basin greatly exceed replenishment? Third, what
is the "groundwater body" relevant to the comparison of extraction and
replenishment rates? Fourth, who is a "miner" under the act? Finally, does

which can be withdrawn annually from a groundwater supply under a given set of
conditions without causingan undesirableresult.The phrase 'undesirable result' is understood
to refer to a gradual lowering of the groundwater levels resulting eventually in depletion
of the supply." Id. at § 33-2.19. See also id. at §§ 33-2.20, 33-2.23, 33-2.25 (discussing,
respectively, "saltwater intrusion", "transmissivity", and "water table").
272. Id. 33-7.
273. Vance Severin, Program Manager, Division of Environmental Health, Department
of Public Health, Butte County, informed the author that, at least since 1979, when he began
working at the office, he was "not aware that any permit applications have been received,
or permit issued under the provisions of Chapter 33." Letter of Vance Severin, Butte County
Dep't of Public Health, to Gregory Weber (Oct. 26, 1992). Four possibilities exist to explain
the lack of interest in obtaining export permits. First, there simply may have been no
demand for such exports. Second, potential exporters may have concluded that their exports
were either outright banned by the ordinance or that a permit would not issue. Third,
potential exporters may have concluded that the transaction costs added by the permit
process made a potential export uneconomical. Finally, potential exporters may have
concluded that the ordinance created such uncertainty as to make even the calculation of
transaction costs too difficult to estimate, thereby leaving the costs of a potential export too
difficult to estimate.
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it does it ban all mining, or only mining where the water is transported
from the basin?' 4
First, on its face, the mining ordinance applies only to exports
where the water is transported "out of the basin." As previously noted,
the ordinance does not expressly define "basin."27 The unfortunate use
of "groundwater basin" unduly muddies the ordinance's meaning. As
noted above, an enormous
range of choices exists for the definition of a
"groundwater basin."2 6 This range highlights the uncertainty inherent
in the ordinance's mining ban. A full treatment of the legal impacts on
water exports of the adoption of any one of these choices is beyond this
article's scope. Instead, the article will consider the impact on exports of
two lateral boundaries with increasingly narrow geographic range.
The broadest possible definition of "groundwater basin" applicable to Butte County would be the adoption of the state Department of
Water Resources' (DWR) survey results. According to the DWR, only two
"groundwater basins" underlie Butte County: the Sacramento Valley
groundwater basin and the Sacramento Valley Eastside Tuscan Formation
Highlands.'m Both of these basins underlie multiple counties in the
Sacramento Valley.' If the DWR definitions were used to identify the
groundwater basins relevant to the mining ban, the ban would not
prevent exports from Butte County if the water would be used on lands

274. The Butte County Code publishers have resolved this ambiguity in favor of the latter
interpretation. They captioned this code provision: "[Mining prohibited where water

transported.]" Butte County, Cal. Code § 33-3 (Supp. 1978). These headnotes are added by
an editor "for stylistic reasons," i.e., "to keep the code's sections consistent with one another."
See Memo from Brad Epstein to Gregory Weber (Oct. 29, 1992), reporting on telephone
conversation with code editor Lori Story (Oct. 26, 1992).
The weight to be attached to this publisher added heading is uncertain. Where a
portion of a code expressly states that chapter headings and titles have no interpretive force,
courts will ignore them. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 40 Cal. Rptr. 121, 124-25 (Cal.App. 1964).
Absent such a disclaimer, courts state: "[a] code's title and chapter headings will properly
be resorted to in doubtful cases for determination of the legislative intent." People v.
Weltsch, 149 Cal. Rptr. 112, 115 (Cal. App. 1978). It seems inappropriate to ascribe legislative
intent to the interpretations of a publisher, at least not where the headings are added after
enactment, and the legislature has not affirmatively ratified such headings by later
amendments to such code sections or chapters.
275. See supranote 269. But cf. Imperial County, Cal., Code § 56301 (1972) (amended 1978)
(defining groundwater "basin").
276. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
277. Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 95. Despite an extensive glossary of groundwater
terms, Bulletin 118-75 does not itself attempt to define "groundwater basin." Id. at 4-5. In
Bulletin 118-80, issued in response to Water Code section 12924, DWR redefined several
basins after "consideration of political boundary lines." Bulletin 118-80, supra note 12, at 8.
278. See Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 57.
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in other Sacramento Valley counties that underlie the same aquifer from
which the water was pumped in Butte County.'
Adoption of the Butte County borders to define the relevant
portion of the DWR identified groundwater basins would greatly narrow
the ordinance's definition of "groundwater basin."
Such a narrower
definition of "groundwater basin" would correspondingly broaden greatly
the mining ban's sweep. Under such a definition, any transportation of
water across the Butte County borders would be subject to the mining
ban."'
Second, regardless of the definition of "groundwater basin," the
mining ban only applies if "[plumping from groundwater bodies [is]
greatly in excess of replenishment." 2 This definition does not specify
the time frame over which to compare extraction and replenishment. In
addition, it does not establish relative criteria for the comparison: how
great a discrepancy is "greatly in excess"? If a court were to engraft some
sort of "reasonable" time frame for comparing extraction with replenishment, the mining ban would not necessarily restrict all out of basin
exports.'
279. CompareTehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.020 (1992) (mining banned where water
transported from the county); see infra, notes 413-21 & accompanying text; see also Inyo
County, Cal., Code § 7.01.020(g) (1980) (defining groundwater basin partially, along county
lines).
280. See Schneider, supra note 59, at 101 ("county" line a possible basin limit).
281. Under either definition, the mining ban seems to apply to those intra county water
transports that might pump water from the county portions of the two DWR identified
basins up the foothills above the valley floor.
282. Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-2.12 (Supp. 1978).
283. This particular incidence of vagueness implicates two different principles of statutory
interpretation. On the one hand, where statutes fail to specify a time frame for notice or
compliance with a statutory requirement, courts may imply a "reasonable" time. See, e.g.,
Dougery v. Bettencourt, 6 P.2d 499, 503 (Cal. 1931) (reasonable time to record a certificate
of sale). On the other hand, a statute may be so vague as to be void. See, e.g., Cranston v.
City of Richmond, 710 P.2d 845, 849-859 (Cal. 1985).
As noted elsewhere, the Butte ordinance gives alternative definitions of
"overdraft." Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-2.13; see also supra note 271; infra notes 312-20 and
accompanying text. Initially, it defines it as a condition where "the amount of water
withdrawn by pumping exceeds the amount of water replenishing the basin over a period of
time." Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-113 (1978). By itself, this portion of the overdraft
definition merely begs the time period question. It does, however, suggest that "mining" and
"overdraft" present questions of degree. Under this portion of the definition, "overdraft"
could occur whenever pumping exceeds replenishment (within the appropriate time period)
houeer slightly. In contrast, mining requires pumping to exceed replenishment greatly.
The alternative "overdraft" definition compresses the open ended "period of time."
It defines "overdraft" as: "the point at which extractions from the basin exceed its safe yield
plus any temporary surplus." Id. Section 33-2.19 then defines "safe yield" as:
[tihe maximum amount of water which can be withdrawn annually from
a groundwater supply under a given set of conditions without causing an
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Third, the definition of "mining" fails to identify the "groundwater bodies" relevant to the comparison of extraction and replenishment
rates. The ordinance does not itself define "groundwater bodies." It does
separately define several types of groundwater bodies, such as aquifer, ' connate water 5 and groundwater.'
If the relevant "groundwater body" under the "mining" definition
is the entire groundwater "basin" from which water is pumped, then
"mining" only occurs if the "[basin wide] pumping is greatly in excess of
[basin-wide] replenishment." Such an interpretation would both greatly
complicate proof of "mining" and greatly restrict the circumstances under
which "mining" could be found. Alternatively, an interpretation of the
relevant "groundwater body" under the "mining" definition as a specific
sub-portion of a groundwater basin would ease proof of "mining." For
example, under such a narrower "groundwater body" definition, "mining"
might occur whenever pumping from a particular source of confined
groundwater were "greatly in excess of replenishment" of that particular
source. Indeed, the best textual support for this narrower interpretation
comes from the definition of "confined groundwater" itself. Section 33-2.7
' 7 Because
defines "confined groundwater" as "[a] body of groundwater."
"confined" groundwater implicitly contrasts with the separately defined
"free" or "unconfined" groundwater, an identifiable source or stratum of
free groundwater likely is also a "groundwater body" under the "mining"
definition.
Fourth, the mining ban does not link "mining"with the acts of
any specific pumpers. Assume that pumping from a groundwater body
by pumpers who use water within the basin already greatly exceeds
replenishment. Does that make any out of basin exporter automatically
a "miner," even if that individual has prescriptive rights and that
individual's pumping rate is not "greatly in excess of replenishment"?'

undesirable result. The phrase, "undesirable result" is understood to refer
to a gradual lowering of the groundwater levels resulting eventually in
depletion of the supply.
Id. §§ 33-2.19. Ultimately, "mining" and "overdraft" may produce the same result: depletion
of the groundwater supply. In context, mining appears to be rapid overdraft.
284. Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-2.1 (Supp. 1978). That section defines "aquifer" as: "a]
geologic formation that stores, transmits and yields significant quantities of water to wells
and springs." Id. This is a standard definition. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
285. Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-2.4 (Supp. 1978).
286. Id. § 33-2.6. That section defines "groundwater" as: "[wlater in the zone of saturation.
Groundwater is presumed to be percolating, although it does occur in known and definite
channels." Id. The ordinance separately defines "free" and "confined" groundwater. See id.
§§ 33-2.8, -2.7 (respectively addressing free and confined groundwater types).
287. Id. § 33-2.7 (emphasis added).
288. As noted above, traditional groundwater rights law allocates pumping rights in
overdrafted basins to pumpers who use the water on land overlying the basin; since, in an
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The ordinance does not directly answer this matter. To the extent the
ordinance merely purports to prevent appropriators who have not
established a prescriptive right to take from an overdrafted basin, it
duplicates state decisional law. If, however, the ordinance attempts to
also bar prescriptive users from exports, it completely eliminates a class
of rights recognized by state decisional law.
The last major question about the impact of Section 33-3 on
exports arises from ambiguous punctuation. The section states: "lilt shall
be unlawful to conduct any mining for water within this county, or for
the owner of real property to allow groundwater of any nature, or
connate water, to be mined where the water pumped is transportedfrom the
basin."' The ambiguity involves the application of the "where . . .
basin" clause. Does it qualify both "any mining.., this county" and "or for
the owner ... to be mined," or only the latter clause? If it qualifies both
clauses, then an in-basin pumper can "mine" with impunity, while an outof-basin exporter may not mine at all. If, however, it qualifies only the
latter clause, then no pumper can mine. For convenience, the latter
interpretation shall be called the "broad," or complete ban; the former
interpretation, the "narrow," or geographically limited ban.
Support for the broad interpretation of section 33-3 comes from
a literal reading of its text, a comparison of its punctuation with the
punctuation of section 33-4, and from the legislative findings in section
33-1. First, arguably, the lack of a comma between "to be mined" and
"where... basin" creates two separate restrictions within section 33-3: the
clause before the section's first "or" makes an actual pumper liable, while
the clause after the first "or" also makes liable an owner who permits a
pumper to mine. Under this interpretation, the first clause bans all
mining within the County; the second clause, however, only penalizes
those non-pumping owners who allow mining for transport beyond the
basin.
Second, additional, indirect support for this broad interpretation
also comes from a comparison with the permit requirement's wording. 29° Section 33-4 states:

overdrafted basin, there is no "surplus" for appropriation, offbasin users can only obtain
appropriative rights. See supra notes 114-50 and accompanying text. The Butte ordinance
would appear to prevent off-basin exports by prescriptive rights holders.
For an outline of prescriptive rights, see supra notes 115, 133.
289. Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-3 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
290. Courts interpret statutes by reference to the entire legislative scheme of which each
individual statute is a component. See, e.g., People v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida,
284 Cal. Rptr. 617, 621-22 (Cal. App. 1991).
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"It shall be unlawful to pump groundwater of any nature or
description, or for a property owner to allow such pumping
on his land, in order to use it or sell it outside the area in
which said pumping affects the natural available water supply
without first obtaining a permit as provided in this chapter. ,,1
Like the mining ban, the permit requirement addresses both
actual pumpers and non-pumping owners who allow pumping to occur.
Unlike the mining ban provision, however, the permit ban inserts a
comma between the non-pumping owner provision and the qualifying
phrase "in order to use or sell it outside the area. " The punctuation of
section 33-4 thus does not purport to make all pumpers or owners get a
permit; rather, it limits the permit requirement to only those pumpers or
property owners who meet the geographical "sale or use" condition. To
be consistent grammatically with the permit provision, the mining
provision should have had a comma between the phrase "to be mined"
and "where the water pumped is transported from the basin. "' 3
Third, the legislative findings in section 33-1 provide the final
support for this broad reading. That section declares that "the protection
of groundwater within the county is of major concern to [county residents]."' Groundwater mining should fit within this concern whether
or not the water is "transported from the basin."
Despite this declaration and the inconsistencies with section 33-4,
an interpretation of the mining provision that penalized all actual miners,
but only penalized those non-pumping owners who allowed miners to
transport groundwater from the basin, makes little sense for four reasons.
First, little justification appears for banning all mining, but then penalizing only those non-pumping owners who allow the actual miners to
transport the water out of the basin. Second, the ordinance should be
interpreted in light of the circumstances that lead to its passage. The
county apparently enacted the ordinance in response to fears that
exporters would take county groundwater during the 1976-77 drought.
Since the problem the county sought to address was the impact of large
scale water exports, the mining ban appears to be an effort to conserve
supplies for local residents, without in itself forcing local pumpers to
change their own behavior.' Third, as noted above, unless the "transported from the basin" restriction applied to all mining, the ordinance

291. Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-4 (Supp. 1978).
292. Id. (emphasis added).
293. See supra note 268 ("mining" defined). Faced with inconsistent punctuation, courts
have not found themselves always bound to give different meanings to differently
punctuated statutes. See People ex. rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 550 P.2d 600, 650
n.2, (Cal.) (Tobriner, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
294. Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-1 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
295. The ordinance's findings, however, do not limit themselves to concerns about
exports. See id. § 33-1.
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would present substantial enforcement problems determining "who" is
the "miner."' Finally, as discussed below, the permit requirement
provision's unambiguous geographical "sale or use" limitation demonstrates that the county did not intend all pumpers, or non-pumping
owners, to have to comply with a potentially onerous and politically
unpopular permit procedure.' In this light, enforcement of a complete
ban on "mining" could have potentially given the county the power to
reduce pumping by all pumpers. Without a clearer evidence of intent to
allow the county to limit all pumping, the likely enormous political
opposition to such a sweeping ordinance makes it very difficult to believe
that the county intended to regulate all pumpers indirectly when it failed
to impose permit requirements directly on all pumpers.
b. Permit Requirement
The permit requirement adds additional uncertainty over the
legality of potential exports. As noted above, section 33-4 only requires
a permit if the water pumped will be used or sold "outside the area in
which said pumping affects the natural available water supply." " This
phrase echoes the Imperial ordinance's "area of influence" provision.'
Like the Imperial ordinance, however, the Butte ordinance does not
define the italicized phrase.'
In particular, it addresses neither the
geographical nor the temporal scope of the "affected area."
Pumping might "affect the natural available water supply" in an
"area" in several ways."0 In the broadest sense, pumping reduces the
supply in the groundwater basin. 2 Thus construed broadly, only
pumping for sale or use outside of the groundwater basin would require
a permit. Such a broad interpretation of "affected area" would parallel the
mining prohibition. As noted above, most likely the ordinance only bans
mining where the water is "transported from the basin."' Similarly, a
broad interpretation of "affected area" would only require a permit if the
water were used or sold outside the groundwater basin.

296. See supra text accompanying note 288.
297. See supra note 19 (agricultural interests oppose groundwater management).
298. Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-4 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
299. See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
300. Imperial County, Cal., Code § 56301(b) (1978).
301. Pumping might "affect" both the quantity and quality of the water constituting the
"natural available water supply." For example, in a coastal county, pumping might accelerate
salt water intrusion. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 59, at 104. Inland, pumping across
otherwise water impermeable geologic strata may lead to mingling of water of different
qualities. See, e.g., Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 121-23. The following discussion focuses
solely on the local impacts on water levels in the area affected by a particular pump.
302. This reduction occurs at least until replenishment.
303. See supra notes 274-97 and accompanying text.
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In most instances, however, an individual pumper will have
almost no perceptible effect on a large groundwater basin. For example,
DWR estimates that the Sacramento Valley groundwater basin (which
partially underlies Butte County) has 113,650,000 acre-feet of storage
capacity in its 5,000 square mile area.'
Maximum well production
rates are 4,000 gallons per minute.' Given the slow rate at which water
will rearrange itself within a large basin after pumping, it may take years
for even a large pumper in Butte County, near the north end of the basin,
to have an impact on the groundwater level in the south end of the
basin.' Meanwhile, a large pumper will almost certainly have very
pronounced local impacts on the aquifer.' These local impacts likely
provide alternatives to a basin wide definition of "affected area."
The most pronounced local aquifer impact from pumping is the
"cone of depression. "
As discussed above, this cone represents a
temporary depletion in the groundwater surround the well as pumping
occurs. The land surface from the center of the well to the edge of the
cone of depression describes the local area most demonstrably "affected"
by pumping.' For convenience, this discussion adopts a Tehama
County convention and describes this local area as a well's "radius of
influence."
Adoption of such a "radius of influence" to define "affected area"
for purposes of the permit requirement would force virtually all exporters
to apply for a permit.3 0 Before the county board of supervisors (board)
will issue a permit, however, the applicant must establish that the permit:
1) will not bring about overdraft; 2) will not bring about saltwater

304. Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 60. The aquifer's usable storage capacity is 22 million
acre-feet. Id.
305. Id. At 325,851 gallons per acre-foot, four thousand gallons per minute equals about
6,500 acre-feet per year.
306. See, e.g., Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 17.
307. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing the "cone of depression").
308. Id.
309. Tehama County defines the surface area overlying the "cone of depression" as the
"radius of influence" of a well. Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.010.16 (1992).
310. The only exception would be a pumper who owned or used contiguous pieces of
property on both sides of the Butte County line. If the radius of influence of the well on the
Butte County parcel extended beyond the Butte County parcel to the contiguous parcel in
the adjoining county, such an exporter would not require a permit.
Adoption of the "radius of influence" as the "affected area" for the permit
provision would have potentially broad application to purely intra-county pumping. Indeed,
taken literally, any pumper who used water on portions of the well-site parcel that extended
beyond the radius of influence would require a permit. By the same token, use of the water
beyond the radius of influence on a contiguous parcel would also require a permit. The
ordinance does not, however, make any exception for such uses. Tehama County, Cal., Code
§§ 9.40.030, .040 (1992); see infra notes 426-29 and accompanying text.
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intrusion; 3) will not adversely affect transmissivity within the aquifer;
and 4) will not adversely affect the water table.31 Of these requirements, the overdraft prohibition presents the principal to a potential
groundwater exporter.
The definition of "overdraft" poses an interpretive problem
identical to one posed by the mining ban.3 2 As it did with the mining
ban, the ordinance defines "overdraft" in terms of a "groundwater
above, however, the ordinance does not define
basin."3 3 As noted 314
"groundwater basin." Were "groundwater basin" interpreted to mean
a DWR identified "groundwater basin," then overdraft would need to be
measured across that entire basin. This poses practical proof difficulties
when dealing with a 7,000 square mile aquifer, such as the Sacramento
Valley groundwater basin. If, however, "groundwater basin" referred to
a smaller segment of a multiple county, DWR identified basin, then
"overdraft" would be established by the pumping and replenishment
patterns in just that smaller segment. Such a smaller segment might
include only the portion of a multiple county DWR identified basin that
underlies Butte County. A narrower definition of "groundwater basin"
magnifies the relative impact of any one well on a basin's water storage.
It also increases the likelihood that an exporter would have to get a
permit.
Slight and indirect support for an interpretation of "groundwater
basin" narrower than a DWR identified basin comes from the alternative
definition of "overdraft."31 s Drawing from the California Supreme
316 the ordinance defines
Court's opinion in Los Angeles v. San Fernando,
"overdraft" in part as: "the point at which extractions from the basin
exceed its safe yield plus any temporary surplus."317 This definition, too,
refers to the otherwise undefined 'basin." Nevertheless, its inclusion of
the vague "safe yield" reference allows incorporation of a concern with
localized pumping effects.31
Under the ordinance, a "groundwater supply's" "safe yield" is
exceeded when pumping exceeds the maximum annual rate that can be
withdrawn without causing a "gradual lowering of the groundwater
levels resulting eventually in depletion of the supply."3 9 Large pumps

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-7 (Supp. 1978); see also infra note 320.
See supra notes 274-97 and accompanying text.
Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-2.13 (Supp. 1978); see supra note 271.
See supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 271 ("overdraft" contains alternative definitions).
537 P.2d 1250, 1309 (1975); see supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-2.13 (Supp. 1978).
See supra note 271.
Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-2.19 (Supp. 1978).
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within Butte County could reduce the groundwater levels locally without
pushing the entire 7,000 square mile Sacramento Valley groundwater
basin into overdraft. Nevertheless, the gradual local reduction of the
groundwater levels effectively depletes the locally usable portion of the
overall basin supply.'
Such local depletion would arguably be an
"undesirable effect" within the meaning of the "safe yield" definition.
Narrowing the definition of "groundwater basin" to include the portion
of a basin locally affected by large scale pumping correspondingly
broadens the potential sweep of the permit requirement.
No easy interpretive solution appears to resolving the question
of the scope of the permit requirement. The failure to identify the
groundwater bodies involved, and the use of the vague categories of "safe
yield," and "overdraft" make difficult any reconciliation of the competing
interpretive possibilities.
The permit requirement places a final restriction on potential
exports. The county retains the right to review the permit annually.32
The county health department has the right to reduce pumping under the
permit if overdraft later occurs.'
Thus, a permit holder retains no
automatic priority if, for example, pumpers not required to obtain a
permit later increase their extractions and cause overdraft.'
In summary, a pumper who wished to export groundwater from
Butte County faces substantial uncertainty when attempting to determine
the scope of the county export restrictions. The ordinance's failure to
define "groundwater basin" or "affected area" makes it nearly impossible
to determine when an exporter might need, or be able to obtain, a permit.
Under even the broadest sense of those terms, however, a pumper who
sought to transport water entirely out of the Sacramento Valley groundwater basin (or the Sacramento Valley Eastside Tuscan Formation
Highlands groundwater basin) as defined by the DWR, will undoubtedly
need a permit. The weaknesses in the "mining" prohibition make it

320. Section 33-7 raises an additional interpretive problem. Under that section, the board
must determine that a permit "will not bring about an overdraft." Butte County, Cal., Code
§ 33-7 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). Arguably, if a basin is already overdrafted at the time
of the permit application, then a new permit applicant's pumping will not "bring about" a
condition that already exists. The final sentence of section 33-7, however, states: "[tlhe board
shall impose such conditions upon the permit so as to prohibit overdraft." Id. This provision
should apply equally to applicants who either "bring about" or "exacerbate" overdraft.
321. Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-8 (Supp. 1978).
322. Id.
323. If the only pumpers who need a permit are "appropriators" within the meaning of
the common law, then the renewal process merely restricts the possibility that prescriptive
rights will accrue should overdraft occur. If, however, the permit process extends to
overlying users or prescriptive rights holders, then the scheme restricts rights otherwise
established by judicial decision.
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impossible to determine the limits of the county board of supervisor's
discretion to approve a permit.
2. Glenn County
a. Findings and Definitions
As originally enacted in 1977, the Glenn County groundwater
ordinance was virtually identical to the Butte County ordinance. Except
for one minor difference in phrasing, the legislative findings are
identical.324 Its definitions of "mining," "overdraft," and "safe yield" are
identical.3' Except for one minor variance, the Glenn County permit
requirement mirrored the Butte County requirement.326 The27 permit
application process and necessary findings were also identical.?
b. Substantive Provisions
The original Glenn County ordinance's only major difference
from its Butte County counterpart involved the last phrase of the mining
ban.' As noted above, Butte County limits at least some of its mining
ban's geographic impact with the phrase, "transported from the basin."'
Glenn County, however, originally concluded its mining ban
provision with the phrase, "transported from the immediate area of its
natural groundwater basin. "'
The precise meaning of the italicized portion of this provision
remains unclear. It raises problems similar to those created by the

324. Compare Glenn County, Cal., Code § 20.04.010 (1991) with.Butte County, Cal., Code
§ 33-1 (Supp. 1978) (both noting virtually identical findings).
325. See Glenn County, Cal., Code §§ 20.04.140, .150, .210 (1977) (discussing respectively,
mining, overdraft, and safe yield).
326. Glen County's code states "Tiltis unlawful to pump..." and Butte County's code
states "Tiltshall be unlawful to pump .... Compare Glenn County, Cal., Code § 20.04.410
(1977) (emphasis added) with Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-4 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis
added).
327. CompareGlenn County, Cal., Code §§ 20.04.420 to 20.04.450 (1977) with Butte County,

Cal., Code §§ 33-5 to 33-8 (Supp. 1978).
328. With the exception of the last phrase, and Glenn County's elimination of commas
offsetting "or connate water," the two counties' mining ban provisions are otherwise
virtually identical. The Glenn County punctuation does not solve the problem noted above
caused by the lack of a comma between "mined" and "where." See supra notes 268, 289-97
and accompanying text.
329. Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-3 (Supp. 1978); see supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
330. Glenn County, Cal., § 20.04.400 (1977) (emphasis added).
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Imperial ordinance's "area of influence.''
The ordinance defines
neither "immediate area" nor "natural." Whatever its precise meaning,
compared to the Butte County provision, this last phrase of the Glenn
County provision connotes a much narrower geographic area in which
"mining" might be permissible.
The 1990 amendments to section 20.04.400 ended the confusion
created by the final phrase.' " Section 20.04.400 now ends: "where the
water pumped is transported outside of the county except as provided in this
chapter."
The substitution of "outside of the county" for the "immediate area" eliminates the predecessor's geographical confusion. Some
additional confusion, however, creeps back in with the new phrase's final
tag, "except as provided in this chapter." On its face, nothing within the
chapter directly purports to allow mining under any circumstances.
The 1990 amendments also eliminated much of the confusion
created by the original permit requirement's "area in which said pumping
affects the natural available water supply."'
The current ordinance
simply substitutes "county" for the vague predecessor. Under the 1990
amendments, any exporter will have to obtain a permit.
Compared both to the original Glenn County ordinance, and its
Butte County counterpart, the current Glenn County ordinance raises
several fewer questions about its scope. Still, while any potential exporter
knows that it will have to apply for a permit, the above noted problems
with the definition of "overdraft" and "groundwater basin" leave ample
uncertainty over any potential permit approval.' Similarly, the failure
to define "groundwater basin," and the other problems with the definition
of "mining," leaves uncertain the ultimate scope of the mining ban as a
limitation on the board of supervisor's power to grant a permit.
3. Modoc County
a. Findingsand Definitions
The Modoc County ordinance sets forth purposes identical to
those announced by the Butte and Glenn provisions.' The ordinance,

331. See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
332. Glenn County, Cal., Ordinance No. 971, § 1 (1990).
333. Id. (codified at Glenn County, Cal., Code § 20.04.400 (1991)).
334. Glenn County, Cal., Code § 20.04.410 (1977) (amended at § 20.04.410 (1990)).
335. As with the Butte County ordinance, no one has yet applied for a permit to export
water from Glenn County. Letter from John Benoit, Planning Director, Planning Department,
Glenn County, to Brad Epstein, Research Assistant (Oct. 22, 1992).
336. Modoc County, Cal., Code § 13.08.010 (1991).
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however, is much more compact than its cousins. For example, its
definitions section eliminates sixteen provisions found in the Butte and
Glenn versions, including a definition of "mining." 7 Similarly, and
again unlike the Butte and Glenn versions, the Modoc permit requirement
does not direct the issuing authority to consider any of those sixteen
provisions.3m
With one exception, the definitions contained in the Modoc
ordinance are identical to those contained in its Butte and Glenn cousins.339 The sole major exception is the definition for "groundwater basin
area."
Modoc defines it as: "an area overlying a geologic formation
or interconnected series of geologic formations which store, transmit and
yield significant quantities of water to wells and springs. M' By itself,
this initial portion of the definition provides little guidance for determining where one basin begins and another ends. The ordinance, however,
partially clarifies the definition by specifying: "the groundwater basin
areas in the county shall be deemed to be coextensive with [five specific
basins and watersheds]."
b. Permit Requirements
The Modoc County permit provisions solves the punctuation
problems plaguing the Butte ordinance.' " It also avoids unnecessary
uncertainty.' The requirement applies only for an extraction that will
be conveyed "outside the groundwater basin area in which it is

337. Unlike Butte and Glenn counties, Modoc County does not define "artesian well,"

"conjunctive use," "connate water," "culture (land use)," "groundwater," "groundwater,
confined," "groundwater, free (unconfined)," "hydraulic gradient," "hydrology," "imported
water," "mining," "percolation," "permeability," "piezometric surface," "porosity," or "salt
water intrusion." See id.
338. Modoc County, Cal., Code § 13.08.050 (1991).
339. The identical definitions include the following terms: aquifer, overdraft, recharge,
safe yield, specific capacity, spreading water, transmissivity, usable storage capacity, water
table, and zone of saturation. See Modoc County, Cal., Code §§ 13.08.020(A), (C)-(K) (1991).
340. Modoc County, Cal., Code § 13.08.020(b) (1991) (emphasis added).
341. Id.
342. Id. These five areas are: 1) "the Surprise Valley watershed;" 2) "the Goose Lake
watershed;" 3) "the Tulelake Basin;" 4) "the upper Pit River watershed to the Canby Bridge;"
and 5) "the lower Pit River watershed to the southern end of Big Valley." Id.
343. The ordinance states: "In Modoc County, it is unlawful to pump groundwater of any
nature or description, or for a property owner to allow such pumping on his land, in order
to convey it outside the groundwater basin area in which it is pumped without first obtaining a
permit." Modoc County, Cal., Code § 13.08.030 (1991) (emphasis added).
344. Of course, it is fraught with the uncertainties inherent in the use of "overdraft" and
"safe yield."
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pumped."us Since the ordinance generally defines "groundwater basin
area" in terms of watershed, any one who intends to pump water out of
the watershed needs a permit.
C.

1980 Sees Two Very Different Approaches:Sacramento and Inyo

Counties
1.

Sacramento:Is Concise Nice?

In February 1980, Sacramento County enacted its water export
ordinance.' Unlike any of the other counties, it also applies to surface
water.4 7 The ordinance simply states: "Ground or surface water shall
not be transported in any manner from Sacramento County to any point
.,30 The ordinance
outside the county, except pursuant to a permit ....
eschews any attempt at hydrological precision. Rather, it leaves the entire
decision in the discretion of the county engineer. That discretion is
limited in three broad ways. First, the export must be "in conformance
with county water planning policies. 34 9 Second, the export may not
"impose liability on the county or the [Sacramento County] water
agency. " ' Third, the export may not "cause adverse impacts on the
source, the area of use, or the environment."3 51
The Sacramento County ordinance avoids all of the drafting
pitfalls that plague the rest of the ordinances. It represents the opposite
extreme from the attempts to ground ordinances in hydrology. Rather
than attempting to define "overdraft," "safe yield," or "mining," words
fraught with pseudoscience, it simply uses "adverse impacts." Such an

345. Modoc County, Cal., Code § 13.08.030 (1991).
346. Sacramento County, Cal., Ordinance No. 410, § 2 (Feb. 26, 1980) (adding § 15.08.095
to the Sacramento County, Cal., Code).
347. Id.
348. Id. The last clause of the ordinance exempts water purveyors who provide water
service in two or more counties within a defined surface area. Id.
349. Sacramento County, Cal., Code § 15.08.095(2) (1989). The policies include those of
the County Board of Supervisors per se, and the County Water Agency, a separate agency
empowered with water management authority. See Cal. Water Code-App. §§ 66-1 to 66-55
(West 1968 & Supp. 1993).
350. Sacramento County, Cal., Code § 15.08.095(2) (1989); see supra note 349 (water agency
empowered).
351. Sacramento County, Cal., Code § 15.08.095(2) (1989). Subsection (2) does not itself
expressly prohibit the engineer from approving a permit that raised planning conflicts,
created liability, or adversely impacted any area or the environment. Subsection (3),
however, specifically prohibits the engineer from issuing a permit that "is inconsistent with
the general plan of the county of Sacramento, the water plan of the Sacramento County
water agency, or a specific plan of the county or water agency which may be affected." Id.
§ 15.08.095(3).
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approach would certainly be superficially more intelligible to an attorney
or judge called to enforce its terms. At the same time, the undefined
appeal to "adverse impacts" loses any sense of predictability. 2 Does it
include a de minimis threshold? Or does any lowering of the water table
mean that an existing in-county pumper, or even a future in-county
pumper, can complain of the greater and more expensive pumping lift?
To what extent does it authorize the engineer to consider third party
impacts, such as on potentially displaced agricultural workers? Is
depriving the County of water that it might need some day "an adverse
effect"? Nowhere is the line drawn.
2. Inyo County: True Basin Management?
Later in 1980, Inyo County became the next county to address
groundwater exports.'
Unlike all of the other ordinances, the Inyo
ordinance does more than merely restrict exports. Rather, the ordinance
authorized a groundwater management scheme that, at least incidentally,
imposed some requirements on all pumpers within the identified basin.
The impetus for the ordinance, and the principal focus of its restrictions,
were the extractions by the City of Los Angeles from the Owens Valley
groundwater basin.
Los Angeles' extractions from the Owens Valley for export to the
City are legendary in California water lore.' After Los Angeles sought
to increase groundwater exports from Owens Valley in the early 1970s,
Inyo County began a series of lawsuits against the City claiming that its
increased pumping required compliance with the then-newly enacted
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).35 The County realized
that eventually the City would be able to meet CEQA's procedural
requirements.' Faced with the legislature's inability to pass state wide

352. Like Butte and Glenn Counties, Sacramento County reports: "[it has] not been able
to discover any circumstance . .. where either an export permit application has been
submitted, or where the County has sought to enforce this ordinance." Letter from Steven
P. Rudolph, Deputy County Counsel, Sacramento County to Gregory S. Weber (Nov. 13,
1992). Mr. Rudolph continued: "It is also relevant to note that the County has no knowledge
of groundwater having been or being exported from the County." Id.
353. Inyo County, Cal., Owens Valley Groundwater Management Referendum Measure
A (Nov. 4, 1980) (enacted).
354. See, e.g., Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert 54-107 (1986).
355. CEQA requires review of a project's environmental impacts, along with a discussion
of alternatives and attempts to mitigate the identified impacts. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§
21000-21177 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992). The lawsuits led to a series of published decisions
generally upholding Inyo County's position. See generally Rossmann & Steel, supra note 18,
at 916-25 (discussing decisions).
356. Rossmann & Steel, supra note 18, at 924.
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groundwater management legislation, 7 on November 4, 1980, Inyo
County voters enacted Referendum Measure A: the "Owens Valley
Groundwater Management" ordinance. '
a. Findings and Definitions
Unlike the short findings provisions of the Imperial, Butte, Glenn
and Modoc ordinances, and the nonexistent findings from the Sacramento
ordinance, the Inyo ordinance contains seven paragraphs of findings and
declarations.' Compared to most of the other ordinances, however, the
portion of its definitions section addressing export is much terser.'
After a standard "groundwater" definition;"' the ordinance clarifies that
it applies only to the portion of the Owens Valley groundwater basin
within Inyo County.' It does not separately define "overdraft," "export," "safe yield" or "mining."'
Its only other definition of note is
"groundwater extraction;" this it defines as: "removal of groundwater by
artificial means from the groundwater basin, or reduction by artificialmeans
of natural rechargefrom surface water into the groundwater basin." '

357. During the 1976-77 drought, Governor Edmund Brown, Jr., created the Commission
to Review California Water Rights Law. Cal. Executive Order No. B-26-77 (May 11, 1977);
see Rossmann & Steel, supra note 18, at 926. The Commission ultimately recommended
enactment of sweeping, state legislation to regulate groundwater. See Final Report, supra
note 6, at 135-254. To date, those reforms have not been enacted.
358. Rossmann & Steel, supra note 18, at 929-30. Rossmann and Steel set out the full text
of the initiative ordinance as Appendix A to their article. Rossmann & Steel, supra note 18,
at 951-57.
359. Inyo County, Cal., Code § 7.01.010 (1980). These include: 1) the historical importance
of the Owens Valley groundwater basin to the county; 2) the importance of the basin to the
state; 3) the need to mitigate and remove adverse environmental effects caused by
groundwater extraction; 4) the environmental and economic effects of lack of basin
management; 5) the county's "paramount right and duty to govern the management and
extraction of resources within its jurisdiction;" 6) the need to adopt a comprehensive
regulation that "consider[s] environmental and economic factors in the area of origin and
the are of use," conjunctive use of surface and groundwater supplies, and water conservation measures; and 7) the need to create a management plan to implement the other
findings. Id.
360. The exception is Sacramento's ordinance, which lacks any definition section.
361. Inyo County, Cal., Code § 7.01.020(g) (1980) (stating "all water contained within the
zone of saturation").
362. Inyo County, Cal., Code § 7.01.020(g) (1980). Bulletin 118-75 identifies this basin as
underlying both Inyo and Mono Counties. Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 73. The ordinance
thus limits some of the confusion resulting from multiple basin counties, since it focuses the
permit requirements on the intracounty basin conditions.
363. The ordinance's permit provisions do not use any of these terms. lnyo County, Cal.,
Code §§ 7.01.030-7.01.041 (1980); see infra notes 365-79 and accompanying text.
364. Inyo County, Cal., Code § 7.01.020(h) (1980) (emphasis added). The list's terseness
might be explained partially by the ordinance's contemplation that the county undertake a
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b. Water Management Plan
The groundwater management plan forms the heart of the Inyo
ordinance. The initiative ordinance directed the county to prepare a plan
that incorporated 12 specific points.' The required elements focus on
local environmental and economic concerns.' The plan must include
"surface and groundwater ... to the extent that they are interchangeable
in terms of their use." 7 It requires identification and quantification of
the groundwater basin's water resources.' Finally, the water management programs developed should be "consistent... to the extent feasible,
with the County's land use plans and the needs of the parties holding
water rights."
c. Permit Program
At first glance, the Inyo ordinance appears to establish comprehensive groundwater extraction controls applicable to all pumpers within
the Owens Valley groundwater basin. Section 7.01.040 states: "[no
person, farm, corporation, or governmental agency.., shall within the
Owens Valley Groundwater Basin extract water from that basin by any

'Water Management Plan." Id. § 7.01.030. The plan's drafters might have defined additional
terms relevant to the plan's details.
365. Id. § 7.01.030.
366. Nine of the twelve factors address local conditions. The initial factor summarizes
them all: "Itihe paramount protection of Inyo County's citizens, environment and economy."
Id. § 7.01.030(a). The other seven detail this general concern: "Iclorrection or mitigation of
observed significant environmental damage"; "mlaintenance of the groundwater table at a
depth that will support natural vegetation and wildlife, minimize air pollution and enable
natural springs to flow"; "[mlaintenance of the groundwater table at a depth that will not
cause excessive drilling or pumping costs for other groundwater uses"; "Ipireservation of
groundwater quality;" "[ilmposition, whenever feasible, of measures to avoid or mitigate
anticipated adverse environmental effects"; '[slatisfaction to the extent feasible of the needs
of the agricultural sector of the Owens Valley through the distribution of water for local
irrigation and to increase the acreage devoted to agriculture other than open range";
"[rleduction in the extent to which ground levels sink as a consequence of groundwater
extraction"; and "[rlesults and adequacy of the extractor's environmental monitoring
program." Id. § 7.01.030.
The remaining three factors include: "[slatisfaction of the needs of the extractor,
taking into consideration the extractor's alternative sources of supply and its conservation
policies and practices"; "consideration of the needs and practices of all water users in the
state, and the status of the state's entire water resources"; and "[cionsideration of guidance
received from governmental agencies other than the applicant." Id.
367. Inyo County, Cal., Code § 7.01.030 (1980).
368. Id.
369. Id.
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artificial means without first obtaining a written permit."3' Unlike the
other ordinances considered so far, this one establishes seven detailed
permit application requirements.3 7 It greatly broadens the list of other
governmental bodies whose comments the Inyo County Water Director
will solicit.' The permit may only be issued if "consistent with the
groundwater management plan."3r
Unlike the other ordinances
examined so far, the Inyo ordinance does not detail extensive hydrological factors for the decision makers. Rather, it simply directs the director
to base the permit decision "upon a review of hydrologic, environmental,
and economic consequences of the proposed groundwater pumping. 374
In addition, it requires detailed monthly extraction
reports375 and
76
administration.
imposes fees to pay for the program's
Despite the apparently broad sweep of the permit program, the
exemptions may have shielded the numerical majority of pumpers from
the permit requirement.'n The ordinance exempts all small, local
370. Id. § 7.01.040. The section exempts "an agency of the United States government to the
extent federal law preempts this ordinance." Id.
371. Id. § 7.01.041. The ordinance requires seven categories of information: 1) detailed

technical well information, including monthly extraction rates; 2) estimated time periods for
pumping; 3) description of adverse environmental effects; 4) possible changes in surface
water uses, including those that might mitigate identified environmental harms; 5) beneficial
uses of the ground and surface water available to the applicant; 6) identification of ultimate
end uses of the water; and 7) alternatives to the export. Id.
372. It requires consultation with thirteen different local, state, and federal agencies. Id.

§ 7.01043.
373. Id. § 7.01.043(d).
374. Id. § 7.01.043(d). The above mentioned requirement that the permit be consistent with
the water management plan incorporates the detailed "hydrologic, environmental, and
economic" factors germane to that plan. See supra note 366. Thus, while on the surface, the
Inyo ordinance permit requirements seems to be only slightly more detailed that the
Sacramento ordinance, supra note 348, in combination, sections 7.01.030 and 7.01.043(d)
make Inyo's the most detailed of all the ordinances in the range of factors considered. At
the same time, the lnyo ordinance avoids the pseudo hydrological "overdraft," "safe yield,"
and "mining" central to most of the other schemes. In its place, section 7.010.30 details many
of the types of concerns with water levels that other ordinances seek to include within their
"overdraft," "safe yield," and "mining" definitions. While the Inyo versions require some
interpretation, see, e.g., Inyo County, Cal. Code § 7.01.030(d) (1980) ("excessive drilling or
pumping costs" not further defined), they generally avoid the interpretive baggage that
accompanies "overdraft," "safe yield," and "mining."
375. Inyo County, Cal., Code §§ 7.01.045, 7.01.046 (1980).
376. Id. § 7.01.060. The fees are imposed according to the "number of acre feet of pumped
groundwater applied for." Id.
377. This was what the City of Los Angeles alleged in its litigation successfully
challenging the ordinance. See Judgment On The Pleadings, City of Los Angeles v. County
of Inyo, No. 12908 (Cal. Super. Ct. Inyo County July 13, 1983) (allegations listed in papers
supporting motion decided by this judgment). The exemptions apply only to the permit
requirement. All pumpers, however, must comply with the well registration and reporting
requirements. See Rossmann & Steele, supra note 18, at 944.
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pumpers who do not sell or exchange water.' The exemptions shift
the program's focus to control of the exports by the basin's biggest
pumper: the City of Los Angeles.
D. Nevada County: Inyo Model Directly Applied to Exports
Enacted in 1986, the Nevada County ordinance follows the same
general format of findings, definitions, prohibitions, and permit procedures. In key areas, it borrows most heavily from Inyo. Both in some of
its definitions and in the extensive development of the permit procedures,
however, the Nevada County ordinance substantially departed from the
then current models available from Butte, Glenn, Imperial, Inyo and
Sacramento Counties. Although no longer enforced as a county ordinance,
it has been repealed and reenacted as an ordinance of the state created
Nevada County Water Agency. ° It continues to serve as a model.-'

378. The ordinance creates two classes of such pumpers. The first class includes pumpers
who extract less than 5 acre feet per year for overlying uses. Inyo County, Cal., Code §
7.01.070 (a) (1980). The second class includes those irrigators who extract 100 acre feet or
less water per year on less than 20 total acres of overlying land. Id. § 7.01.070(b). The
ordinance authorized the Water Department Director to recommend removal of an
exemption for cumulative negative environmental effects. Id. § 7.07.071.
379. Shortly after the ordinance's enactment, the City filed two lawsuits to block its
enforcement. In City of Los Angeles v. County of Inyo, Civ. No. 12908 (Cal. Super. Ct. Inyo
County July 13, 1983) (case decided on motion for summary judgment), the trial court
upheld the City's claim that the ordinance was preempted under state law. Id. The County
appealed, and ultimately, the parties settled the dispute. Stipulation and Order for
Judgment, City of Los Angeles v. County of Inyo, Civ. No. 12908 (Oct. 18, 1991). In the 60
page settlement, the County agreed not to enforce the ordinance against the City. Id. at 5859. In turn, the City agreed to a participate in a joint long term groundwater management
plan. Id. at 5-58.
The plan addresses "groundwater mining:" 'The goal is to avoid long term
groundwater mining from aquifers of Inyo County." Id. It then implicitly defines "mining"
by limiting "annual groundwater pumping so that the total pumping from any well field
area over a 20 year period (the then current year plus the 19 previous years) does not
exceed the total recharge to the same well field area over the same 20 year period." Id. In
limited circumstances, such as after the initiation of a groundwater recharge program, or
if appropriate "for other relevant reasons that are consistent with [the management plan's]
goals and principles," pumping may exceed this rate. Id.
380. In Truckee-Donner Pub. Util. Dist. v. County of Nevada, No. 35920 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nevada County Dec. 8, 1988) (decided on motion for summary judgment), the trial court
ruled that the ordinance was preempted under Cal. Const. art. XI, § 7. Order Granting
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment And Denying Defendant's Miotion For Partial
Summary Judgment at 3, Truckee Donner Pub. Util. Dist. v. County of Nevada, No. 35920
(Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1988). Following the trial court's ruling, the county repealed the
ordinance. See Minute Order Ruling On Motion To Dismiss at 1, Truckee-Donner Pub. Util.
Dist. v. County of Nevada, No. 35920 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 1988). In addition, the county
decided not to appeal. See letter of Melanie K. Wellner, Deputy Counsel, Nevada County,
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Indeed, it has directly inspired several portions of the proposed Sutter
County ordinance. Despite its improvements over the then available
models, however, it suffers from some of the same definition problems.
1. Findings and Definitions
The Nevada County findings apparently borrowed their first two
A third provision,
provisions from the Butte and Glenn models.'
preventing the ordinance's application to overlying users, had no direct
An additional provision reinforces the ordinance's
predecessor.'
limitation to water pumped from "state-identified groundwater aquifers." The only Nevada County aquifer identified by the California
Department of Water Resources in Bulletin 118-75 is the Martis Valley
(Truckee Valley) aquifer.'

to Gregory S. Weber (Oct. 29, 1992). Instead, sitting as board of supervisors of the Nevada
County Water Agency, the county board of supervisors reenacted the county's groundwater
export ordinance as the water agency's ordinance. Id. The Nevada County Water Agency
"has some broad powers to manage groundwater." Id. These powers included the power to
commence an "action or proceeding ... to declare rights in the natural flow of any...
subterranean supply of waters... or to prevent unlawful exportation of water from...
[the] ...agency." Cal. Water Code-App. § 90-13 (West 1968); see generally Cal. Water Code
§ 60230(g) (West 1966 & Supp. 1993) (water replenishment districts have same, uncertain
powers); supra note 180. The Nevada County Water Agency ordinance also exempted the
Truckee Donner Public Utility District from the export control .ordinance. Letter from
Wellner, supra.
381. Many 'of the Nevada provisions found their way into the draft Sutter County
groundwater export ordinance circulated for comment in the summer of 1992. See, e.g.,
Proposed Sutter County, Cal., Code § 1540-020(b) (1992) (discussion draft circulated Aug.
1992) (defining "export of groundwater" identically as in Nevada County, Cal., Land Use
And Development Code § L-X 6.2(D) (1986)); Proposed Sutter County, Cal., Code § 1540020(i) (1992) (discussion draft circulated Aug. 1992) (defining "overdraft" identically as in
Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.2(N) (1986)).
382. The first two sentences of the findings mirror the Butte and Glenn models. Nevada
County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.1 (1986).
383. The third sentence of the findings states: "It is not the intent of this ordinance to
affect the withdrawal of use of groundwater by an overlying landowner or occupier which
withdrawal is for domestic use or irrigation on the overlying parcel." Nevada County, Cal.,
Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.1 (1986).
384. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.1 (1986) concludes:
"It is also not the intent of this ordinance to regulate groundwater except that groundwater
contained in state-identified aquifers." Originally, the ordinance addressed only "identified"
aquifers. See Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code §§ L-X 6.1, L-X 6.2(K)
(1986) (adding the term "identified aquifers"). Just two months after its enactment, the
Nevada County Board of Supervisors amended the ordinance to clarify that the only
"identified" aquifers were those identified by the state in Bulletin 118-75. Nevada County,
Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.1, L-X 6.2(K)(2) (1986) (amended by Nevada
County, Cal., Ordinance No. 1370 (March 24, 1986).
385. Bulletin 118-75, supra note 1, at 97. The Nevada County ordinance does not itself
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The explicit limitation of the ordinance to specified "state-identified" aquifers eliminates much of the definitional confusion plaguing the
In addition, the Nevada ordinance
Butte and Glenn provisions.'
makes three major definition changes. First, it eliminates any definition
or discussion of "mining." Second, it simplifies the definition of "overdraft.""7 Third, it adds a new definition for "export of groundwaWhile the elimination of the "mining" provision greatly elimiter."'
nates much of the confusion plaguing the Butte and Glenn ordinances,
the "overdraft" and "export" changes add their own interpretive wrinkles.
The ordinance's simple "overdraft" definition eliminates the
second, alternative definition contained in the Butte and Glenn models.
It simply defines "overdraft" as: "Itihecondition of a groundwater basin
where the amount of water withdrawn by pumping exceeds the amount
In so simplifying the definition, Nevada County
of replenishment."'
loses the explicit definitional link between "overdraft" and "safe
Since "safe yield," as defined identically in the Butte and
yield."'
Glenn provisions, presents its own interpretive problems, the loss of the
explicit linkage with "overdraft" may avoid some definitional confusion " Nevertheless, the simplification makes even more glaring the
definition's lack of a time frame for comparing extractions and replenishment.3

mention Bulletin 118-75. To avoid any confusion about what the ordinance means by a
"state-identified" aquifer, the ordinance expressly states that "Martis Valley (Truckee Valley)"
is the only state identified aquifer. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code
§ L-X 6.2(K) (1986).
386. See, e.g., supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
387. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.2(N) (1986); see infra
text accompanying note 389.
388. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.2(D) (1988).
389. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.2(N) (1988). As
such, the "overdraft" definition follows the Bulletin 118-75 formulation. See Bulletin 118-75,
supra note 1, at 4. The provision eliminated came from the Supreme Court's gloss on
"overdraft" in Los Angeles v. San Fernando.See supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
390. Nevada County's "safe yield" definition is identical to the Butte and Glenn models.
Compare Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.2(V) (1988) with
Butte County, Cal., Code § 33-2.19 (Supp. 1978) and Glenn County, Cal., Code § 20.04.210
(1977). Although the Nevada County ordinance does not explicitly link "safe yield" and
"overdraft," the ordinance directs the Planning Director both to consider a proposed export
use's impact on "safe yield" and to "specify the safe yield per year for export water for each
permit holder." Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code §§ L-X 6.6, 6.7
(1986).
391. See supra notes 312-20 and accompanying text.
392. The loss of express linkage between "overdraft" and "safe yield" reduces the potential
for clarification of "overdraft" that might occur after any resolution of the "safe yield"
conundrums. While those conundrums are substantial, as noted above, the "safe yield"
definition does provide some factors relevant to the determination of an appropriate time
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The major definitional uncertainty added by the Nevada County
ordinance comes from its "export of groundwater" definition. The
ordinance defines that term in pertinent part as: "[riemoval of water from
a state-identified groundwater aquifer by any means to anyplace outside
the immediate groundwater basin."' The ordinance, however, neither
defines nor otherwise explains "immediate groundwater basin."
The ordinance's "groundwater basin" definition provides the only
clue to the meaning of "immediate." It defines "groundwater basin" as:
"[tihe geographic area underlain by a state-identified groundwater
aquifer, including recharge and discharge areas."'
An "immediate"
groundwater basin could thus simply be the state identified groundwater
aquifer without the recharge and discharge areas.
Any other interpretation necessarily involves finding some
nonarbitrary line with which to separate "immediate" and "non-immediate" areas of a groundwater basin. The findings' provision addressed to
overlying owners offers a vague suggestion. As noted above, the findings
announce that the ordinance has no effect on "the withdrawal or use of
groundwater by an overlying landowner or occupier which withdrawal
is for the domestic use or irrigation on the overlying parcel."39 The
italicized "the" is ambiguous when applied to a pumper who withdraws
water from the aquifer from a well on one parcel for use on a different
parcel that also overlies the aquifer. Arguably, such a use might be
beyond the "immediate" area from which the water was extracted.'"

frame for comparing extractions and replenishment. See supra notes 312-20 and accompanying text.
In addition to leaving the time frame matters unaddressed, the "overdraft"
simplification does nothing to address the problem of determining who is causing overdraft.
See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
393. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.2(D) (1986)
(emphasis added). The definition adds: "lexportation includes pumping of groundwater for
(1) direct discharge into a surface water system which conveys water out of the groundwater basin or (2) resale to a customer or user who will convey the water out of the
groundwater basin." Id.
394. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.2(G) (1988)
(emphasis added).
395. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.1 (1988) (emphasis
added).
396. As noted above, the law has not entirely determined whether such a use is within
the overlying right. See supra note 115. On the one hand, if such a use were not an "overlying" use, then the Nevada ordinance "immediate" area limitation might be unnecessary. On
the other hand, even if state decisional law does not recognize such an overlying right, the
Nevada "immediate area" limitation might be attempting to regulate extractions that are
otherwise within the "overlying rights" recognized by decisional law.
The ordinance's "permit conditions" provision indirectly and ambiguously
addresses the distinction between immediate and non-immediate use in the groundwater
basin. Section L-X 6.7 states: "The Planning Commission shall place no conditions upon or
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2. Substantive Provisions
Unlike Butte and Glenn counties, Nevada County does not
expressly address groundwater "mining." Rather, its regulatory scheme
focuses exclusively on groundwater "export." Nevada County requires a
permit to export groundwater, as defined above, or to "install any
groundwater transport facility to convey water from a state-identified
groundwater aquifer." n
The Nevada County ordinance departs from its Sacramento
Valley counterparts in several ways. It draws its principal inspiration
from the Inyo ordinance.' The Nevada ordinance does vary from the
Inyo model in several ways. First, it expressly makes the California
Second, it partially clarifies
Environmental Quality Act applicable.'
set allocations for water withdrawn from the groundwater basin which will be actually used
orconsumed within the groundwaterbasin."Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development
Code § L-X 6.7 (1988) (emphasis added).
By itself, this provision does not resolve the applicability of the export definition
to overlying, but non-immediate users. If such an overlying but non-immediate user is not
an "exporter," then section L-X 6.7 serves one of two functions. First, it simply reiterates the
general inapplicability of the ordinance to any pverlying users. Second, to the extent that
a single extractor is pumping for both an overlying and a non-overlying use, the section
clarifies that the Planning Director can only condition the portion of the extraction used for
export.
Alternatively, if an overlying but non-immediate user is an "exporter," then such
an exporter has to follow the permit process, even if ultimately the Planning Commission
has no authority to condition the non-immediate but overlying uses. On the one hand, such
an application appears to be an empty and expensive requirement. In such a light, it would
counsel rejection of the export definition to an overlying but not immediate user. On the
other hand, if such an extraction had environmental or economic consequences different
from "pure" overlying uses, then the application process would at least force the pumper
to identify and confront these consequences. The rtquired reports might give the County
helpful information, even if ultimately the Planning Commission could not impose
conditions upon the pumping.
Another possible interpretation of "immediate groundwater basin" might involve
the cone of depression. This possible limitation echoes the discussion above of the Imperial
and Butte ordinances. See supra notes 241-45, 275-81 and accompanying text. Use of "cone
of depression" or the equivalent to distinguish between "immediate" and "non-immediate"
groundwater basin would undoubtedly trigger permit requirements of some otherwise
overlying users. As noted immediately above, the Nevada County ordinance somewhat
ambiguously tries to avoid its application to overlying users.
397. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 63 (1988).
398. Compare, e.g., Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.4
(1988) with lnyo County, Cal., Code § 7.01.041 (1988) (former having eight information
categories required from permit applicant and the latter having seven of eight identical to
Nevada County requirements); compare also lnyo County, Cal., Code § 7.01.030(b)-(i) (1988)
and supra note 366 with Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X
6.7(B)-(I) (identical findings required).
399. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.5 (1988).
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the overdraft analysis by requiring a determination that "the quantity of
water sought to be exported will not result in overdraft" ° and specifying
the "safe yield per year for export water" that will protect the groundwater
supply."' Finally, since the Nevada ordinance was directed solely at
exporters, it had no need for the Inyo exemptions for small, in basin
users. Rather, the Nevada ordinance exempted exporters who were
continuously exporting water during any six month period of the year
preceding the ordinance's enactment.'
E. Tehama County: The 1986-92 DroughtPrompts Another Export
Control Ordinance
1. Findings and Definitions
The Tehama County "aquifer protection" ordinance substantially
resembles in both structure and content the Butte and Glenn ordinances.' Like its two older cousins, the Tehama County ordinance contains
findings, definitions, mining prohibitions, and permit requirements.
Nevertheless, Tehama County's ordinance substantially restricts pumping
for export by changing the mining definition, adding a "radius of
influence" restriction, and greatly expanding the permit requirement.
A major difference in tone between the Tehama County ordinance
and its cousins readily appears in the ordinance's initial findings. As
noted above, both Butte and Glenn counties began their ordinances with
a section containing a single short paragraph extolling the importance of
groundwater to the health, welfare, safety, and economy of their
respective counties.' In contrast, Tehama County prefaced its "aquifer
protection" provisions with 15 paragraphs of findings and declarations.0 Like their Butte and Glenn counterparts, these provisions
attempt to link aquifer management with concerns over the county's
economy and environment. Unlike Butte and Glenn counties however,
Tehama elaborates the linkages in great detail."

400. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.7 (1988) (emphasis
added). With the exception of Sacramento County, the Sacramento Valley counties'
ordinances all inelegantly caution their boards to prevent the "permit" from "resultling) in
overdraft." See, e.g., supra note 320.
401. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.7 (1988) (emphasis
added).
402. Nevada County, Cal., Land Use And Development Code § L-X 6.10 (1988).
403. Tehama County, Cal., Code Ch. 9.40 (1992) ("Aquifer Protection").
404. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
405. Tehama County, Cal., Ordinance No. 1552 (1992). These findings, however, will not
be within the codified version of the ordinance.
406. See id. paras. 3,9. The Tehama ordinance foresees fuller development of the county's
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Most of the definitions set forth in the Tehama County ordinance
are identical to the comparable Butte and Glenn provisions.' In three
critical ways, however, the definition lists differ. First, the Tehama
County ordinance adds a definition of "domestic water well." ° This
provision sets up several exceptions to the ordinance's pumping
limitations.' Second,4 10the Tehama County code adds a definition of
"radius of influence." This provision sets up a major new pumping
limitation." Finally, the Tehama County ordinance's "mining" definition differs substantially from its Butte and Glenn cousins. 12
Tehama County defines "mining" as:
Extraction of groundwater by any means, including pumping
and the use of artesian wells, from any aquifer within the
county of Tehama which in contemplation of pre-existing
extractions of ground water [sic] used beneficially upon lands
overlying the aquifer within the County and the reasonably
foreseeable beneficial uses to which the groundwater from the
aquifer could be made to lands overlying the aquifer within
the County which [sic] exceeds the reasonably foreseeable
replenishment potential of the watersheds' native water
together with such imported water as may be available to be
applied to the recharge the [sic] aquifer.4
By defining the relevant "groundwater bodies" as "any aquifer within the
county of Tehama," this definition solves the initial problem created by

agricultural economy "for a host of reasons, including the presence of an aquifer or aquifers
that have not yet been damaged by imprudent water production practices." Id. para. 3. The
ordinance also identifys numerous harms that mining or overdrafting from new wells might
cause, even when the water will be used "upon overlying and immediately adjacent lands
within the County." Id. para.9.
407. Compare Tehama County, Cal., Code §§ 9.40.010(11), (18) (1992) with Butte County,
Cal., Code §§ 33-2.13, -2.19 (Supp. 1978) and Glenn County, Cal., Code §§ 20.04.150, .210
(1977) (identical overdraft and safe yield provisions in all three codes).
408. Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.010(3) (1992) (well used for residential and yard
uses "within the curtilage of a dwelling" on the well site parcel or a contiguous parcel).
409. Tehama County, Cal., Code §§ 9.40.030, .040 (1992); see infra note 427.
410. "The radial distance from the center of a well bore to the point where there is no
lowering of the water table or potentiometric surface (the edge of the well's cone of
depression)." Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.010(16) (1992).
411. Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.040 (1992) (radius of influence restrictions); see
infra notes 426-29 and accompanying text.
412. Compare Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.010 (10) (1992) with Butte County, Cal.,
Code § 33-2.12 (Supp. 1978) and Glenn County, Cal., Code § 20.04.140 (1991) (differing
mining definitions); see also supra notes 268, 274-97, 325 and accompanying text.
413. Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.010(10) (1992).
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Butte and Glenn counties' undefined reference to "groundwater bodies." ' Nevertheless, while solving this problem, the Tehama County
provision proceeds to pose several interpretive challenges of its own.
The first problem requires reconstruction of the 93 word sentence
to clarify the relationship between the multiple clauses and phrases.
Much of the confusion comes from the lack of punctuation and the
inclusion of an apparently superfluous "which" preceding "exceeds" in the
definition's latter portion.41 If the second "which" is ignored, and
clarifying changes added, the definition appears to read:
Extraction of groundwater ...from any aquifer within the
county of Tehama which[,] in contemplation of [both:]
[11pre-existing extractions of [groundwater] used beneficially
upon lands overlying the aquifer within the county[,] and
[21 the reasonably foreseeable beneficial uses to which
groundwater from the aquifer could be made to lands overlying the aquifer within the County[,]
exceeds the reasonably foreseeable replenishment potential
...
of the watersheds' native water together with such imported
water as may be available to be applied to the recharge [of]
the aquifer.
This reconstruction, however, raises its own problems.
As noted above, both the Butte and the Tehama County
ordinances define "mining" by setting up a simple equation: "mining"= "pumping" > "replenishment."416 Similarly, the initial and final
portions of the Tehama County ordinance appear to set up a similar
equation: "mining"="extraction" > ((native water replenishment) + (water
imported for recharge).) This equation, however, leaves out the definition's
two phrases that qualify "extraction": "pre-existing extractions for
overlying use within the county" and "reasonably foreseeable future in
county overlying uses." The question remains: how does "contemplation"
of "present" and "future" in-county uses affect the definition of "mining"
itself?
None of the other definitions addresses either the meaning of
these two phrases, or their role in the "mining" equation. Several possible
interpretations exist. First, the phrases might carve out from the "mining"
414. See, e.g., supra notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
415. The problem stems from the "which" that precedes "in contemplation of" in the
ordinance's initial portion. The second "which" simply makes no sense.
416. See supra notes 268, 325. Both these ordinances require pumping to be "greatly in
excess of replenishment." Id.
The preceding discussion noted a problem with these simple "mining" definitions
that applies to the Tehama County ordinance, too. All three definitions fail to identify a time
frame for comparing the rates of extraction and replenishment. See supra notes 282-83 and
accompanying text.
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definition an exemption for in-county uses. Under this interpretation,
pumping that exceeded replenishment would not be "mining" if the water
were "used beneficially" in-county on lands overlying the aquifer. Such
an interpretation, however, does not follow easily from the vague text of
the mining definition. Moreover, it adds little to the overall groundwater
control ordinance. It simply follows the mining restriction itself. The
Tehama county ordinance only bans "mining" if the extracted water "is
transported... from the [county.]"41' Under this interpretation, an incounty pumper faces no potential liability for "mining." The "mining"
equation would read: "mining"="extraction(forout-of-county uses)">((native
water replenishment)+(waterimported for recharge).)
Second, the "present" and "future" in-county use phrases might
simply purport to reserve water for any future in-county uses. Under
such a reading, "mining" occurs when a proposed export project will take
water away from future in county uses, even if the combined rates of
then-present pumping for in-county uses and export pumping is
otherwise less than the combined rate of natural and artificial replenishment. Under this reading, the "mining" equation would read: "mining"=((presentpumpingfor in-county uses) + (exportpumping))>((nativewater
replenishment) + (water imported for recharge).)
Finally, at the opposite extreme from the first interpretation, the
"present" and "future" in-county use phrases might simply reinforce the
basic equation that "mining"="extraction (for any purpose) ">((native water
replenishment) + (water imported for recharge).) Little textual support exists
within the definition itself for this interpretation.41 Nevertheless, the
ordinance's broad legislative findings demonstrate the board's concern
effects of increased pumping even for in-county, overlying
over 41the
9
uses.

Although the board thus expressed its concern over potential
mining for overlying uses, it ultimately limited the mining ban to out-ofcounty extractions.4 Thus, even if the mining definition itself arguably
might have limited in-county extractions for in county uses, such a
definition would have little impact on a potential exporter's ability to
pump for uses outside of the county.42

417. Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.020 (1992).
418. Indeed, such a reading would reduce the overall equation to "mining" = "pumping" > "replenishment."This would make the lengthy Tehama County provision into a virtual
twin of its far shorter Butte and Glenn county cousins.
419. See Tehama County, Cal., Ordinance No. 1552, paras. 9, 12 (1992). Specific concerns
noted are drought induced increased well drilling for intracounty uses which alarms county
supervisors and a fear of intracounty exports. Id.
420. See Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.040 (1992).
421. The only impact on-an exporter readily imaginable from such a broad definition
would be the county wide level at which mining occurred. If "mining" can occur when
((present + future) in-county pumping) > ((native water replenishment) + (water imported for
recharge)), then there will be no water available for export pumping.
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2. Substantive Provisions
In addition to these definition changes, the Tehama County
ordinance makes three major substantive changes from its Butte and
Glenn county counterparts. First, like the current Glenn County ordinance, the Tehama County ordinance's punctuation leaves no doubt that
the mining ban applies only to water that is "transported ...from the
County of Tehama."
Second, the Tehama County ordinance greatly broadens the
permit requirement. Unlike the vague Butte County provision, and
the generally narrower Glenn County provision,424 the Tehama County
provision requires a permit from any one who pumps for use (or sale for
use) "on other than the parcel of land upon which the extraction occurs,
or contiguous parcels of land under the same ownership as the parcel
from which the extraction occurs."' This provision requires a permit
from any exporter who wished to take water out of the county for use on
any parcel other than one immediately across the Tehama County line
from the Tehama County parcel upon which the pumping occurred.
Third, the Tehama County ordinance adds an entirely new
pumping restriction. Section 9.40.040 makes it unlawful to operate (or
allow another to operate) a well "in such a manner that the radius of
influence of such well extends beyond the boundaries of the parcel of
land upon which the well is located, or alternatively, beyond the
boundaries of contiguous parcels of land under the same ownership as
that parcel upon which the well is located."'26 As originally enacted, this
provision applied with almost equal force to both in-county users and
exporters.'
Almost immediately, the county amended the ordinance
by exempting wells "actually in operation in calendar year 1991 or any
prior year." '
422. Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.020 (1992); see also supra notes 274-97, 333 and
accompanying text.
423. See supra note 270.
424. See supra note 326. In one instance, Glenn County's permit requirement is broader
than the Tehama County provision. Glenn County requires all out of county pumpers to
obtain a permit. Glenn County, Cal. Code § 20.04.410 (1991). In contrast, if a Tehama County
pumper owned a contiguous parcel of land across the Tehama County line, pumping from
the Tehama County parcel for use on the adjoining, non-Tehama County parcel, would not
appear to require a permit. Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.030 (1992).
425. Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.030 (1992) (also exempting defined drinking water
purveryors serving Tehama County residents).
426. Id. § 9.40.040. For the definition of "radius of influence," see supra note 410.
427. The provision exempts both defined "domestic wells" and the same suppliers of
Tehama County public water system exempted from the permit requirement. Tehama
County, Cal., Code § 9.40.040 (1992); see generally supra note 408.
428. Tehama County, Cal., Ordinance No. 1553 (Feb. 18, 1992).
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This pumping restriction places an additional substantive
limitation upon some potential exporters. For those exporters who draw
or purchase water from a well grandfathered in under the amendment,
the radius of influence restriction will have little impact.4 ' If the
grandfather clause does not apply to water from a particular well, then
the radius of influence restriction may greatly reduce the availability of
sites for potential export pumping-even if there is no demonstrated
"mining," "overdraft," or other long term negative impacts associated with
a particular well. Export pumpers will have to buy larger parcels, or
parcels more remote from neighboring wells.'
V.

EXPORT REGULATION BY STATE CREATED
GROUNDWATER AUTHORITIES

The major legislative alternative to locally enacted groundwater
export controls is state creation of a groundwater management agency.
In 1953, the legislature added sweeping groundwater management
powers to the Orange County Water District (OCWD). 1 The 1953
amendments to its charter authorized the OCWD to limit overall district
groundwater pumping and equalize the relative costs of surface and
groundwater supplies through a "basin equity assessment. "43 2 The
OCWD Act, does not, however, directly address groundwater export
issues in its statutory scheme.43

429. Arguably, enlargement or deepening of a well under some circumstances might
trigger the radius of influence restrictions. See Tehama County, Cal., Code § 9.40.040 (1992).
430. In addition to Tehama County's 1992 enactment of a groundwater export ordinance,
1992 also saw Sutter County draft a groundwater export ordinance. Sutter County, Cal.,
Proposed Ordinance, An Ordinance of the County of Sutter Amending the Sutter County
Ordinance Code by Adding Chapter 1540 Relating to the Mining of Water (1992). See Letter
from James Scanlon, Deputy County Counsel, Sutter County, to Sutter County Water
Districts (Aug. 27, 1992) (containing draft of "Proposed Sutter County Ordinance Regarding
Groundwater Management"). At the time of this writing, the County has not proceeded on
this proposal.
431. 1953 Calif. Stats. 2035, 2060-67; see generally Schneider, supra note 59, at 43-49.
432. See Calif. Water Code-App. § 40-31.5 (West Supp. 1993); see generally Schneider, supra
note 59, at 47-49.
433. , Although the current version of the OCWD Act does not detail export restrictions,
it does, however, expressly authorize the district to initiate "actions and proceedings... to
prevent unlawful exportation of water from the district." Cal. Water Code-App. § 40-2(9)
(West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). It does not, however, otherwise directly address the
legality of exports. The Water Code Appendix is peppered with similar language in special
district legislation. See, e.g., supra note 380 (Nevada County Water Agency has such
undefined powers). The reference to "actions and proceedings" in these acts appears to limit
the special districts' powers to that of being able to sue, or to appear as a party before an
agency, to establish an unlawful export. Without more, it does not appear to authorize the
special district to legislate on these matters. Cf. Cal. Water Code § 275 (West 1971) (granting
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Sierra Valley GroundwaterBasin Act

The first special district legislation to address groundwater export
directly was the Sierra Valley Groundwater Basin Act (Sierra Valley Act,
or Act).' Added in 1980, the legislation authorized Plumas and Sierra
counties to create a joint powers agency' known as the "Sierra Valley
Groundwater Management District."' The Department of Water Resources had identified "special problems" with that basin. 7 The reduction of artesian head resulting from increased well drilling threatened
winter valley cattle watering.'
1. Findings and Definitions
Unlike many of the more recent special acts, the Sierra Valley Act
contains no express legislative findings. It does extensively define
relevant terms.' Six definitions help avoid much of the confusion
inherent in many of the ordinances considered above.
First, the Act defines "groundwater basin" as: "the groundwater
basin within the boundaries of the district and any sub-basins located
therein.""0 As a special act directed towards solving a particular basin's
problems, the legislation by nature eliminates much of the confusion
plaguing the county ordinances considered above. The "groundwater
basin" definition removes any residual confusion by including "subbasins" within the overall basin definition.

State Water Resources Control Board the power to take "all appropriate proceedings or
actions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent... [waste] of water").
The following section of the article focuses on those special districts expressly
empowered to limit groundwater exportation pursuant to groundwater management
authority.
434. Cal. Water Code-App. § 119-101 (West Supp. 1993).
435. A "joint powers agency" is an agreement by two or more public agencies to exercise
jointly any of the powers they could each exercise separately. See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 65006599 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993).
436. Cal, Water Code-App. § 119-102 (West Supp. 1993). An additional section of the 1980
legislation also authorized Lassen and Sierra Counties to enter into a management
agreement with Nevada, or Washoe County, Nevada, governing the bi-county, interstate
Long Valley groundwater basin. Cal. Water Code-App. § 119-1301 (West Supp. 1993). It also
allows the two California counties to manage jointly the California portion of the Long
Valley basin with the same powers otherwise granted to the Sierra Valley Groundwater
Management District. Id.
437. Bulletin 118-80, supra note 12, at 35, 38.
438. Id. at 38.
439. Cal. Water Code-App. §§ 119-301 to 119-322 (West Supp. 1993).
440. Id. § 119-311,
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Second and third, the Act distinguishes two classes of extractors
who have appropriative rights. It defines "export" as those extractions
that will be used outside of the district boundaries." 1 Thus, nonoverlying users who appropriate groundwater for use outside of district are
"exporters." In contrast, the Act creates a new class of appropriators:
"district off-basin users.""2 These appropriators extract "groundwater
for use on land within the district which does not overlie the groundwater basin." 3 The distinction becomes critical to the substantive rights
created by the Act."
Fourth, the Act provides a basic definition of "overdraft." It
defines "overdraft" as: "the condition of the groundwater basin where the
average annual amount of water extracted exceeds the average annual
supply of water to the basin, plus any temporary surplus." 5 While not
as specific as the Imperial ordinance, it does specify "average annual
amount" as the relevant measures of time and quantity for comparing
extractions and replenishment.
Fifth, the Act adds a definition not found in any of the ordinances. It defines "available supply" in part as:
the quantity of groundwater which can be withdrawn annually from the groundwater basin without resulting in or aggravating conditions of overdraft, subsidence, or groundwater
quality degradation. Available supply of the groundwater
basin includes the average annual natural water supply,
imported water or other water which has been spread to the
basin or otherwise added to the basin, and return flows to the
basin attributable to these sources reaching the groundwater
basin in the course of use."3
Finally, the Act defines "well interference" as: "a substantial water
level decline in a short time period in a localized area caused by
Of course, this provision is no
pumping from extraction facilities."'

441. id. § 119-307.
442. Id. § 119-306.
443. Id.
444. Cal. Water Code-App. § 119-709.7 (West Supp. 1993); see infra notes 453-56 and
accompanying text.
445. Id. § 119-314. Unlike the ordinances considered above, the Act expressly defines
"temporary surplus" as: "the amount of water that can be extracted from the groundwater
basin, without adversely affecting the available supply of the groundwater basin, to provide
storage space for natural recharge that would be lost during wet years if it could not be
stored in the groundwater basin." Id. § 119-319. This definition follows directly from Los
Angeles v. San Fernando. Supra note 130; see also supra note 87.
446. Cal. Water Code-App. § 119-302 (West Supp. 1993).
447. Id. § 119-321.
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model of precision. For example, it does not limit "localized area" as
specifically as the Tehama ordinance's definition of "radius of influence."" 8 Nevertheless, it does at least provide three relative concepts:
1) "substantial" versus "insubstantial" water level decline; 2) "short" versus
"long" time period; and 3) "localized" versus "regional" or "widespread"
area.
2. Substantive Provisions
The Sierra Valley Act authorizes, but does not require, extensive
groundwater management provisions. For example, it allows the District
to require well registration and extraction statements.' In addition, it
may regulate well spacing or operation to minimize well interference.4"
This power includes the right to adjudicate whether well interference
from an extraction infringes another extractor's legal rights.45' In
general, if the District "determines that groundwater management
activities may be necessary," the District may exercise any of several
identified powers. 2
The Act extensively details the district's export regulation
authority. Central to the export regulation scheme is a legislative
prioritization of appropriative groundwater rights. Section 119-709.7
grants a priority to both overlying groundwater users and to "district offbasin groundwater users" over exporters.4 In some circumstances, this
provision can reprioritize existing uses; the in-district use priority applies
"irrespective of the time such export uses are commenced."' In addition, the Act authorizes the district to grant some off-basin district users
a priority over overlying users, based on a need for "equitable distribution of the groundwater resource. "
The Sierra Valley Act thus provides a rare and limited state
legislated scheme for acquiring private rights to groundwater. In place of

448. See supra notes 410, 426-29, and accompanying text.
449. Cal. Water Code-App. §§ 119-601 to 119-607 (West Supp. 1993).
450. Id. §§ 119-703 to 119-704.
451. Id. § 119-705. This contrasts with the powers of local public agencies under A.B. 3030.
As noted above, that bill expressly precludes a local public agency from determining
extractor's legal rights. See supra note 207.
452. Cal. Water Code-App. § 119-702 (West Supp. 1993) (authorizing, inter alia, water
purchase, storage, conservation, and exchange); see also id. §§ 119-801 to 119-1206
(groundwater extraction and management charges, water development projects, judicial
enforcement). These powers are fairly typical of powers granted to those state created local
water agencies authorized to manage groundwater. See, e.g., supra note 180 (water replenishment districts).
453. Cal. Water Code-App. § 119-709.7(a) (West Supp. 1993).
454. Id.
455. Id. § 119-709.7(b).
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the traditional, two tier scheme of water rights rules governing groundwater extraction, the legislature has created a three tier scheme. Even
more significantly, the legislature granted the district the power to adjust
the automatic priority otherwise granted to overlying users by common
law, in favor of local (i.e., in-district) appropriative uses.'
These legislative changes to water rights law strongly support the
district's export management authority. The Act requires an exporter to
obtain a permit specifying the amount of water it can export. 457 Permit
applicants must demonstrate "an available supply ... in excess of the
amount currently required for reasonable and beneficial uses within the
district."4' The applicant must also demonstrate that the export, "if
permitted, would not adversely affect the rights of groundwater users
within the district. "419 If the district later determines that overdraft
exists, it can suspend previously authorized exports.4
B. Other DistrictsFollow the Sierra Valley Model

In 1989, the legislature extended export control powers to two
other specially created local public agencies in Eastern California. 1 The
legislation that created the Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater
Management District contains critical definitions, groundwater management provisions, and export restrictions virtually identical to the

456. The constitutionality, under the state and federal "takings" clauses, of such a
reprioritization of an existing right is beyond the scope of this article.
In the event that any pumper petitions a court to adjudicate a groundwater basin,
the legislature has directed the court how to apportion the groundwater. In general, the
court must allocate groundwater similarly to the district's allocation of basin waters in times
of overdraft. CompareCal. Water Code-App. § 119-712 (West Supp. 1993) with id. § 119-709.5;
see also infra note 460.
457. Cal. Water Code-App. § 119-706(a) (West Supp. 1993).
458. Id. § 119-706(b).

459. Id.
460. Id.§ 119-707. If export restrictions alone will not "eliminate existing or threatened
conditions of overdraft, the district may limit or suspend extractions by district users." Id.
§ 119-709. Under such circumstances, the district primarily allocates water "on the basis of
the number of acres overlying the basin or subbasin that a user owns or leases in proportion
to the total number of acres overlying the basin or subbasin." Id. § 119-709.5. The district
can, however, adjust "any figure ...up or down for any of the following factors: (1) Itlhe
number of acres actually irrigated compared to the number of acres owned or leased; (2)
[dcrop type; (3) [wlasteful of inefficient use; (4) irleasonable use; (5) [alny other factors that
the district reasonably feels it should consider in order to reach an equitable distribution
within the entire district." Id.
461. Cal. Water Code-App. §§ 128-1 to 128-906 (West Supp. 1993) (Mono County TriValley Groundwater Management District Act); id. §§ 129-1 to 129-1301 (Honey Lake Valley
Groundwater Management District).
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Sierra Valley Act.' The legislation that created the Honey Lake Valley
Groundwater Management District, in Lassen County, mirrors the Sierra
Valley Act for the most part.463 The Honey Lake Valley Act, however,
does not contain the Sierra Valley Act's legislative distinctions between
in-district and out-of-district appropriators.
In 1991, the Legislature again modeled special district legislation
upon the Sierra Valley Act. The Ojai Basin Groundwater Management
Agency Act creates an agency in Ventura County with power to regulate
groundwater and restrict its export.' Like the Honey Lake Valley Act,
however, the Ojai Basin Act does not expressly prioritize water among
465
different types of appropriators.
The Sierra Valley Act and its progeny continue to serve as models
for special district legislation. 6 Indeed, in 1992, two counties that had
enacted groundwater export ordinances moved forward with proposals
for state legislation to created special county-wide groundwater management districts with groundwater management and export control
authority. In 1992, Glenn County unsuccessfully sought legislation that

462. Compare Cal. Water Code-App. § 119-302 to 119-322 (West Supp. 1993) with id.
128-302.5 to 128-322.
463. Compare Cal. Water Code-App. § 119-302 to 119-322 (West Supp. 1993) with id.
129-302 to 129-322.
464. Cal. Water Code-App. §§ 131-101 to 131-1201 (West Supp. 1993). Again, many of the
Ojai Basin Act's principal definitions and substantive provisions are substantially similar to
the Sierra Valley Act's provisions. Compare id. §§ 131-302 to 131-327 with id. §§ 119-302 to
119-322.

The Sierra Valley Act, the Mono County Act, and the Honey Lake Valley Act all
prohibit exports unless the applicant demonstrates that "there is an available supply .. in
excess of the amount currently required for reasonable and beneficial uses within the
district." Cal. Water Code-App. § 119-706 (West Supp. 1993) (Sierra Valley Act); id. § 128-706
(Mono County Act); id. § 129-706 (West Supp. 1993) (Honey Lake Valley Act) (emphasis
added). The Ojai Basin Act, however, prohibits exports "unless the applicant has established
that the temporary surplus is in excess of the amount currently required for reasonable and
beneficial uses within the agency." Cal. Water Code-App. § 131-708(b) (West Supp. 1993)
(emphasis added). The Sierra Valley Act, the Mono County Act, and the Honey Lake Valley
Act define "temporary surplus" as: "the amount of water that can be extracted from the
groundwater basin, without adversely affecting the available supply of the groundwater
basin, to provide storage space for naturalrecharge that would be lost during wet years if it could
not be stored in the groundwater basin." Cal. Water Code-App. § 119-319 (West Supp. 1993)
(Sierra Valley Act); id. § 128-319 (Mono County Act); id, § 129-319 (Honey Lake Valley Act)
(emphasis added). In contrast, the Ojai Basin Act expands the definition: "the amount of
water that can be extracted from the basin without permanently adversely affecting the
available supply or the ability of the basin to provide storage space for natural or artificial
recharge that would be lost during wet years if it could not be stored in the basin." Cal.
Water Code-App. § 131-325 (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
465. Cal. Water Code-App. § 131-403 (West Supp. 1993).
466. Cf. Calif Water Code-App. §§ 121-102 to 121-1105 (West Supp. 1993) (Fox Canyon
Groundwater Management Act).
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would have created a Glenn County Groundwater Management
District."67 Twice passed by the legislature, it was twice vetoed by
Governor Wilson.' While the proposed Glenn County Act varied
substantially from the Sierra Valley Act, nevertheless, the Sierra Valley
Act's influence remains apparent.' 9 Similarly, in 1992 and 1993, Imperial County was continuing to draft special district legislation modeled
after the Sierra Valley Act and its progeny.470
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The extended tour through the maze of ordinances and special
district legislation 471 leads to two sets of conclusions about local control
of groundwater transfers. First, authorized counties or other local public
agencies who undertake groundwater transfer control need to pay much
greater attention to the details of their local legislative schemes. Second,
the balkanization of groundwater basin management, particularly in
multi-county basins such as the Sacramento Valley groundwater basin,
argues strongly for greater state legislative guidance over important
water allocation decisions with statewide import. At the very least, state
legislation could add some greater uniformity to provisions adopted by
those localities who are both authorized and who choose to regulate
groundwater extractions. More importantly, state law could ensure that
groundwater export controls that do not involve true basin management
do not benefit local economies at the expense of the state economy as a
whole.

467. See supra note 201.
468. See supra note 201.
469. For example, the proposed Glenn County Act contains many of the same definitions
and substantive provisions as the Sierra Valley Act. Compare S.B. 207 §§ 202, 209, 212, 501,
502 (1992) (unenacted) with Cal. Water Code-App. §§ 119-302, -311, -314, -701, -702 (West
Supp. 1993) (same definitions of terms and substantive provisions). The vetoed Glenn
County Act, however, departed from the Sierra Valley Act in quite a few ways. Some of the
differences relevant to export regulation include both different definitions and different
permit requirements. Compare S.B. 207 §§ 205(a), 507(b) (1992) (unenacted) with Cal. Water
Code-App. §§ 119-307, -706 (West Supp. 1993) (note differences in definition of "export" and
permit restrictions on water exports).
470. Letter of Joanne Yeager, Deputy County Counsel, Imperial County, to Gregory
Weber (Feb. 20, 1992). The County received a "final draft" bill from its special counsel on
February 26, 1993.
471. Supra notes 215-470 and accompanying text.
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A. GreaterCare Needed in Drafting Locally Initiated Groundwater
Transfer Regulations
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the debate over the degree
of state control over groundwater transfer matters, the crafters of groundwater transfer regulations need to pay much greater attention to the
details of their legislative schemes. Over the past 20 years, a "common
law" of local legislative efforts to control groundwater exports has arisen.
The law is "common" not in the legal sense of a judicially created body
of law; rather, it is common in the sense that the various counties have
borrowed substantial portions of previous local legislative efforts in
developing their own particular solutions to the transfer problems. At the
same time, they have departed from their models at times. This ability to
borrow from the best current solutions and innovate where the best is not
appropriate is one of the strong points in favor of local control over
groundwater issues. Unfortunately, the borrowing patterns have not
always reflected a coherent and precise tailoring of legislative expression
to local circumstances.
The reasons for the pattern of borrowing and innovation are
likely as much a result of accident as conscious design. Lacking a central
depository for the local ordinances, it is difficult to assemble a complete
set of these ordinances. Sudden concerns over groundwater transfers,
particularly in times of drought, may lead to hasty, imprecise drafting.
In addition, complicated or poorly understood local hydrology does not
lend itself easily to simple legislative solutions.4'
While progress in eliminating unnecessary legislative confusion
has not been uniform, there have been major steps forward over the past
decade. For those counties that have been able to convince the legislature
to enact special district legislation, the Sierra Valley Act has become a
true model.' That Act and its progeny generally define precisely the
affected area, the meaning of export, and the requirement for an export
permit. Moreover, the export control schemes are accompanied by general

472. Of course, as noted earlier, see supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text, local
public agencies have no monopoly on poor drafting. As also noted, however, at least with
a poorly drafted state statute, the provisions will be uniform, once the courts figure out
what they mean. In contrast, with 58 counties, and over 900 other local public agencies that
may have some authority to regulate groundwater under A.B. 3030, the need for drafting
precision is even greater, since the chances for incoherency in resource planning are
multiplied a thousand fold. An optimist would conclude that, with maybe 1,000 entities
potentially at work on their groundwater management ordinances, some of them will "get
it right" and come up with a well crafted scheme. A pessimist, however, might conclude
that 995 of the entities may well "get it wrong," and the resulting resource management
scheme would be an incoherent shambles.
473. Supra notes 434-60 and accompanying text.
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basin management powers. Finally, in both the Sierra Valley and Mono
County Acts, the legislature has expressly sanctioned the apparent goal
of many export control provisions: an express priority to those appropriators who will use the water on lands within the local public agency, at
the expense of those who will export the water beyond the basin
boundaries. Such an express, state approved groundwater appropriative
rights scheme reduces the opportunity for pure parochialism in water
allocation decisions.
Still, even the Sierra Valley Act progeny have room for some
improvement. The definitions of "overdraft" lack precise time units for
comparing extraction and replenishment rates. Most recently, the Ojai
Basin Act has eliminated the helpful "available supply" term as the
linchpin of the export permit scheme.474 In its place, it substituted a
new definition of "temporary surplus" that unhelpfully extends that
concept beyond the accepted meaning derived from Los Angeles v. San
Fernando. 5 The vetoed Glenn County Act went even further, and
eliminated express requirements for proof of either "available" or
"temporary" surplus.4 76 In all the special district acts, the export permit
requirements apply even though the districts undertake no other
management activities that would spread more evenly the burden of
increased groundwater use efficiency and reduced local environmental
harms. Finally, only the Mono, County Act has followed the Sierra Valley
Act's state prioritization of appropriative groundwater rights.' The
legislature's failure to prioritize classes of appropriative groundwater
rights in the other special acts raises the possibility that local districts will
attempt to achieve such a de facto prioritization in the name of purely
parochial economic concerns.
In contrast to the state created legislative districts, less coherence
emerges from a consideration of the county ordinances. Three broad
groups of ordinances appear: 1) the Imperial ordinance; 2) the current
Sacramento Valley ordinances; and 3) the Inyo and Nevada ordinances.478

The Imperial ordinance appears largely to have been ignored as
later counties approached groundwater export issues. This ignorance has
had mixed blessings. On the one hand, Imperial's vague and confusing

474. See supra note 464 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 130, 141-150 and accompanying text.
476. See supra note 469.
477. See supra note 462.
478. Arguably, the proposed but not adopted Sutter County ordinance, which drew from
both the Nevada and the Sacramento Valley models, represented a fourth, hybrid group.
See supra note 430.
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"area of influence" provision4 has not been directly copied by any
subsequent counties, although equally obtuse terms have surfaced in its
place in some of the Sacramento Valley counties.' On the other hand,
in terms of units of time and quantity for comparing extraction and
replenishment rates, the Imperial ordinance still offers the most precise
definition of "overdraft" of all the ordinances and special statutes
surveyed.
The Sacramento Valley ordinances present the greatest range of
drafting caused problems. The Sacramento ordinance is unparalleled in
its simplicity."' Through this simplicity, it avoids creating any of the
interpretive problems plaguing the more technically articulated ordinances. At the same time, it invites interpretive guidance in the most
fundamental sense: what is an "adverse effect"? Of the four other
Sacramento Valley ordinances, the Modoc ordinance is the least ambitious
and creates the least confusion. 2 The Butte ordinance would benefit
greatly from a complete overhaul.' Its failure adequately to define
"groundwater basin," "mining," and "overdraft," and its unclear "mining"
ban create unnecessary confusion over the ordinance's scope. The Glenn
ordinance shares much of the same drafting caused problems as its Butte
cousin.'" The Tehama ordinance avoids a couple of the Butte and
Glenn problems and adds workable "radius of influence" concepts, but its
"mining" provisions are hopelessly confusing."'
Still, even in Butte and Glenn counties there has been some
progress in eliminating unnecessary confusion. In the last two years,
Glenn County has amended its ordinance to eliminate the permit
requirements vague reference to "immediate area of its natural groundwater basin." In addition, it has proposed to scrap the entire ordinance
in favor of detailed special legislation.'
While the Butte County
ordinance remains unchanged since its 1978 introduction, the county has
made some progress in overall groundwater management efforts with its
recent memorandum of understanding with the Butte Basin Water Users
Association.'

479. See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
480. See, e.g., notes 269, 275-81 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 346-352 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 336-345 and accompanying text.
483. See supra notes 265-323 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 324-335 and accompanying text.
485. See supra notes 403429 and accompanying text.
486. See supra note 469.
487. See "Memorandum of Understanding Providing for the Formation and Operation of
the Butte Basin Water Users Association" (1992) (on file with the Butte Basin Water Users
Ass'n in Chico, Cal.). Among other things, this group aims to "ensure that water transfers
in or outside the Basin do not adversely impact Butte Basin water users and otherwise
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The Inyo and Nevada ordinances represent the best crafted
ordinances.' They solve several of the definition problems plaguing
the other ordinances. Most particularly, the ordinances specify exactly the
regulated groundwater bodies and eliminate entirely the unnecessary
confusion created by the "mining" provisions from Butte, Glenn and
Tehama. The permit conditions give a potential exporter broad and
specific notice of the factors relevant to the permit decision. The reporting
and monitoring requirements help build important data bases. Of all the
ordinances, only the Inyo ordinance approximates true groundwater
basin management.
Still, even these ordinances could stand some improvement. In
particular, the Nevada "export" definition adds unnecessary confusion,
and the "overdraft" definition is unduly simple. Beyond the two
definition changes, the Nevada and Inyo ordinances suffer from
parochialism in the groundwater basin management responsibilities.
Although on its face applicable to all groundwater extractors in the Inyo
County portion of the Owens Valley groundwater basin, the Inyo
ordinance has a broad "de minimis" exemption that, as a practical matter,
exempts substantial numbers of local users from the permit requirements.
Absent the permit requirements, local users, even of small quantities,
have much less incentive to manage their own water uses appropriately.
The Inyo exemptions can be overridden if exempt pumpers cause,
individually or collectively, a "significant negative effect on the environment.'" But the burden of establishing such effect apparently lies with
the county. For its part, the Nevada ordinance expressly applies only to
exporters. Thus, neither the Inyo nor the Nevada ordinance substantially
encourages local users to extract and use groundwater efficiently and
wisely. They both put the practical burden of environmental regulation
solely on the most politically weak constituency: appropriators for export
beyond their political boundaries.
With the passage of A.B. 3030,"1 the legislature has created the
potential for an unprecedented expansion of the patchwork quilt of
locally initiated groundwater transfer legislation. Most likely, as the
hundreds of local public agencies consider their groundwater management options, they will seek guidance from the existing ordinances and
special district legislation. In choosing from the available models, such
agencies should take care to avoid the drafting pitfalls identified in this
article.
comply with county of origin rules set forth in Water Code Sections 11128, 11460 and
10505." Id. at 1.
488. See supra notes 353-79, 380-402 and accompanying text.
489. Inyo County, Cal., Code § 7.01.071 (1980).
490. See supra note 197.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

In particular, local public agencies should address five matters
that can create absolutely unnecessary interpretive problems. First, define
precisely the groundwater basins, or portions thereof, subject to regulation. This is most important when there are basins that extend beyond the
political boundaries of the local public agency drafting the groundwater
management ordinance. Additional clarification may be needed to the
extent that multiple aquifers may exist in different layers underlying the
same surface parcel.
Second, avoid entirely provisions defining or banning "mining."
The term has no precise hydrological meaning. None of the efforts so far
has created a workable legal definition. In particular, the relationship
between "mining" and "overdrafting" has yet to be clarified adequately.
Ultimately, prevention of "overdraft" should adequately prevent "mining"
without unnecessarily complicating the analysis.
Third, when defining "overdraft," provide time and quantity units
for comparing extraction and replenishment rates. For greatest accuracy,
include the "temporary surplus" definition from Los Angeles v. San
Fernando. But add time and quantity units to more precisely define the
vague "safe yield" definition commonly used as a gloss on the Los Angeles
v.San Fernando"overdraft" definition. Moreover, ultimately, the ordinance
will have to recognize the hydrological interconnectedness of surface and
groundwater supplies, as ultimately, basin pumping involves either
withdrawals from storage or interception of surface flows.
Fourth, when regulating overdraft in a basin whose hydrological
boundaries extend beyond the local public agency's legal boundaries,
clarify the components of the extraction and replenishment equation. In
particular, define whether the equation includes pumping and replenishment that occurs in the portions of the hydrologically defined basin that
extend beyond the local public agency's legal boundaries.
Fifth, when regulating exports, include the Sierra Valley Act
"available supply"' definition as the exporter's principal burden.
Distinguish the legal consequences, if any, that attach to off-basin but indistrict appropriations, from those that attach to off-basin, out-of-district
appropriations.
B. Continued Need for State Legislative Guidance on Groundwater
Transfers
Prior to the enactment of AB 3030, those well intentioned county
efforts to regulate groundwater aimed to fill a major regulatory gap in
the state water resources scheme. The state's failure to prevent massive,

491. See supra note 446.

Summer 19941

GROUNDWATER EXPORT LEGISLATION

overpumping induced lowering of groundwater tables to sub-optimal
levels and triggered substantial concern in some communities.
In AB 3030, the legislature has taken a step forward toward filling
this gap. That act bases its scheme on local groundwater control. Local
control of groundwater management offers the opportunity to tailor
regulation to local conditions as determined by knowledgeable local
officials.492 At the same time, the substantial variations that have
resulted among the local ordinances present unnecessary confusion that
often bears no reasonable relationship to any legitimate local need. A
crazy quilt of local regulations now covers California groundwater
resources. The legal wrinkles of this quilt inhibit appropriate state wide
development of a critical resource. Such inhibition, of course, is no
accident. Rather, the local controls on groundwater export aim precisely
at preserving local use of what is perceived to be a local resource.4' In
so doing, they beg the question: to what extent are these groundwater
resources "local"?
Nowhere is the potential state wide impact of the crazy quilt local
regulatory scheme more pronounced than in the northern Sacramento
Valley groundwater basin. This basin is relatively groundwater rich.
Moreover, extractions can be moved relatively easily through existing
water conveyance facilities. As noted above, the 1991 Drought Water
Bank purchased over a quarter million acre-feet of "groundwater" from
this area.4' The groundwater was purchased to meet critical water uses
in other parts of the state. In negotiating the water transfers, the Drought
Water Bank was confronted potentially with addressing the various
export control ordinances.49 At the time, Modoc, Butte and Glenn
counties had their ordinances on the books. Since then, Tehama has
added its provision, while other counties may not be far behind. If the
drought were to continue, or other water shortages develop, the Drought
492. See supra note 19.
493. Even when purportedly aimed at ameliorating local environmental problems, the
local ordinances' almost uniform failure to regulate local pumping for local uses
demonstrates a preoccupation with preservation of local uses at the expense of uses in other
parts of the state.
494. As noted above, almost all of the water purchased came from surface water rights
held by those farmers or water agencies that also had access to groundwater. See supra note
29.
495. Of course, as noted earlier, Water Code section 1220(b), the only express legislative
authorization for Sacramento Valley groundwater export restrictions, does not apply to the
DWR. See supra note. Moreover, pre-AB 3030 purported local restrictions of DWR activities
face preemption challenges under the state constitution. To the extent, however, that AB
3030 now allows local export controls, such controls may now tie the Water Bank's hands.
In any event, whether pre-AB 3030 or post-AB 3030, and whether ultimately valid or not,
the local restrictions add an additional layer of uncertainty to the state's ability to respond
quickly in a state wide water emergency.
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Water Bank (or an equivalent public agency) may well have to negotiate
its way through a complex maze of ordinances, each with potentially
different definitions and substantive provisions. Each separate ordinance
is potentially as unintelligible as some of the existing versions. The
passage of A.B. 3030 has only increased the likelihood that such a crazy
quilt will arise to inhibit unnecessarily groundwater transfers.
At the very least, the legislature should bring some coherency to
these local legislative efforts by providing some uniform provisions
applicable to any local efforts to legislate groundwater transfer provisions. Local groundwater regulation authority does not excuse incoherence. Yet, absent some legislatively sanctioned set of core definitions and
substantive provisions, incoherence and inconsistency will likely result.
The best evidence for that is the current set of ordinances. Many of the
provisions are so vague as to be incomprehensible. Many of the
variations between the ordinances seem accidental, and not the result of
careful tailoring of law to local conditions or knowledge. If the legislature
wishes to continue to let local agencies manage this resource, let the local
agencies choose to tailor the details of the regulatory scheme, as
appropriate, to local conditions. The core concepts, definitions, and
procedures, and substantive restrictions should be uniform throughout
the state.
By enacting such a series of standard definitions and substantive
provisions, the legislature could still defer to local wisdom in deciding if
to regulate at all. If local authorities decide that regulation is needed, they
would still have great flexibility in choosing from among the set of
standard provisions the particular regulatory mix that will meet the local
needs. Such state created model legislation could avoid the incoherent
crazy quilt without sacrificing the supposed virtues of local expertise and
flexibility.
Ultimately, the current patchwork quilt of local groundwater
transfer regulation raises questions more profound than those caused by
the mere incoherence of definitions and substantive provisions. Rather,
the current crop of export control ordinances demonstrates a marked bias
in favor of groundwater uses in the areas of extraction. It is probably no
accident that the locally crafted groundwater management efforts have
generally not gone beyond export controls.4' State common law has
allowed appropriations whenever there was groundwater surplus to the
needs of overlying users. The export controls, often inelegantly, have
attempted to create two classes of appropriators: those exporting beyond
the regulating county's borders, and those using the water off-basin but
496. The recent Tehama "radius of influence" well-interference restriction is a notable
exception to the general pattern that local pumpers bear no burden of wise groundwater
use. See supra notes 410, 426-29 and accompanying text.
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in-county. The environmental consequences appear substantially identical
with both types of appropriations. By focusing on out-of-county
exporters, the counties can serve their parochial economic interests
without any political downside, as the restricted exporters may well not
be resident voters.49' Even if the exporters are residents, the ultimate
end users will not be.
In various circumstances, local conditions might justify some local
priority for in-district groundwater appropriations. For example, the
terms of sale of proposed water transfers may not adequately compensate
for third party economic effects. But the history of local groundwater
transfer regulation demonstrates no such fine tuning of market based
resource allocation decisions. Rather, the pattern demonstrated in the
local ordinances so far has been unilateral local retention of a resource
critical to the state's economy. Moreover, local regulation has largely
exempted all local users. Other than local economic and political
parochialism, nothing justifies requiring wise resource management only
of out of county appropriators.
Given the political differences between in-district and out-ofdistrict appropriators, it is likely that the current patterns favoring local
uses will continue in the crop of groundwater management ordinances
that can be expected under A.B. 3030. Given the widespread opposition
to centralized, state groundwater appropriation legislation, the legally
sanctioned balkanization of the state's groundwater resources likely will
continue at a greater pace under A.B. 3030. Ultimately, it will likely take
prolonged statewide water shortages, aggravated by drought, increasing
population, and restricted water markets, to change the political dynamic.
But, eventually, the people will have to determine the extent to which
groundwater surplus to the present needs of overlying users is a resource
available to all "the people of the state."4'

497. The best example of this is the Tehama ordinance's restrictions on the Myers' Seed
Company's attempts to pump water out of the county for use on the company's Colusa
County farm. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Indeed, this is economic parochialism taken one step further, since the Myers transfer will ultimately use the groundwater on
lands that overlie the same groundwater basin, albeit in a different county. Nevertheless,
it, and the Haleakala Farms transfer, demonstrate the arbitrariness of using "county" lines
to create artificial barriers to water use.
498. See Cal. Water Code § 104 (West 1971) (state's people have paramount interest in all
the state's water).

